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ABSTRACT 
Extensive studies and research have been conducted on insider threats, the possible 
causes, predictive models and best practices for prevention, early detection, and 
mitigation of the threats of insider attacks to a wide range of critical infrastructure, 
government agencies, and the private sector. Current research shows a great deal of 
attention directed at the cyber threats toward organizations. 
In contrast, relatively little research has been conducted on the insider threat with 
regard to financial fraud and embezzlement to organizations. Left undetected, insiders 
can cause irreparable and devastating consequences to private and public sector 
organizations, which compromise the integrity of the overall financial system. Recent 
criminal cases have revealed a disturbing trend linking many of the trusted insiders 
convicted of conducting fraud or embezzlement within the victim organizations to an 
addiction to gambling or prescription drugs. Also alarming is the frequency of trusted 
insiders conducting fraud within government agencies to support their addiction. This 
paper studies research on insider threats, and suggests that addiction is a contributing 
factor to the motives of the insiders’ criminal behaviors. Research also suggests that 
accurate reporting by law enforcement agencies is not occurring in police reports on 
motives or causes of the reasons insiders are committing their crimes. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Trusted insiders are committing fraud and embezzlement within 
organizations: Is there a connection to addiction, as the motivating factor 
for their illegal activities? 
Insider threats pose hazards to private industry, critical infrastructure, and government 
organizations. Threats include financial loss, security breaches, and a loss of confidence 
in the integrity and operations of all manner of institutions at which trusted insiders have 
access to controlled or restricted materials, including money. Research conducted on 
organizational insider threats and their possible causes have neglected a potentially useful 
aspect of investigation practices that could significantly mitigate the insider threat. 
Predictive modeling presented in this thesis proposes the creation of new means to 
mitigate threats of this nature. Current research directs a great deal of attention to cyber 
threats. Comparatively scant attention to an enduring, existing threat from insiders can be 
increased, and should have a high payoff in fraud and embezzlement prevention.  
To begin, compilation of evidence from 40 recent criminal fraud and 
embezzlement cases involving trusted insiders, from four U.S. Secret Service field offices 
in Louisville, Cincinnati, Memphis, and Nashville revealed a disturbing, yet useful trend: 
most of the trusted insiders convicted of fraud or embezzlement were also addicted to 
gambling or to pain prescription medication. This high correlation between fraud and 
addictive behavior is the basis for the recommendations in this study. All cases reviewed 
for this research were closed and adjudicated—the total number of white-collar 
perpetrators included in the study is forty-five. Even though the information can be 
readily obtained through questioning and during the course of routine investigation, 
motives for illegalities by trusted insiders committing fraud and embezzlement often are 
omitted as unnecessary. Since they are not required to include that information in the 
record, law enforcement officials are not properly and uniformly recording the motives of 
these criminals. Motives matter because, armed with these data that drive behavior, 
private, non-profit, as well as public sector organizations, and law enforcement can be in 
a better position to predict, and therefore prevent, insider crimes with increased efficacy. 
 xv 
Consider this histogram in Figure 1, which is based on 10 years of case studies. 
Numbers indicate clearly that fraud and embezzlement cases from the four Midwest 
Secret Service field offices are strongly linked with addictive behavior. It seems 
reasonable that this finding will hold true in other field offices across the country.  
 
Figure 1.   Secret Service Case Studies Showing Addiction Related Behavior in 23/45 
Insiders Convicted of Fraud or Embezzlement 
 
Given this obvious link between addictive-related behavior and white-collar 
crime, action is warranted. Approaching insider threat systematically requires a schema, 
and Dr. Donald Cressey provides a useful one.  
 
Figure 2.   Cressey Fraud Triangle 
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The fraud triangle includes three contributing factors that encompass most 
criminal embezzlement actions: pressure to commit the offense, opportunity to commit 
the offense, and an excuse to rationalize the illegal behavior. This combination of factors, 
when acted upon, can compromise the integrity of a company, or of the entire financial 
system even when a single individual has earned trust and unfettered access to sensitive 
materials. Also alarming is the frequency of trusted insiders conducting fraud and 
embezzlement within government agencies to support their addiction(s). This paper 
studies research on insider threats, and suggests that addiction is a contributing factor to 
the motives of the insiders’ criminal behavior. 
Understanding sources of pressure, and recognizing when opportunity exists can 
help organizations and law enforcement officials intervene effectively to curb fraud and 
embezzlement before it occurs. Alertness can come in the form of recognition using 
existing cases, and the improved recording of motive in future cases, and paying especial 
attention to those cases in which addictive behavior is present. 
Calculating the addiction rates for Americans is not an exact science; however, 
research indicates it is a significant cost to society. These statistics are collected in many 
ways by researchers; however, actual police statistics on reported crimes in which 
causality is a discernable item is clearly an area lacking a comprehensive method for 
accurate accounting. The lack of accurate statistics on the causality of crimes perpetrated 
because of an addiction is clearly an important measurement that researchers, 
criminologists, and homeland security officials should be able to capture. More 
compelling is the need for these same officials to be able to draw clear conclusions on 
accurate statistics surrounding causes and motives for not only fraud and embezzlement 
cases regarding trusted insiders, but additionally, all criminal acts reported to law 
enforcement. This lack of accurate reporting on causes and motives for criminal behavior 
indicates serious gaps in the overall crime reporting in this country, and a gap analysis 
including the comprehensive examination of motivating causes of crime, to include 
addiction is warranted.  
Ultimately, what this study proposes is a multi-faceted approach to insider threats: 
accurate recording of motive in criminal cases, and promulgation of those reports to U.S. 
 xvii 
law enforcement and homeland security stakeholders charged with the task of reducing 
insider threats. Specifically, knowledge afforded by this research indicates that the 
following entities should take specific actions:  
 U.S. SECRET SERVICE 
Initially, future research should begin with the author’s own agency, the U.S. 
Secret Service (USSS). As indicated in this thesis, the USSS investigates thousands of 
financial crimes cases each year, and more specifically, investigates hundreds of cases 
under the category of fraud, embezzlement and miss-appropriation, which is most closely 
aligned to trusted insiders committing fraud and embezzlement within organizations.  
The USSS would be an excellent federal agency to conduct an in-depth case 
review of all its closed fraud, embezzlement, and misappropriation cases investigated in 
the last five years, to determine and document the trusted insiders’ motive or causality of 
the criminal behavior. The USSS could take the lead in research as a federal agency 
under the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) that has a primary mandate to 
investigate complex financial crimes cases. The USSS could provide a comprehensive 
analysis of causation and motives for trusted insiders committing fraud and 
embezzlement against organizations. This documentation could provide valuable data to 
researchers on the ausation of financial crimes cases. This information would also 
provide an opportunity to determine what if any effect addiction plays in determining 
insider’s motive for conducting their illegal activity.  
 KENTUCKY STATE POLICE 
The Kentucky State Police (KSP) is the primary police records retention and 
reporting agency for the Commonwealth of Kentucky. KSP would be an excellent state 
agency to take on the role of requiring its 400 city and county law enforcement agencies 
to document and record the causality and motives of crimes committed in Kentucky. KSP 
could serve as a model for other state police agencies that also record and provide police 




 FBI AND DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Uniform Crime Report, as well 
as the National Incident-Based Reporting System, should require law enforcement 
agencies to report causality and motives of criminal offenses in police reports. This 
information plays a key role in understanding not only why criminals are committing 
crime but also provides law enforcement agencies’ and researchers’ insight into how 
much addiction plays a role in criminal behavior. 
Finally, people are an organization’s greatest asset and most critical vulnerability. 
The key to reducing fraud and embezzlement is recognizing that all organizations must 
consider the very real challenge of defending against the insider threat with at least the 
level of attention paid to external threats. Prevention, detection, and mitigation strategies 
are paramount for any organization to have in place before the insider attack occurs. 
Excellent programs are available to organizations for training and education on the 
insider threat. A number of programs already exist concerning best practices that 
organizations of all sizes should adhere to and incorporate as a part of their internal 
security policies and procedures regarding potential insider compromises. 
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A. BACKGROUND AND PROBLEM SPACE  
In 2009, a former mid-level tax office manager for the District of Columbia was 
convicted of issuing $48 million in bogus property tax refunds for herself and her co-
conspirators, who included family, friends, and a collusive bank manager. Described as 
the largest and longest-running embezzlement scheme in the city’s history, investigation 
revealed that loopholes in software and lax internal controls had allowed her to carry on 
undetected for nearly two decades.1 Until her arrest, this trusted insider was a 26-year tax 
employee operating inside of her organization. “She was known among her colleagues as 
a problem solver with a knack for finding solutions by using the department’s antiquated 
and balky[sic] computers or finding a way around them.”2 According to the head of the 
tax office, “The system had in place a plethora of internal controls as well as a number of 
manual controls, but you are always vulnerable to an enterprising employee who knows 
how the controls work.”3 
Although she apologized for her conduct, the insider continued to display the 
confidence of a woman who managed to steal $48.1 million in fraudulent tax refunds 
before she was caught. “If you put me back in there today,” she told a federal judge, “I 
could get each of you a check.” The United States (U.S.) Attorney for the District of 
Columbia stated, “Many people think white-collar crime is a victimless crime, and it is 
not.” “It may take years to recover from this.” The former tax office manager has 
admitted that she exploited lax oversight in the tax office to issue more than 230 
fraudulent property tax refund checks to friends and co-conspirators starting in 1989. 
Between 2000 and 2007, her most prolific period, she issued 152 fraudulent refund 
1 Ashley Southall, “17-Year Term for Official in Tax Scam,” New York Times, July 1, 2009, sec. U.S., 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/01/us/01embezzle.html. 
2 Christian W. Probst et al., “Aspects of Insider Threats,” in Insider Threats in Cyber Security, ed. 
Christian W. Probst et al., Advances in Information Security 49, Springer U.S., 1–15, 2010, http://link. 
springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-4419-7133-3_1. 
3 Dan Keating, “Tax Suspect’s Guidance on Software Left D.C. at Risk,” Washington Post, June sec. 
Metro, 10, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/06/09/AR20080609 
02879_2.html. 
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checks worth $42 million. During this same time frame, investigators discovered that this 
trusted insider also gambled heavily, and made 45 trips to Las Vegas and Atlantic City.4 
Her lawyer said that she had a substance abuse and gambling addiction.5 
This story, sensational in its severity and financial impact to the taxpayers of the 
District of Columbia, is unfortunately not unusual. Fraud and embezzlement committed 
by trusted insiders within organizations have been in existence as long as money has been 
moving through businesses.6 What is compelling about the former DC tax office manager 
is that she operated at a high degree of competence for a prolonged period of time, with a 
substance abuse and gambling addiction as a primary motivating factor for her illegal 
activity.7  
Fraud is defined as deceit, trickery, or breach of confidence or trust perpetrated 
for profit or to gain some unfair or dishonest advantage.8 To embezzle is to appropriate 
fraudulently to one’s own use, as money or property entrusted to one’s care.9 An “insider 
threat” is a term that can be defined as an individual, and more broadly, the danger posed 
by an individual who possesses legitimate access and occupies a position of trust within 
the infrastructure or institution being targeted.10 An “insider attack” is when the 
4 Del Quentin Wilber, “Tax Scam Leader Gets More Than 17 Years,” Washington Post, sec. Metro, 
July 1, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/30/AR2009063001 
652.html?sid=ST2008091700125. 
5 John Metcalfe, “Rita Crundwell vs. Harriette Walters: Who Embezzled Better?,” The Atlantic Cities, 
April 18, 2012, http://www.theatlanticcities.com/neighborhoods/2012/04/rita-crundwell-vs-harriette-
walters-who-embezzled-best/1797/. 
6 Gary S. Green, “White-Collar Crime and the Study of Embezzlement,” Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science 525 (January 1, 1993): 95–106. 
7 Probst et al., “Aspects of Insider Threats.” 
8 “Fraud,” accessed January 20, 2014, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/fraud?show= 
0&t=1390187912. 
9 “Embezzle,” accessed January 20, 2014, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/embezzle. 
10 Richard Brackney and Robert Andersen, “Understanding the Insider Threat: Proceedings of a March 
2004 Workshop R. Understanding the Insider Threat: Proceedings of a March 2004 Workshop,” in 
Proceedings of a March 2004 Workshop (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2004), http://www. 
rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/conf_proceedings/2005/RAND_CF196.pdf. 
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individual who occupies a position of trust or authorization within an organization 
executes a prohibited or illegal action against it.11 
1. Motives Matter When It Comes to Fraud and Embezzlement 
After an organization discovers that it has been victimized by a trusted insider 
who has committed a financial crime against it, inevitably, the questions asked are always 
the same: Why did they do it? What motivated the individual to cause so much harm to 
the organization and in the end to themselves, their families, and in some cases, the 
communities they live in? Was it greed alone or does an individual commit financial 
fraud or embezzlement within an organization for other reasons? What drives them to 
breach the trust of their employer, was it a character flaw within the individual or simply 
a crime of opportunity? What propels a person to cross the line from trusted employee 
and friend to embezzler? The organizations themselves are faced with recovering from 
the forfeiture of trust, as well as the significant loss of financial resources. Executives and 
fellow co-workers in the victim organizations predictably question themselves and ask 
how did they miss reading the clues of dishonesty and deception with a trusted employee 
who once held their trust and confidence.  
Unfortunately, one of the realities of studying insider threats to organizations in 
which fraud and embezzlement have occurred is the lack of detailed documented motives 
in police reports and investigations as to why the insider committed their illegal 
activities.12 Further complicating the accuracy of knowing the motives behind insider 
criminal behavior is the availability of statistical data from the Uniformed Crime Report 
published every year by the Department of Justice.13  
11 Dawn Cappelli, Andrew P. Moore, and Timothy J. Shimeall, Common Sense Guide to Prevention 
and Detection of Insider Threats (Pittsburgh, PA: Carnegie Mellon University Cy Lab, July 2006). 
12 Jennifer N. Arthur, Robert J. Williams, and Yale D. Belanger, “The Relationship Between Legal 
Gambling and Crime in Alberta1,” Canadian Journal of Criminology & Criminal Justice 56, no. 1 (January 
2014): 49–84, doi:10.3138/cjccj.2012.E51. 
13 “Summary of the Uniform Crime Reporting Program,” accessed March 7, 2014, http://nationalatlas. 
gov/articles/people/a_crimereport.html#two. 
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2. Facing the Trusted Insider 
All organizations face the problem of an insider threat occurring within its 
boundaries. Private sector, public sector, and non-profit organizations are all susceptible 
to a trusted employee or individual operating legitimately within the safe working 
environment of the industry or sector affected who conduct themselves in illegitimate and 
illegal ways that can harm the organization.14 Insider attacks also take on many different 
forms, from fraud and embezzlement to theft of intellectual property, espionage, and all 
variations of information technology (IT) misuse.15 Cyber crime reports in the media and 
through other sources are a constant reminder that these events are publicly reported, and 
in fact, can have significant financial ramifications, as well as immeasurable damaging 
effects to an entity’s reputation and stability of its workforce.16 Left undetected, insiders 
can cause irreparable and devastating consequences to private and public sector 
organizations that compromise the integrity of the overall financial system, and therefore, 




14 Dawn M. Cappelli, Andrew P. Moore, and Randall F. Trzeciak, The CERT Guide to Insider 
Threats: How to Prevent, Detect, and Respond to Information Technology Crimes (Theft, Sabotage, 
Fraud), 1st ed. (Boston, MA: Addison-Wesley Professional, Part of the SEI Series in Software Engineering 
Series, 2012). 
15 Frank L. Greitzer et al., “Combating the Insider Cyber Threat,” IEEE Security Privacy 6, no. 1 
(January/February 2008): 61–64, doi:10.1109/MSP.2008.8. 
16 Dawn M. Cappelli et al., “Common Sense Guide to Prevention and Detection of Insider Threat, 3rd 
Edition—Version 3.1.” Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellon University and CyLab, 2009, 
http://www.cert.org/archive/pdf/CSG-V3.pdf. 
17 Adam Cummings et al., “Insider Threat Study: Illicit Cyber Activity Involving Fraud in the U.S. 
Financial Services Sector,” Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellon University and CyLab, 2012, 
http://repository.cmu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1688&context=sei; R. Ladouceur et al., “Social Cost 
of Pathological Gambling,” Journal of Gambling Studies 10, no. 4 (1994): 399–409. 
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3. Can Addiction Be a Motivating Factor for Committing Fraud and 
Embezzlement?  
Research suggests that a gambling addiction,18 an addiction to pain prescription 
medication,19 and an enhanced lifestyle may be an indicator of an insider threat to an 
organization.20 From a homeland security perspective, government organizations and 
related private sector agencies are also at risk to insider threats from individuals 
conducting fraud or embezzlement with addiction behaviors.21 This claim is supported by 
behavioral research case studies, which have indicated that a relationship exists between 
insiders conducting fraud and embezzlement, and addiction to gambling or pain 
prescription medication.22  
Recent criminal cases have revealed a disturbing pattern linking many of the 
trusted insiders with an addiction to gambling or prescription drugs as the motivating 
factor for perpetrating embezzlement or fraud against victim organizations.23 Also 
alarming is the frequency of trusted insiders conducting fraud and embezzlement within 
18 Alex Blaszczynski, Neil McConaghy, and Anna Frankova, “Crime, Antisocial Personality and 
Pathological Gambling,” Journal of Gambling Behavior 5, no. 2 (June 1, 1989): 137–52, doi:10.1007/ 
BF01019760. 
19 Stephen J. Ziegler and Nicholas P. Lovrich, “Pain Relief, Prescription Drugs, and Prosecution: A 
Four-State Survey of Chief Prosecutors,” The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 31, no. 1 (2003): 75–100, 
doi:10.1111/j.1748-720X.2003.tb00060.x. 
20 Green, “White-Collar Crime and the Study of Embezzlement.” 
21 Richard J. Frances, Sheldon I. Miller, and Avram H. Mack, Clinical Textbook of Addictive 
Disorders (New York: Guilford Press, 2005), 234–236; National Research Council, Pathological 
Gambling: A Critical Review, Committee on the Social and Economic Impact of Pathological Gambling, 
Committee on Law and Justice, Commission on Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education 
(Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1999), 3–26. 
22 Jay Albanese, “White Collar Crimes and Casino Gambling: Looking for Empirical Links to 
Forgery, Embezzlement, and Fraud,” Crime, Law & Social Change 49, no. 5 (June 2008): 333–47, 
doi:10.1007/s10611-008-9113-9; Virgil W. Peterson, “Why Honest People Steal,” Journal of Criminal Law 
and Criminology 38, no. 2, art. 2 (1947): 94–103. 
23 Southall, “17-Year Term for Official in Tax Scam”; Bryan Smith, “Rita Crundwell and the Dixon 
Embezzlement,” Chicago Magazine, December 2012, http://www.chicagomag.com/Chicago-Magazine/ 
December-2012/Rita-Crundwell-and-the-Dixon-Embezzlement/; Associated Press, “Tulsa Fires Athletic 
Director over Gambling Probe,” December 4, 2012, http://bigstory.ap.org/article/tulsa-fires-athletic-
director-over-gambling-probe; USDOJ, “Convention Center’s Former Executive Director Sentenced to 24 
Months in Prison for Embezzlement,” U.S. Attorney’s Office—Western District of Kentucky, June 7, 2012, 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/kyw/news/2012/20120607-01.html. 
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government agencies to finance and support their addiction.24 Many of these trusted 
government employees who have committed illegal activities have had access to sensitive 
information concerning their particular municipalities, and in some cases, have had 
access to some of this nation’s most guarded secrets and intelligence programs, which 
when revealed compromises the reputation and integrity of their oaths of office, and 
potentially, national security.25 
The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners announced in its “2012 Annual 
Report to the Nations” that workplace fraud costs a typical organization five percent of its 
annual revenue. “Applied to the estimated 2011 Gross World Product, this figure 
translates to a potential projected global fraud loss of more than $3.5 trillion.” The 
median loss caused by the occupational fraud cases in the study was $140,000. More than 
one-fifth of these cases caused losses of at least $1 million.26 It is estimated that the costs 
of white-collar crime in the United States may reach as much as $1 trillion annually.27 
“The 2012 Marquet Report on Embezzlement” shows that the number of major 
embezzlements in the United States has increased significantly in a recent two-year 
period. The average size of the reported losses in the reviewed cases also increased at a 
rate of $1.4 million in 2012 compared with an average of $750,000 in 2011. According to 
24 Metcalfe, “Rita Crundwell vs. Harriette Walters: Who Embezzled Better?”; Robert Patrick, “Former 
Brentwood Official Admits Embezzling Money, Gambling It Away,” Stltoday.com, June 29, 2011, 
http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/former-brentwood-official-admits-embezzling-
money-gambling-it-away/article_210f8282-a269-11e0-84b8-0019bb30f31a.html; Terry Collins, “Calif. 
Politician Pleads Guilty to Misusing Funds,” Associated Press, accessed September 30, 2013, http://big 
story.ap.org/article/ex-n-calif-politician-pleads-guilty-felonies; Elliot Spagat, “Ex-San Diego Mayor’s 
Gambling Wagers Top $1B,” Associated Press, accessed September 30, 2013, http://bigstory.ap.org/ 
article/ex-san-diego-mayor-faces-money-laundering-charge. 
25 Nolan Clay, “Ex-FBI Agent in Oklahoma Gets Six Months in Prison for Embezzling,” 
NewsOK.com, accessed March 14, 2014, http://newsok.com/ex-fbi-agent-in-oklahoma-gets-six-months-in-
prison-for-embezzling/article/3738422; Larry Lebowitz, “Ex-FBI Agent Sentenced to Five Years in 
Prison,” Sun Sentinel, November 24, 1998, http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/1998-11-24/news/9811240441 
_1_sentence-sullivan-s-role-gambling-debts; Associated Press in Washington, “U.S. Nuclear Commander 
Tim Giardina Fired Amid Gambling Investigation,” The Guardian, October 9, 2013, http://www.theguar 
dian.com/world/2013/oct/09/us-nuclear-commander-tim-giardina-fired-amid-gambling-investigation. 
26 “2012 Report to the Nations—Key Findings and Highlights,” accessed January 17, 2014, 
http://www.acfe.com/rttn-highlights.aspx. 
27 Laurie L. Ragatz, William Fremouw, and Edward Baker, “The Psychological Profile of White-
collar Offenders Demographics, Criminal Thinking, Psychopathic Traits, and Psychopathology,” Criminal 
Justice and Behavior 39, no. 7 (July 1, 2012): 978–97, doi:10.1177/0093854812437846. 
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the study, “Gambling and substance abuse was a clear motivating factor in driving some 
major embezzlement cases.”28 
It is important to be able to better detect insiders within organizations who have a 
predisposition to an addiction to gambling or pain prescription medication.29 Research 
and recent criminal cases suggests a connection between insider threats and addiction as a 
motivating factor and cause of illegal activities perpetrated by trusted insiders, as well as 
providing a compelling impetus for further case study into this phenomenon. 
Within the broad parameters of the insider threat, extensive studies and research 
have been conducted that have focused primarily on cyber-attacks, IT, espionage, and 
intellectual property theft. A growing knowledge base is available, which defines 
possible causes, predictive models, and best practices for mitigation.30 However, within 
the comprehensive research that has been published on the insider threat, less attention 
has been placed on the narrower focus of insider fraud and embezzlement cases in which 
the trusted insiders were motivated by the need to finance and support an addiction as the 
primary reason for conducting their illegal activity within the victim organization. 
This study addresses the connection between insider fraud and embezzlement 
cases to individuals with addictive personality behaviors, specifically, gambling and pain 
medication addiction. It examines the connection to addiction with regard to insider fraud 
and embezzlement as a financial motivator for committing crime within organizations. It 
also asserts that many contributing factors cause insider threats to organizations; 
however, it is suggested that addiction plays a determining factor in many criminal cases 
28 Marquet International, Ltd., “The 2012 Marquet Report on Embezzlement: A White Collar Fraud 
Study of Major Embezzlement Cases Active in the U.S. in 2012,” May 14, 2013, http://www.marquetinter 
national.com/pdf/the_2012_marquet_report_on_embezzlement.pdf. 
29 David M. Ledgerwood et al., “Clinical Features and Treatment Prognosis of Pathological Gamblers 
with and Without Recent Gambling‐Related Illegal Behavior,” Journal of the American Academy of 
Psychiatry and the Law Online 35, no. 3 (September 1, 2007): 294–301; Nady el-Guebaly et al., 
“Compulsive Features in Behavioral Addictions: The Case of Pathological Gambling,” Addiction 107, no. 
10 (October 2012): 1726–1734, doi:10.1111/j.1360-0443.2011.03546.x. 
30 Andrew Moore et al., “A Preliminary Model of Insider Theft of Intellectual Property,” Software 
Engineering Institute, June 1, 2011, http://repository.cmu.edu/sei/726; George Silowash et al., “Common 
Sense Guide to Mitigating Insider Threats, 4th Edition,” Software Engineering Institute, December 1, 2012, 
http://repository.cmu.edu/sei/677; Cappelli, Moore, and Trzeciak, The CERT Guide to Insider Threats: 
How to Prevent, Detect, and Respond to Information Technology Crimes (Theft, Sabotage, Fraud).. 
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of fraud and embezzlement conducted by trusted insiders and focuses on addiction as a 
motivating factor, primarily due to time and space restrictions for this paper. It is argued 
that this phenomenon is underreported in law enforcement investigations, and the 
Uniformed Crime Report, and may be occurring more frequently than is conveyed. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
Trusted insiders are committing fraud and embezzlement within organizations: Is 
there a connection to addiction as the motivating factor for their illegal activities?  
C. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
A review of the literature clearly indicates that organizations are vulnerable to 
insider threats.31 The trusted insider with ill intent who has access to information, 
systems, and facilities is capable of doing significant damage to an organization.32 The 
literature also indicates that trusted insiders who have an addiction or a predisposition to 
addictive behaviors are susceptible to conducting illegal actions to finance and support 
the addiction.33 However, literature regarding threats to organizations caused by trusted 
insiders conducting fraud and embezzlement because of an addiction is scarce. Further, 
when it comes to reporting whether the insider was addicted to gambling or pain 
prescription medication, data is lacking regarding the amount of criminal activity being 
reported by law enforcement agencies concerning the motives for fraud and 
embezzlement cases conducted by insiders.34 This study contributes to the existing 
research on insider threats to organizations and helps bridge gaps with regard to the 
31 Cappelli, Moore, and Trzeciak, The CERT Guide to Insider Threats: How to Prevent, Detect, and 
Respond to Information Technology Crimes (Theft, Sabotage, Fraud); Green, “White-Collar Crime and the 
Study of Embezzlement”; Joseph T. Wells, Corporate Fraud Handbook: Prevention and Detection 
(Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2011). 
32 Greitzer et al., “Combating the Insider Cyber Threat”; Marissa R. Randazzo et al., Insider Threat 
Study: Illicit Cyber Activity in the Banking and Finance Sector (Pittsburg, PA: Software Engineering 
Institute, June 2005). 
33 National Gambling Impact Study Commission, Final Report (Washington, DC: Impact Study 
Commission, June 1999); Donald R. Cressey, Other People’s Money; A Study in the Social Psychology of 
Embezzlement (Montclair, NJ: Patterson Smith, 1973); Henry R. Lesieur, “Gambling, Pathological 
Gambling and Crime,” in Handbook on Pathological Gambling, ed. Thomas Galski (Springfield, IL: 
Charles C. Thomas, 1987), 89–110. 
34 Arthur, Williams, and Belanger, “The Relationship Between Legal Gambling and Crime in 
Alberta1.” 
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limited reporting of addiction as a motive for the causation of fraud and embezzlement 
cases by insiders’ being reported to and by law enforcement. 
D. METHODOLOGY 
This research focuses on individuals—”trusted insiders”—within organizations 
who have committed fraud or embezzlement against an organization. The research 
determines what, if any, connection the insiders’ motivation for committing the offense 
was due to an addiction. A hybrid research methodology employing case studies 
exercising both qualitative and quantitative features is used. 
E. ORGANIZATION OF THIS RESEARCH 
First, 40 recently closed and adjudicated fraud and embezzlement criminal cases 
involving 45 convicted insiders investigated by the U.S. Secret Service (USSS) in the 
Louisville, Cincinnati, Memphis, and Nashville Field Offices are reviewed.35 The 
objective of this research was to determine if addiction or addictive actions played a role 
or contributed to the motivating factors by the insiders’ for committing their illegal 
activities. USSS fraud and embezzlement cases were chosen because of the close 
association that a trusted insider plays in committing these types of crimes within 
organizations.  
Next, the results of research conducted by the Software Engineering Institute at 
Carnegie Mellon University Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) Program are 
examined. CERT completed data research on 680 insider threat cases currently in their 
database to determine if addiction or addictive behaviors were a contributing factor to the 
35 Ten recently closed criminal cases each from the above four Secret Service Field Offices are 
reviewed, with 45 convicted insiders from the 40 closed criminal cases reviewed. Only information 
provided by the closed criminal case files was reviewed by the writer who had unrestricted access to the 
information contained in the closed case reports as the Special Agent in Charge of the U.S. Secret Service 
Louisville Field Office. No personally identifiable information (PII) information of the convicted insiders 
was used in this review, unless it was from published open source media reports. 
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convicted insider’s’ motives for conducting their illegal activity.36 The research is then 
evaluated, conclusions drawn, and recommendations provided for further research and 
review of insiders committing fraud and embezzlement in organizations due to addiction-
related characteristics. 
 
36 Currently, the CERT Program has over 700 documented cases of malicious insiders convicted in a 
U.S. court of law for criminal violations regarding illegal insider activity involving some form of critical IT 
services. The current cases in the insider threat database involve insider incidents from 1996 to the present. 
The following are the sources of information CERT used to code insider threat cases: public sources of 
information include media reports, court documents, and publications. Non-public sources of information 
include law enforcement investigations, organization investigations, interviews with victim organizations 
and convicted insiders. No PII information of individuals in the Insider Threat database is disclosed or 
published by CERT. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Since June 2013, the world became fixated on a former National Security Agency 
(NSA) “trusted insider,” by the name of Edward Snowden, who began releasing 
damaging secrets of NSA spying activities on American citizens, world leaders, and 
others, in a global tale of intrigue that would be the largest intelligence leak in the 
agency’s history. The U.S. government was once again caught off guard by one of its 
own, who using IT, revealed some of the nation’s most highly protected secrets. 
Snowden’s motives for doing so appear to be purely ideological in nature.37 However, 
ideology is not the only reason, or even the most important reason, an individual may 
become an insider threat. 
In a criminal case that involved a highly esteemed, “trusted insider” who also 
garnered worldwide media attention in 2013, the former mayor of San Diego, admitted 
that she took $2.1 million from her late husband’s charitable foundation in a decade-long 
gambling spree when she wagered more than $1 billion. “The former Mayor was a 
selfless public official who contributed much to the well-being of San Diego,” said the 
U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of California. “However, no figure, regardless of 
how much good they’ve done or how much they’ve given to charity can escape criminal 
liability with impunity.”38 The trusted insider’s’ motive for conducting her illegal activity 
was due to a gambling addiction.39 San Diego is the seventh largest city in the United 
States and is home to numerous U.S. military bases.40 
Insider attacks have occurred across all public, private and non-profit sectors, 
which cause significant damage to the affected organizations. These acts have ranged 
37 Glenn Greenwald, “Edward Snowden: The Whistleblower Behind the NSA Surveillance 
Revelations|World News,” The Guardian, June 9, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/09/ 
edward-snowden-nsa-whistleblower-surveillance. 
38 Spagat, “Ex-San Diego Mayor’s Gambling Wagers Top $1B.” 
39 Ibid. 
40 “San Diego, California—City Information, Fast Facts, Schools, Colleges, and More,” accessed May 
27, 2014, http://www.citytowninfo.com/places/california/san-diego. 
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from less technical attacks, such as fraud and embezzlement or theft of proprietary 
information, to technically sophisticated cybercrimes that sabotage the entire 
organization.41 “Damages are not only financial, but can also include severe impact to the 
organization’s reputation, resulting from widespread public reporting of the event.”42  
During the past three decades, the U.S. government and the private sector have 
made a significant investment in the study of behavioral risk indicators associated with 
espionage, sabotage, and threats to IT systems associated with an employee.43 Thirty 
years ago, it was reported in Americans Who Spied Against Their Country Since World 
War II that the most significant risk to national security was associated with the employee 
who was on the inside, and not the result of actions conducted by “secret agents from 
foreign governments.”44 
Today, organizations are growing in understanding that the insider threat is real 
and all sectors are potential targets of a trusted insider operating legitimately within the 
borders of the enterprise. A growing field of research analyzes the insider threat with 
extensive studies focused on espionage, sabotage, theft of intellectual property and 
threats to IT systems.45 A developing knowledge base is available from numerous 
academic researchers and practitioners, which defines possible causes, probable motives, 
predictive models, and best practices for mitigating the threats of insider attacks to a wide 
41 Michelle Keeney et al., Insider Threat Study: Computer System Sabotage in Critical Infrastructure 
Sectors (Pittsburgh, PA: U.S. Secret Service and CERT Coordination Center, Carnegie Mellon Software 
Engineering Institute, 2005). 
42 Cappelli et al., Common Sense Guide to Prevention and Detection of Insider Threats. 
43 Michael G. Gelles, David L. Brant, and Brian Geffert, “Building A Secure Workforce: Guard 
Against Insider Threat,” Deloitte Federal Government Services, 2008, https://www.deloitte.com/ 
assets/Dcom-UnitedStates/Local%20Assets/Documents/us_ps_insiderthreat_100108.pdf. 
44 Suzanne Wood and Martin F. Wiskoff, Americans Who Spied Against Their Country Since World 
War II (Monterey, CA: Defense Personnel Security Research Center, 1992). 
45 Eric Cole and Sandra Ring, Insider Threat: Protecting the Enterprise from Sabotage, Spying, and 
Theft: Protecting the Enterprise from Sabotage, Spying, and Theft (Maryland Heights, MO: Syngress, 
2005); Moore et al., “A Preliminary Model of Insider Theft of Intellectual Property”; Steven Band et al., 
“Comparing Insider IT Sabotage and Espionage: A Model-Based Analysis|SEI Digital Library,” Software 
Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellon University, 2006, http://resources.sei.cmu.edu/library/asset-
view.cfm?assetid=8163#. 
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range of the nation’s critical infrastructure, government agencies, and the private 
sector.46  
In contrast to the emerging body of study on IT threats, less research has been 
conducted on the insider threat posed by financial fraud and embezzlement to 
organizations caused by addiction as a motivating factor or primary cause for the insider 
attack. Recent criminal cases have revealed a disturbing pattern linking many of the 
insiders perpetrating fraud or embezzlement, with an addiction to gambling or 
prescription drugs.47 Also alarming is the frequency of trusted insiders conducting fraud 
or embezzlement within government agencies to support their addiction.48 Left 
undetected, insiders with an addiction can cause permanent and destructive consequences 
to private, public, and non-profit sector organizations, potentially bankrupting, 
demoralizing, and possibly, compromising the soundness and strength of the overall 
financial system of the United States or even impacting national security.49  
It is important for homeland security officials to take note and study insider threat 
cases at all levels of government, as well as the private sector. This literature review is a 
critical examination of the relevant literature on the issue of the insider threat along with 
addiction as a motivating factor. It begins with defining insider threat, reviews what the 
scope of the insider threat is, examines studies completed on insider threats, and analyzes 
46 Randazzo et al., Insider Threat Study: Illicit Cyber Activity in the Banking and Finance Sector; 
Cummings et al., “Insider Threat Study: Illicit Cyber Activity Involving Fraud in the U.S. Financial 
Services Sector”; Cappelli, Moore, and Trzeciak, The CERT Guide to Insider Threats: How to Prevent, 
Detect, and Respond to Information Technology Crimes (Theft, Sabotage, Fraud). 
47 Southall, “17-Year Term for Official in Tax Scam”; John Schriffen, “Ex-Comptroller Faces Jail in 
$53M Scam,” ABC News, November 15, 2012, http://abcnews.go.com/Business/comptroller-rita-
crundwell-pleads-guilty-stealing-53m-illinois/story?id=17723699; Cynthia R. Fagen, “Twisted Sister in 
Nun Jail,” New York Post, November 13, 2011, http://www.nypost.com/p/news/local/twisted_sister_in_ 
nun_jail_gZfMQUNa031kduaErl9htM; USDOJ, “Convention Center’s Former Executive Director 
Sentenced to 24 Months in Prison for Embezzlement.” 
48 Metcalfe, “Rita Crundwell vs. Harriette Walters: Who Embezzled Better?”; Patrick, “Former 
Brentwood Official Admits Embezzling Money, Gambling It Away”; Joseph De Avila, “Financial Scandal 
Strains Community in Winsted, Conn.,” October 16, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142 
4052702304561004579137440704100238?KEYWORDS=+embezzlement+and+gambling+. 
49 Associated Press, “Retired Colonel Sentenced for Embezzling Millions,” KTVK Azfamily.com, 
March 28, 2012, http://www.azfamily.com/news/Retired-colonel-sentenced-for-embezzling-millions-
144694985.html; Associated Press in Washington, “U.S. Nuclear Commander Tim Giardina Fired Amid 
Gambling Investigation”; Lebowitz, “Ex-FBI Agent Sentenced to Five Years in Prison.” 
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related research on addiction, specifically, in the areas of gambling and pain prescription 
medication in which insiders conducted fraud and embezzlement to support their 
addictive behaviors. 
The literature concludes with possible preventative measures, identification, and 
insider threat mitigation strategies. The review suggests that further scientific case studies 
on insiders who have committed fraud or embezzlement because of addiction as a 
primary motivator is warranted. The literature indicates that motives and causation of 
crime is not captured in police reports and through the Uniformed Crime Report 
regarding individuals committing crime due to an addiction. The literature suggests that a 
connection between insider threats and insiders with addiction or addictive behavior traits 
exists, and may provide a compelling impetus for further case study of this phenomenon, 
which is what this paper intends to demonstrate. 
B. INSIDER THREATS DEFINED 
The literature shows that the definition of “insider” and “insider threat” has 
evolved over the years and varies depending on the context in which it is used. According 
to one researcher, even the definitions of insider can be contradictory.50 For example, a 
RAND report defines an insider as “an already trusted person with access to sensitive 
information and information systems.”51 Elsewhere in the report it defines an insider as 
“someone with access and privilege, or knowledge of information and systems,” and 
omits the need for that person to be trusted.52  
Matt Bishop and Carrie Gates believe that an insider is an individual who has 
“access, knowledge and trust” within an organization.53 John Patzakis defines the insider 
50 Matt Bishop and Carrie Gates, “Defining the Insider Threat” (presented at the Fourth Annual Cyber 
Security and Information Intelligence Research Workshop, Davis, CA: ACM Press, 2008), 1, 
doi:10.1145/1413140.1413158. 
51 Brackney and Andersen, “Understanding the Insider Threat: Proceedings of a March 2004 
Workshop R. Understanding the Insider Threat: Proceedings of a March 2004 Workshop.” 
52 Ibid., 10. 
53 Matt Bishop et al., “A Risk Management Approach to the ‘Insider Threat,’” in Insider Threats in 
Cyber Security, ed. Christian W. Probst et al., Advances in Information Security 49 (Springer U.S., 2010), 
116–117, http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-4419-7133-3_6. 
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as, “anyone operating inside the security perimeter,” but ignores trust and knowledge of 
the systems.54 Dawn Cappelli et al. defines the insider as “a current or former employee, 
contractor, or other business partner who has or had authorized access to an 
organization’s network, system, or data and intentionally exceeded or misused that access 
in a manner that negatively affected the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the 
organization’s information or information systems.”55 
Thomas Noonan and Edmund Archuleta, in their report from “The National 
Infrastructure Advisory Council,” defines the insider threat to critical infrastructures as, 
“one or more individuals with the access and/or inside knowledge of a company, 
organization, or enterprise that would allow them to exploit the vulnerabilities of that 
entity’s security, systems, services, products, or facilities with the intent to cause 
harm.”56 Frank L. Greitzer et al. refers to the insider threat as “harmful acts that trusted 
individuals might carry out; for example, something that causes harm to the organization, 
or an unauthorized act that benefits the individual. The insider threat is manifested when 
human behaviors depart from established policies, regardless of whether it results from 
malice or disregard for security policies.”57 
Jeffrey Hunker and Christian Probst provide the definition of an insider from a 
2008 cross-disciplinary workshop on Countering Insider Threats, “as a person that has 
been legitimately empowered with the right to access, represent, or decide about one or 
more assets of the organization’s structure.” Although minor contradictions occur in the 
54 John Patzakis, “IRBestPractices.pdf,” Guidance Software, September 2003, http://faculty.usfsp.edu/ 
gkearns/Articles_Fraud/IRBestPractices.pdf. 
55 Cappelli et al., Common Sense Guide to Prevention and Detection of Insider Threats. 
56 Thomas Noonan and Edmund G. Archuleta, “The National Infrastructure Advisory Council’s Final 
Report and Recommendations on–The Insider Threat to Critical Infrastructures,” Department of Homeland 
Security, April 8, 2008, 11. http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/niac/niac_insider_threat_to_critical_infra 
structures_study.pdf. 
57 Frank L. Greitzer et al., “Identifying At-Risk Employees: Modeling Psychosocial Precursors of 
Potential Insider Threats,” in 2012 45th Hawaii International Conference on System Science (HICSS), 
2012, 2392–2401, doi:10.1109/HICSS.2012.309. 
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definition of an insider, the core element is always based on an individual who has access 
into, or within, an organization.58 
C. SCOPE AND IMPACT OF INSIDER THREATS 
Statistics vary regarding the prevalence of cases perpetrated by insiders compared 
to those perpetrated by those external to the targeted organizations.59 Marissa Randazzo 
et al. opines, “Nevertheless, insiders pose a substantial threat by virtue of their knowledge 
of and access to their employers’ systems and/or databases, and their ability to bypass 
existing physical and electronic security measures through legitimate means.”60  
In a “2007 Computer Security Institute Survey” about computer crime and 
security, 59% of respondents indicated that they had experienced insider exploitation of 
IT resources. Roughly one in four believed that more than 40% of their total financial 
losses from cyber-attacks were due to insider activities.61 
A “2008 National Computer Security Survey” suggests that the insider threat is 
real and the consequences significant: 40% of all incidents reported were attributed to 
insiders. Additionally, 74% of all cyber theft was attributed to insiders, including 93% of 
embezzlement incidents and 84% of intellectual property thefts.62 “The 2013 State of 
Cyber Crime Survey” reveals that 33% of respondents identified “insider crimes as more 
likely to cause more damage to an organization than an external attack.”63  
58 Jeffrey Hunker and Christian W. Probst, “Insiders and Insider Threats—An Overview of Definitions 
and Mitigation Techniques,” Journal of Wireless Mobile Networks, Ubiquitous Computing, and 
Dependable Applications 2, no. 1 (2011): 6–7. 
59 Robert Richardson, “CSI FBI Survey 2003—Fbiraportti.pdf,” yle, 2003, http://www.yle.fi/mot/ 
kj040524/fbiraportti.pdf. 
60 Dawn Cappelli et al., “Insider Threat Study: Illicit Cyber Activity in the Banking and Finance 
Sector,” U.S. Secret Service and CERT Coordination Center/Software Engineering Institute, 2004, 
http://www.cert.org/archive/pdf/bankfin040820.pdf. 
61 Robert Richardson, “The 12th Annual Computer Crime and Security Survey,” Computer Security 
Institute, 2007, http://gocsi.com/sites/default/files/uploads/2007_CSI_Survey_full-color_no%20marks. 
indd_.pdf. 
62 Louis M. Davis et al., “The National Computer Security Survey (NCSS): Final Methodology–
RAND_TR544.pdf,” The RAND Corporation, 2008, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/ 
technical_reports/2008/RAND_TR544.pdf. 
63 CSO Magazine et al., “2013 State of Cybercrime Survey,” PwC, 2013, http://www.pwc.com/us/ 
en/press-releases/2013/cybercrime-threats-continue.jhtml. 
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The damages caused by malicious insiders each year are substantial, and continue 
to increase. The toll of insider events causes not only financial strain, but also negative 
publicity, loss of public confidence, and untold other negative consequences for an 
organization.64 A recently disclosed theft of personal information on 26.5 million U.S. 
veterans and active-duty personnel from the home of a Department of Veterans Affairs 
analyst lead one writer to proclaim, “This is a catastrophe that should have been 
anticipated and could have been avoided.” The security risks posed by insiders are 
becoming more visible and damaging but are far from new. “Many executives in the 
federal government and corporate America remain ill equipped and unprepared to address 
the security threats posed by their trusted insiders.”65 
According to a 2013 RSA presentation that cited open-source data-breach reports 
and data-loss surveys gathered over a recent 10-year period, “The average cost per 
incident is $412,000, and the average loss per industry is $15 million over ten years. In 
several instances, damages reached more than $1 billion.”66  
These financial losses strongly suggest that organizations need to address insider 
attacks, especially when research indicates that trusted insiders against organizations 
perpetrate 70% of fraud rather than external criminals, yet, 90% of security controls and 
monitoring are focused on external threats. “With the appropriate motivation and time, 
human beings who are trusted insiders will find their way around most technical 
controls.”67 
64 Cappelli, Moore, and Trzeciak, The CERT Guide to Insider Threats: How to Prevent, Detect, and 
Respond to Information Technology Crimes (Theft, Sabotage, Fraud). 
65 Sean Steele, “VA Breach Shows Growing Insider Threats,” Network World 23, no. 24 (June 19, 
2006): 43–43. 
66 Kathleen Richards, “RSA 2013: FBI Offers Lessons Learned on Insider Threat Detection,” Search 
Security, March 5, 2013, http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/news/2240179082/RSA-2013-FBI-offers-
lessons-learned-on-insider-threat-detection. 
67 Carl Colwill, “Human Factors in Information Security: The Insider Threat – Who Can You Trust 
These Days?,” Information Security Technical Report 14, no. 4 (November 2009): 186–96, doi:10.1016/ 
j.istr.2010.04.004. 
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D. FRAUD AND EMBEZZLEMENT: IS IT REALLY THAT BAD? 
According to a report recently published by Marquet International, major 
embezzlement incidents in the United States (defined by cases in which at least $100,000 
was misappropriated) increased 11% in 2012 when compared to the number of cases 
analyzed in 2011. The 528 cases analyzed in “The 2012 Marquet Report on 
Embezzlement” are the most ever recorded in the report’s five-year history. In the cases 
analyzed, the average amount of money lost by businesses was about $1.4 million. The 
businesses in all the cases analyzed lost a total of approximately $737 million.68 
The “2012 Report to the Nations” produced annually by the Association of 
Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) reported that fraud being conducted by trusted 
insiders lasted an average of 18 months before being detected. The perpetrators 
conducting the fraud who possessed higher levels of authority within the organization 
tended to cause much larger losses. The average amount of loss among frauds committed 
by owners/executives was $573,000, the median loss caused by managers was $180,000, 
and the median loss caused by other employees was $60,000.69  
Occupational fraud conducted by trusted insiders is a significant threat to small 
businesses. The smallest organizations in the study suffered the largest median losses 
because, “these organizations typically employ fewer anti-fraud controls than their larger 
counterparts, which increases their vulnerability to fraud.”70 
Research conducted by the ACFE concluded that the industries most commonly 
victimized are banking and financial services, government and public administration, and 
the manufacturing sectors. The research reflected that individuals working in one of six 
departments committed the majority, or 77% of all frauds: accounting, operations, sales, 
executive/upper management, customer service, and purchasing. This distribution was 
very similar to what was found in the 2010 ACFE study.71 
68 Marquet International, Ltd., “The 2012 Marquet Report on Embezzlement: A White Collar Fraud 
Study of Major Embezzlement Cases Active in the U.S. in 2012.” 




                                                 
“The 2012 Marquet Report on Embezzlement” indicated that the organizations 
most susceptible to fraud and embezzlement schemes by trusted insiders are those that do 
not have a division of labor when it comes to their finances or a multitude of people 
monitoring money coming in and out of the organization. The most common victims of 
insider fraud and embezzlement were non-profit, religious organizations, and small 
businesses, which revealed that these types of enterprises have relatively weak controls in 
place to counter the insider attack.72 This literature indicates that these are informal, self-
reported estimates, but indicate that the problem is genuine and noteworthy. 
Shari Pfleeger and Salvatore Stolfo believe that credible data describing the scope 
and impact of unwelcome insider actions are more difficult to determine, for two reasons:  
First, many organizations are unwilling to reveal the nature and magnitude 
of insider incidents they have experienced for fear of reputational harm. 
Second, most published cyber surveys are convenience surveys; it is 
impossible to know what population the results represent. This paucity of 
data is challenging for insider threat researchers who require good data 
with which to build models, make predictions, and support good decision-
making by end users.73  
Quantifying the damage of an insider attack can be difficult because it can extend 
far beyond the stolen or corrupted items’ actual cost. For example, it is extremely 
difficult to estimate the amount of damage to finances and confidence around negative 
publicity for a publicly traded company, a non-profit, or a government organization 
affected by a high profile or high-level employee conducting an insider attack.74  
In a recent survey of small businesses, a University of Cincinnati criminal justice 
researcher found that only 16% of those that have experienced theft by employees 
actually reported that theft to the police, in spite of 64% of the small businesses surveyed 
reported experiencing employee theft. The researcher stated, “It’s important to look at 
this topic because such theft represents a loss to the tax base and would also seem to put 
72 Marquet International, Ltd., “The 2012 Marquet Report on Embezzlement: A White Collar Fraud 
Study of Major Embezzlement Cases Active in the U.S. in 2012.” 
73 Shari Lawrence Pfleeger and Salvatore Stolfo, “Addressing the Insider Threat,” IEEE Security & 
Privacy 7 (2009), http://academiccommons.columbia.edu/catalog/ac:125619, 10. 
74 Cappelli et al., Common Sense Guide to Prevention and Detection of Insider Threats. 
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such businesses at risk, and so, put our overall economy at risk. After all, small 
businesses with 100 or fewer employees comprise 97% of all businesses in the United 
States.”75 
According to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, one third of small business 
bankruptcies are the result of employee theft, which includes fraud and embezzlement. 
This development comes at a time when long-term trends show that small businesses 
have been responsible for more than 65% of new jobs over the last 17 years, according to 
the U.S. Small Business Administration.76 
The “2011 CyberSecurity Watch Survey” shows, “the public may not be aware of 
the number of insider events or the level of the damage caused because 70% of insider 
incidents are handled internally without legal action.” This element of the survey was in 
line with the “2010 CyberSecurity Watch Survey” completed on insider threats.77 
“Moreover, due to the secretive nature of white-collar crime, it is also severely 
underreported in both frequency of occurrence and prosecution. Because prosecutors 
screen cases for further investigation and prosecution, the number of cases accepted for 
prosecution grossly underrepresents the frequency of occurrence.”78 
E. RESEARCH ON INSIDER THREATS AND INSIDER ATTACKS 
Literature reviewed indicates that considerable research has been done to examine 
and define the general nature of inappropriate insider activity primarily in the IT space, 
with the goal that eventually organizations can reduce the threat and have a more 
complete understanding of the nature of insider threats. Beginning in 1999, RAND 
conducted a series of workshops to generate a research agenda for addressing this 
75 M. B. Reilly, “Surprising Survey: Most Small Businesses Remain Silent Rather Than Report 
Employee Theft,” February 18, 2014, http://phys.org/news/2014-02-survey-small-businesses-silent-
employee.html. 
76 Ibid. 
77 “2011 CyberSecurity Watch Survey: Organizations Need More Skilled Cyber Professionals to Stay 
Secure,” Marketwire, accessed February 10, 2014, http://www.marketwired.com/press-release/2011-
CyberSecurity-Watch-Survey-Organizations-Need-More-Skilled-Cyber-Professionals-1387863.htm. 
78 Ziegler and Lovrich, “Pain Relief, Prescription Drugs, and Prosecution: A Four-State Survey of 
Chief Prosecutors.  
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problem.79 The objective of the RAND workshops was to address researchers and to 
encourage a more penetrating exploration of the causes of and possible solutions to 
mitigating the insider threat within the information technology domains.80 The 
workshops focused on defining the nature of insider threats and developing a foundation 
of knowledge on insider attacker characteristics, vulnerabilities they tend to exploit, and 
attack methods they employ.81 
The Defense Personnel Security Research Center (PERSEREC) and CERT at 
Carnegie Mellon University’s Software Engineering Institute initiated an ongoing 
partnership in 2001 to research cyber- or computer-related insider threats jointly in the 
military services and defense agencies. This partnership formed and enabled work to 
begin in response to recommendations in the 2000 Department of Defense (DOD) “DOD 
Insider Threat Mitigation Report.” The focus of the partnership was to identify 
characteristics of the environment surrounding insider threats and insider cyber events 
evaluated for criminal prosecution by DOD investigative services. Since that time, both 
organizations have conducted separate research in this area, and published detailed results 
analyzing both the psychological and technical aspects of malicious technical activity by 
trusted insiders.82  
79 Robert H. Anderson, “Research and Development Initiatives Focused on Preventing, Detecting, and 
Responding to Insider Misuse of Critical Defense Information Systems: Results of a Three-Day Workshop. 
RAND CF-151-OSD,” RAND Corporation, 1999, http://citeseer.uark.edu:8080/citeseerx/showciting;jsess 
ionid=66C66F7E33D77E8C7241750AD878F092?cid=252875. 
80 Robert H. Anderson et al., “Research on Mitigating the Insider Threat to Information Systems—#2 
Proceedings of a Workshop Held August, 2000” (RAND Corporation, 2000), http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA386077. 
81 Brackney and Andersen, “Understanding the Insider Threat: Proceedings of a March 2004 
Workshop R. Understanding the Insider Threat: Proceedings of a March 2004 Workshop.” 
82 Final Report of the Insider Threat Integrated Process Team, Office of the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence) (Washington, DC: Department of 
Defense, April 24, 2000), 7–8; Eric D. Shaw, “‘Ten Tales of Betrayal: The Threat to Corporate 
Infrastructures by Information Technology Insiders,’ Report 2—Case Studies, Technical Report 05–05,” 
Defense Personnel Security Research Center, Monterey, CA, 2005, http://www.dhra.mil/perserec/ 
reports.html; Eric D. Shaw and Lynn F. Fischer, “Ten Tales of Betrayal: The Threat to Corporate 
Infrastructures by Information Technology Insiders Analysis and Observations,” Defense Personnel 
Security Research Center, Monterey, CA, September 2005, http://www.dhra.mil/perserec/reports/tr05-
13.pdf; Cummings et al., “Insider Threat Study: Illicit Cyber Activity Involving Fraud in the U.S. Financial 
Services Sector.”  
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The literature reveals thorough case studies of convicted insiders, attack 
characteristics, and analysis on the background surrounding the insider attack on 
individual insider cases. Adam Cummings et al. noted that this early work was important 
because PERSEREC compiled information related to espionage and insider events 
against U.S. concerns. PERSEREC produced two valuable data sets that have been used 
extensively by insider threat researchers.83  
In its noted work, “Espionage Against the United States by American Citizens, 
1947–2001 and The National Security Espionage Database,” PERSEREC produced 
detailed information on 150 cases of one-time trusted insiders who committed espionage 
against the United States. Several categories of information were gathered in their 
database including biographic, employment and related security clearance characteristics, 
details of each act of espionage perpetrated, motivations, and consequences of the acts. 
Money was cited as the dominant motivator for the trusted insider as the reason for their 
acts of spying.84 One researcher stated, “While this data set provides an invaluable 
overview of these cases over time, it does not provide the level of information available 
from more in-depth case studies with additional data sources, such as interviews with 
investigators, suspects, and their co-workers and legal records. This detailed information 
is critical to deriving practical lessons for security practitioners.”85 
“Project Slammer” was a study conducted by the DOD and the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI), which examined the motives and patterns of behavior of convicted 
83 Final Report of the Insider Threat Integrated Process Team, Office of the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence) (Washington, DC: Department of 
Defense, April 24, 2000), 7–8; Eric D. Shaw, “‘Ten Tales of Betrayal: The Threat to Corporate 
Infrastructures by Information Technology Insiders,’ Report 2—Case Studies, Technical Report 05–05,” 
Defense Personnel Security Research Center, Monterey, CA, 2005, http://www.dhra.mil/perserec/ 
reports.html; Eric D. Shaw and Lynn F. Fischer, “Ten Tales of Betrayal: The Threat to Corporate 
Infrastructures by Information Technology Insiders Analysis and Observations,” Defense Personnel 
Security Research Center, Monterey, CA, September 2005, http://www.dhra.mil/perserec/reports/tr05-
13.pdf; Cummings et al., “Insider Threat Study: Illicit Cyber Activity Involving Fraud in the U.S. Financial 
Services Sector.” 
84 Katherine L. Herbig and Martin F. Wiskoff, “Espionage Against the United States by American 
Citizens 1947–2001, PERSEREC Technical Report 02–5,” Defense Personnel Security Research Center, 
Monterey, CA, July 2002, http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/spies.pdf. 
85 Cummings et al., “Insider Threat Study: Illicit Cyber Activity Involving Fraud in the U.S. Financial 
Services Sector,” 3. 
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spies. This study brought to light a series of complicated and multifaceted motivational 
factors that drove spies to do what they did. This group of spies was asked about their life 
circumstances at the time they began spying, the motivation behind their acts, and the 
thought processes that led them to spy.86 The results identified an interaction of factors, 
none of which alone was sufficient to result in an act of espionage, but taken together 
over time, the traits and experiences common to many of the perpetrators appear to have 
formed a common pathway by way of personal stressors and predispositions to cause the 
acts of espionage.87 Money featured highly in the motivations to act illegally. 
Eric Shaw and Lynn Fischer conducted important research on 10 cases of trusted 
insiders operating in the critical infrastructure sectors. The cases in question were IT 
insider events in which an insider or former insider, having had legitimate access to a 
critical information system, abused or violated that trust for personal advantage or to 
exact revenge on a person or organization. In each case, the actions of a disgruntled or 
self-interested offender seriously damaged or compromised the operability of a critical 
information system. They investigated background behaviors of the malicious insiders, 
attempted to determine possible motivating factors for the insiders’ actions, documented 
relevant case facts of each incident, and endeavored to draw appropriate conclusions on 
insider behavior that occurred before, during, and after each event.88 Kramer suggests 
that further research is needed on predictive indicators and algorithms because when 
opportunity and motivation come together, an insider attack is possible.89 However, 
86 CIA, Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room, “Project Slammer Interim Report 
(U),” Director of Central Intelligence, 1992, http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conver 
sions/89801/DOC_0000218679.pdf. 
87 Krista Forcier, “Project Slammer: Why Spies Are Spying,” National Security Training Institute, 
November 12, 2013, https://www.nstii.com/content/project-slammer-why-spies-are-spying. 
88 Shaw and Fischer, “Ten Tales of Betrayal: The Threat to Corporate Infrastructures by Information 
Technology Insiders Analysis and Observations.” 
89 Lisa A. Kramer, Richards J. Heuer, Jr., and Kent S. Crawford, “Technological, Social, and 
Economic Trends That Are Increasing U.S. Vulnerability to Insider Espionage,” Defense Personnel 
Security Research Center, Federation of American Scientists, May 2005, http://www.fas.org/sgp/ 
othergov/dod/insider.pdf. 
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despite considerable research into the psychology and motivation of insiders, it remains 
difficult to predict who will commit insider fraud.90  
In 2002, CERT and the USSS initiated the Insider Threat Study, a joint study of 
the psychological and technical issues surrounding actual insider threat cases. The study 
combined the U.S. National Threat Assessment Center’s expertise in behavioral 
psychology with CERT’s technical security expertise, to provide in-depth analysis of 
approximately 150 insider incidents involving IT that occurred in critical infrastructure 
sectors between 1996 and 2002. Analysis included the thorough review of case 
documentation and interviews of personnel involved in each incident.91 
Four reports were published as part of the Insider Threat Study, one of which 
analyzed malicious insider incidents in the banking and finance sector by examining 
actual cases identified through public reporting or as a computer fraud case investigated 
by the USSS. Each case was analyzed from a behavioral and a technical perspective to 
identify behaviors and communications in which the insiders engaged prior to and during 
their harmful activities.92 Michele Keeney et al. analyzed insider attacks across all critical 
infrastructure sectors in which the insider’s intent was to harm the organization, an 
individual, or the organization’s data, information system, or network.93 Subsequently, 
two additional reports followed with similar extensive research and attack analysis on 
insiders in the IT sector,94 and threats to the government sector.95 The reports include 
statistical findings and implications regarding technical details of the incidents, detection 
90 Cappelli et al., “Insider Threat Study: Illicit Cyber Activity in the Banking and Finance Sector,” 
2004. 
91 Band et al., “Comparing Insider IT Sabotage and Espionage: A Model-Based Analysis|SEI Digital 
Library.” 
92 Randazzo et al., Insider Threat Study: Illicit Cyber Activity in the Banking and Finance Sector. 
93 Keeney et al., “Insider Threat Study: Computer System Sabotage in Critical Infrastructure Sectors.” 
94 Eileen F. Kowalski, Dawn M. Cappelli, and Andrew P. Moore, “Insider Threat Study: Illicit Cyber 
Activity in the Information Technology and Telecommunications Sector,” Software Engineering Institute 
and United States Secret Service, January 2008, http://www.cert.org/archive/pdf/insiderthreat_it2008.pdf. 
95 Eileen F. Kowalski et al., “Insider Threat Study: Illicit Cyber Activity in the Government Sector,” 
Software Engineering Institute and United States Secret Service, January 2008, http://www.cert.org/ 
archive/pdf/insiderthreat_gov2008.pdf. 
 24 
                                                 
and identification of the insiders, nature of harm, as well as insider planning, 
communication, behavior, and characteristics.96 
Additionally, completed studies on police corruption and fraud, and studies on 
sabotage and the exploitation of information systems have been completed.97 Cole 
analyzes incidents of insider theft, sabotage, and spying from private sector and public 
sector entities, which draw attention to pitfalls organizations are missing by not putting 
protective measures in place. Case studies are reviewed and technology remedies are 
applied to counter the insider threat.98 
F. SHOULD WE GO BACK TO BASICS ON PREDICTING INSIDER 
THREATS WHEN IT COMES TO INSIDER FRAUD AND 
EMBEZZLEMENT? 
While the motivating factor among perpetrators of fraud and embezzlement cases 
was hard to ascertain in a majority of the cases examined in “2012 Report to the 
Nations,” produced annually by the ACFE, those discovered included supporting 
gambling addictions and problems with substance abuse, or in some cases, providing for 
a loved one. The report shows the average duration for a major embezzlement scheme is 
nearly five years with some lasting as long as 20 years before they are uncovered.99  
The ACFE Report indicated that most occupational fraudsters who were trusted 
insiders within organizations are first-time offenders with clean employment histories. 
Approximately 87% of occupational fraudsters have never been charged with or 
convicted of a fraud-related offense, and 84% have never been punished or terminated by 
an employer for fraud-related conduct.100 Research has consistently shown that most 
96 Cappelli et al., “Common Sense Guide to Prevention and Detection of Insider Threat, 3rd Edition—
Version 3.1.”  
97 Carol Meyers, Sarah Powers, and Daniel Faissol, “Taxonomies of Cyber Adversaries and Attacks: 
A Survey of Incidents and Approaches,” Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, April 2009, https://e-
reports-ext.llnl.gov/pdf/379498.pdf. 
98 Cole and Ring, Insider Threat. 
99 Joel Griffin, “Major Embezzlement Cases on the Rise,” SecurityInfoWatch.com, May 20, 2013, 
http://www.securityinfowatch.com/article/10946366/marquet-international-report-finds-major-
embezzlement-cases-increased-in-2012. 
100 “2012 Report to the Nations—Key Findings and Highlights.” 
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trusted insiders who commit fraud and embezzlement within organizations do not have a 
previous criminal record.101 
G. THE FRAUD TRIANGLE 
Trying to explain why insider threats occur, specifically fraud and embezzlement, 
is complicated. If research shows that most people who commit fraud against their 
employers are not career criminals, are trusted employees who have no criminal history, 
and who when caught, do not consider themselves to be lawbreakers, what is being 
missed? Common factors contribute to the vulnerability of these otherwise normal, law-
abiding persons, to commit fraud. 
Research indicated that the fraud triangle explains one of the more highly 
regarded theories as to why insider fraud occurs. Developed in the early 1950s by 
criminologist Donald Cressey,102 the fraud triangle is one of the most well-known fraud-
specific models published.103 Cressey interviewed imprisoned bank embezzlers and 
observed that many of these formerly law-abiding citizens, people he called “trust 
betrayers,” had a “non-sharable financial problem.”104 This observation led him to 
develop the fraud triangle, depicted in Figure 1. 
101 Green, “White-Collar Crime and the Study of Embezzlement,” 95–106; Cressey, Other People’s 
Money; A Study in the Social Psychology of Embezzlement; Cappelli et al., “Insider Threat Study: Illicit 
Cyber Activity in the Banking and Finance Sector,” 2004; Band et al., “Comparing Insider IT Sabotage and 
Espionage: A Model-Based Analysis|SEI Digital Library”; Wells, Corporate Fraud Handbook: Prevention 
and Detection. 
102 Wells, Corporate Fraud Handbook: Prevention and Detection; Green, “White-Collar Crime and 
the Study of Embezzlement”; W. Albrecht et al., Fraud Examination (Stamford, CT: Cengage Learning, 
2008); Randazzo et al., Insider Threat Study: Illicit Cyber Activity in the Banking and Finance Sector. 
103 Cressey, Other People’s Money; A Study in the Social Psychology of Embezzlement, ch. 1. 
104 Non-sharable problems all involve some sort of embarrassment, shame, or disgrace. More 
importantly, they all threaten the fraudster’s status as a person trusted by others. 
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Figure 1.  The Fraud Triangle 
Cressey’s theory holds that for fraud to occur, three dimensions must all be 
present: pressure, opportunity, and rationalization.105 
Pressure is what causes a person to commit fraud. It often stems from a 
significant financial need or problem. This problem or need can arise due to 
external pressures, such as medical bills, addiction problems, or even just 
expensive taste. While some fraud is committed purely out of greed, Cressey 
observed that perpetrators often needed to resolve their problem in secret, making 
it “non-sharable.”106 
Opportunity is the ability to commit fraud. It may be the result of weak internal 
controls or poor management oversight. Organizations have more control over the 
opportunity dimension than the other two dimensions. Organizations can build 
processes, procedures, and controls that inhibit or deter employees’ ability to 
commit fraud and then effectively detect it when it occurs.107 
Rationalization is a perpetrator’s process of overcoming any personal or ethical 
hesitations to commit the fraud. It involves reconciling the bad behavior with 
commonly accepted notions of decency or trust. Rationalizing individuals may 
believe that due to perceived miss-treatment, the organization owes them 
something or that committing the fraud is the only way to save their family from 
devastation. Rationalization may incorporate beliefs that the fraudster is merely 
borrowing money until it is possible repay it. At the other end of the spectrum, 




                                                 
rationalization incorporates misunderstanding of the severity of the fraudulent 
acts or apathy about their consequences.108 
Cressey emphasizes that in the vast majority of cases he studied, at some time 
prior to the crime, the individuals believed certain situations existed in which trust 
violation was acceptable. When subjects applied these situations to their personal 
circumstances, trust was violated. “Further, the neutralization aspect of Cressey’s process 
is consistent with the theory of differential association in that there was a gradual erosion 
of the subjects’ morality, culminating in the justification for embezzlement, assuming 
that the excuses were not post factum impressions.109“ While Cressey’s offenders did not 
associate with persons who directly influenced their decisions to embezzle, some 
evidence exists that through contacts with others, they came to believe that some business 
offenses were merely technical violations rather than morally wrong.110 Justifications for 
committing the crime such as, “I was only borrowing the money” or “I deserve a little 
more in my paycheck for all the work I do around here,” come to light. It is also noted 
that the research did not conclude that Cressey’s theory was an absolute reason for 
individuals committing fraud or embezzlement within organizations; however, it was 
valid in many circumstances surrounding an individual’s motivations.111  
H. THE ADDICTION ANGLE TO INSIDER THREATS 
Greitzer et al., in their research on identifying at risk employees, considers 
“concerning behavior” as an indicator for at risk employees; however, they fail to identify 
addictive characteristics as part of the behavioral indicators.112 This finding is consistent 
108 Cressey, Other People’s Money; A Study in the Social Psychology of Embezzlement, ch. 1. 
109 Green, “White-Collar Crime and the Study of Embezzlement.” 
110 Ibid. 
111 Ibid; Ragatz, Fremouw, and Baker, “The Psychological Profile of White-collar Offenders 
Demographics, Criminal Thinking, Psychopathic Traits, and Psychopathology,” 978–97; Dorothy Zietz, 
Women Who Embezzle or Defraud: A Study of Convicted Felons (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1981). 
112 Greitzer et al., “Identifying At-Risk Employees.” 
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in the literature reviewed.113 Researchers on recent insider threat studies might be 
missing a key connection between addictions to gambling or prescription pain medication 
and the perpetration of illicit financial crime activity by trusted insiders within 
organizations.  
1. Gambling 
According to the National Research Council (NRC) study on Pathological 
Gambling, “the existence of a number of costly financial problems are related to 
pathological gambling, including a variety of crimes such as embezzlement, loss of 
employment, and bankruptcy.”114 The NRC study stated, “Although the research in this 
area is sparse, it suggests that the magnitude and extent of personal consequences on the 
pathological gambler and on his family may be severe.”115 Other research indicates that, 
where casino jurisdictions exist, an increase nationally in the statistics for increased 
embezzlement arrests appears to occur.116 The National Gambling Impact Study 
classifies pathological gambling as an impulse disorder that may include such activities 
“as committing illegal acts such as forgery, fraud, theft or embezzlement to finance 
gambling.”117 In a recent paper, entitled “Pathological Gambling and “Other Behavioral” 
Disorders,” the author reports on increased drug behavioral disorders and impulse control 
disorders (ICD), which include pathological gambling and compulsive buying disorder. 
113 “Insider Fraud Is Common and Often Flies Under Corporate Radar,” Security: Solutions for 
Enterprise Security Leaders 48, no. 11 (November 2011): 12–15; Darrell D. Dorrell and Gregory A. 
Gadawski, “Investigating Embezzlement: Three Don’ts,” Value Examiner, August 7, 2012, 26–28; Nancy 
Blodgett, “Stealing Your Practice Blind,” ABA Journal 73, no. 8 (August 1, 1987): 78–82; Ragatz, 
Fremouw, and Baker, “The Psychological Profile of White-collar Offenders Demographics, Criminal 
Thinking, Psychopathic Traits, and Psychopathology.” 
114 National Research Council, National Research Council. Pathological Gambling: A Critical 
Review, Committee on the Social and Economic Impact of Pathological Gambling, Committee on Law and 
Justice, Commission on Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education. 
115 Ibid. 
116 Albanese, “White Collar Crimes and Casino Gambling: Looking for Empirical Links to Forgery, 
Embezzlement, and Fraud,” 333–47; Ricardo C. Gazel, Dan S. Rickman, and William N. Thompson, 
“Casino Gambling and Crime: A Panel Study of Wisconsin Counties,” Managerial & Decision Economics 
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The study stresses that a possible connection can be made between these disorders and 
that health practitioners and counselors should be knowledgeable of the implied 
correlation.118  
Early research conducted on embezzlement cases revealed that the most frequent 
factor in motives identified with the perpetrators (trusted insiders) of embezzlement cases 
was gambling.119 “The personal and social effects of pathological gambling often include 
psychological distress, significant financial losses, family problems, legal and 
employment difficulties, and suicide.”120 Gerhard Meyer and Michael Stradler indicate in 
their research, “The majority of clinical studies on pathological gamblers in outpatient 
treatment centers and self-help groups indicate that a high percentage of subjects 
committed criminal offenses in order to finance their gambling.”121 According to Max 
Abbott et al., between one and two-thirds of problem gamblers engaged in treatment or 
mutual help groups like Gamblers Anonymous (GA) report having committed gambling-
related offences.122 Several studies have reported high rates of gambling-related criminal 
activity amongst severe problem gamblers.123  
118 Richard J. Frances, Irvin Miller Miller, and Avram H. Mack, Clinical Textbook of Addictive 
Disorders, Third Edition, 3, illustrated (New York: Guilford Press, 2011), http://books.google.com/ 
books/about/Clinical_Textbook_of_Addictive_Disorders.html?id=JJk52UeE6hYC. 
119 Peterson, “Why Honest People Steal,” 94–103; Cressey, Other People’s Money; A Study in the 
Social Psychology of Embezzlement; Henry R. Lesieur, The Chase: Career of the Compulsive Gambler, 
vol. xxi (Oxford, England: Anchor, 1984); Henry R. Lesieur and Robert L. Custer, “Pathological 
Gambling: Roots, Phases, and Treatment,” American Academy of Political and Social Science 474, no. 1, 
(July 1, 1984): 146–56; Gerhard Meyer and Michael A. Stadler, “Criminal Behavior Associated with 
Pathological Gambling,” Journal of Gambling Studies 15, no. 1 (March 1, 1999): 29–43, doi:10.1023/ 
A:1023015028901; Alex Blaszczynski, “Criminal Offences in Pathological Gamblers,” Psychiatry, 
Psychology and Law 1, no. 2 (1994): 129–38, doi:10.1080/13218719409524836. 
120 Larry L. Ashley and Karmen K. Boehlke, “Pathological Gambling: A General Overview,” Journal 
of Psychoactive Drugs 44, no. 1 (March 2012): 27–37, doi:http://dx.doi.org.libproxy.nps.edu/10.1080/0279 
1072.2012.662078. 
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122 Max W. Abbott, Brian G. McKenna, and Lynne C. Giles, “Gambling and Problem Gambling 
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21, no. 4 (Winter 2005): 537–58, doi:10.1007/s10899-005-5562-6. 
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Academic research and the prevalence of numerous criminal cases have shown 
the existence of a relationship between criminal behavior and pathological gambling.124 
Research indicates that pathological gambling is frequently associated with financial, 
vocational, interpersonal, and psychiatric problems. Some gamblers also experience 
substantial legal problems related to gambling.125 These types of related illegal behaviors 
typically include fraudulent financial dealings, such as embezzlement, theft, writing bad 
checks, and surreptitious use of another person’s credit or using another’s personal 
identity to obtain credit cards or obtain loans in that person’s name.126 Such crimes are 
frequently committed in desperation, either to cover up financial damage from gambling 
related losses or to fund further gambling sprees. Illegal activities may intensify the 
severity of gambling-related problems, and ultimately, result in arrest, conviction and 
incarceration, or in desperation, suicide.127 John Kindt, in his study on the success of 
tobacco lawsuits, argues that the gambling industry should be financially held responsible 
for pathological gamblers because, “Pathological gamblers tend to engage in forgery, 
theft, embezzlement, drug dealing, and property crimes to pay off gambling debts.”128 
Henry Lesieur’s early research on pathological gamblers describes the 
development of excessive gambling in individuals wherein the gambler’s intensifying 
financial pressures and increasing desire to maintain the ability to gamble causes the 
gambler ultimately to become involved in criminal activity. This work accurately 
describes behaviors of trusted insiders engaged in fraud or embezzlement with the need 
to provide a mechanism of funding ‘their gambling activities at any cost. Lesieur 
124 Rosenthal and Lesieur, “Pathological Gambling and Criminal Behavior,” in Explorations in 
Criminal Psychopathology: Clinical Syndromes with Forensic Implications; Stephenie Overman, 
“Addiction: Odds Are Gamblers Cost Companies,” HRMagazine 35, no. 4 (April 1990): 50; Blaszczynski, 
“Criminal Offences in Pathological Gamblers.” 
125 Lesieur, “Gambling, Pathological Gambling and Crime,” in Handbook on Pathological Gambling, 
89–110. 
126 National Gambling Impact Study Commission, Final Report. 
127 Ledgerwood et al., “Clinical Features and Treatment Prognosis of Pathological Gamblers with and 
Without Recent Gambling‐Related Illegal Behavior,” 294–301; Lesieur, The Chase; Alex Blaszczynski and 
Eimear Farrell, “A Case Series of 44 Completed Gambling-related Suicides,” Journal of Gambling Studies 
14, no. 2 (1999): 93–109. 
128 John Warren Kindt, “The Costs of Addicted Gamblers: Should the States Initiate Mega-Lawsuits 
Similar to the Tobacco Cases?,” Managerial and Decision Economics 22, no. 1/3 (January 1, 2001): 22. 
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describes a roadmap of the pathological gambler who makes a series of wrong turns 
conducting illegal actions that then cascade into making bad decisions that will ultimately 
destroy the gambler in the end.129  
Studies vary on the exact pervasiveness in the trend with respect to the growth in 
the population of pathological gamblers.130 Statistics indicate that the prevalence of the 
disorder is on the rise. In 1976, research estimated that the base rate of the U.S. adult 
population who constituted pathological gamblers was 0.77%.131 In its 1997 meta-
analysis of literature on problem and pathological gambling prevalence, the Harvard 
Medical School Division on Addictions estimated at the time that the number of adult 
problem and pathological gamblers in the United States was 7.5 million. The study also 
estimated adolescent problem and pathological gamblers numbered 7.9 million.132 
Current studies, however, estimate that approximately 1.6–5% of the adult gambling 
population in America experiences significant problems because of their gambling 
activities.133 This percentage is presumed to be even higher among special populations 
including those comprising young adults, people with mental health disorders, and 
incarcerated individuals.134 
Across numerous countries, it is recognized that problem gambling is a significant 
public health concern with between 1–2% of the population estimated to be affected. 
Despite having a lower prevalence than substance abuse disorders, such as alcoholism, 
129 Lesieur, The Chase; Rosenthal and Lesieur, “Pathological Gambling and Criminal Behavior,” in 
Explorations in Criminal Psychopathology: Clinical Syndromes with Forensic Implications, 149–69. 
130 Ledgerwood et al., “Clinical Features and Treatment Prognosis of Pathological Gamblers with and 
Without RecentGambling‐Related Illegal Behavior”; Howard J. Shaffer, Matthew N. Hall, and Joni Vander 
Bilt, “Estimating the Prevalence of Disordered Gambling Behavior in the United States and Canada: A 
Research Synthesis,” American Journal of Public Health 89, no. 9 (September 1999): 1369–75; “How 
Many Pathological Gamblers Are There?” accessed February 1, 2014, http://www.americangaming.org/ 
industry-resources/faq/how-many-pathological-gamblers-are-there. 
131 Ashley and Boehlke, “Pathological Gambling,” 28. 
132 National Gambling Impact Study Commission, Final Report, 4–1. 
133 Ledgerwood et al., “Clinical Features and Treatment Prognosis of Pathological Gamblers with and 
Without Recent Gambling‐Related Illegal Behavior”; Ashley and Boehlke, “Pathological Gambling.” 
134 Nigel Turner et al., “The Relationship of Problem Gambling to Criminal Behavior in a Sample of 
Canadian Male Federal Offenders,” Journal of Gambling Studies 25, no. 2 (June 2009): 153–69, doi:10. 
1007/s10899-009-9124-1. 
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problem gambling often presents as an acute disorder.135 Problems can emerge within a 
relatively short period of time and the effects are often thought to extend to as many as, 
“10 to 15 people who have contact with the gambler, including spouse, children, parents, 
and fellow gamblers, people stolen from, employers and employees.”136  
As one researcher has noted:  
As was the case with alcoholism for many years, compulsive gambling 
often is unrecognized and misunderstood. Perhaps this is because 
compulsive gambling is a drugless addiction. A pathological gambler will 
end up in one of three places: in recovery, institutionalized in a hospital or 
jail, or dead. The keys to treatment are education, prevention, and 
intervention.137 
2. Pain Prescription Medication 
Addictive gambling is pathological. However, pathology extends beyond the 
psychological to the physical. Recent criminal cases involving pain prescription 
medication are indicative of the growing concern regarding trusted insiders within 
organizations committing fraud and embezzlement to support their addiction. In 2012, the 
former office manager for a dental office was sentenced to 30 months in federal prison 
for embezzling over $174,000. According to the U.S. Attorney for the Western District of 
Washington, “The defendant committed a long-running scheme of financial crimes to 
feed her oxycodone addiction and betray the trust of her employer.” Commenting further 
on the case, the U.S. Attorney also noted, “People need to recognize that prescription 
drug abuse is growing in communities, leaving heavy damage in its wake.”138 
135 Paul Delfabbro, “Problem and Pathological Gambling: A Conceptual Review,” Journal of 
Gambling Business & Economics 7, no. 3 (September 2013): 35–53. 
136 Lesieur and Custer, “Pathological Gambling: Roots, Phases, and Treatment,” 148. 
137 Denise Phillips, “Gambling: The Hidden Addiction,” Behavioral Health Management 25, no. 5 
(October 2005): 32–37. 
138 U. S. Attorney’s Office (USAO), “U.S. Attorney’s Office—U.S. Department of Justice,” 
September 7, 2012, http://www.justice.gov/usao/waw/press/2012/September/bowman.html. 
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According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, prescription drug 
abuse is the nation’s fastest growing drug problem and has been classified as an 
epidemic.139 According to a release from the Department of Justice, it is reported that: 
National statistics show an increasing level of unlawful drug diversion and 
abuse of pharmaceutical controlled substances, as well as overdoses of 
such drugs resulting in rising medical costs. Studies reflect that hospital 
admissions attributable to prescription drug abuse and overdose have 
increased 500% over the last 10 years, and are currently costing the United 
States more than $1 billion dollars in health care costs each year.140  
Government employees are not immune to committing crimes to support a pain 
medication addiction as noted in another 2012 insider fraud case; the former executive 
director and a co-conspirator of a city-county convention center was convicted of 
embezzlement. “They devised a scheme to steal money that was intended for the greater 
good of the community,”141 stated the U.S. Attorney for the Western District of 
Kentucky. “In doing so, they violated the public’s trust and harmed an important 
community asset.” The trusted insider embezzled $250,000 to support his addiction to 
pain medication.142 
“The economic cost of nonmedical use of prescription opioids in the United States 
totals more than $50 billion annually; lost productivity and crime account for the vast 
majority (94%) of these costs.”143 In a 2006 Congressional Hearing, Laxmaiah 
Manchikanti, MD, the chief executive officer of the American Society of Interventional 
Pain Physicians testified, “Prescription drug abuse today is second only to marijuana 
abuse…. initiates to drug abuse started with prescription drugs (especially pain 
139 The White House, “Office of National Drug Control Policy,” 2012, http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
ondcp. 
140 U. S. Attorney’s Office (USAO), “Health Care Professional Pleads Guilty to Product Tampering 
Demerol Diverted at Bellevue, WA Surgery Clinic,” May 28, 2009, http://www.justice.gov/usao/waw/ 
press/2009/may/gibson.html. 
141 USDOJ, “Convention Center’s Former Executive Director Sentenced to 24 Months in Prison for 
Embezzlement.” 
142 Ibid. 
143 Ryan N. Hansen et al., “Economic Costs of Nonmedical Use of Prescription Opioids,” The Clinical 
Journal of Pain 27, no. 3 (2011): 194, doi:10.1097/AJP.0b013e3181ff04ca. 
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medications) more often than with marijuana.”144 In a recent article in the Journal of 
Safety Research about prescription addiction issues in the workplace, it was noted, 
“Prescription opioids are killing Americans at more than five times the rate that heroin is, 
according to the most recent numbers from the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention.”145 Commenting about the growing abuse of opioids, and the recent death of 
actor Phillip Seymour, investigative reporter Joel Achenbach noted, “These drugs are 
sold under such familiar brand names as OxyContin, Vicodin and Percocet and can be 
found in medicine cabinets in every city in American society.”146 
Research examining news reports and government media releases indicate that 
numerous recent criminal investigations have revealed a number of insider fraud and 
embezzlement cases related to prescription drug addiction,147 and gambling addiction.148 
A significant overlap also appears to exist between pathological gambling and chemical 
dependency.149 Research further indicates an underlying organizational vulnerability 
perpetrated by individuals who have been compromised by addictive behavior.150  
It is also important to note that the research indicated that a significant portion of 
these recent criminal cases have involved mid- to high-level “trusted insider” government 
144 Laxmaiah Manchikanti, “Prescription Drug Abuse: What Is Being Done to Address This New 
Drug epidemic? Testimony before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human 
Resources.,” Pain Physician 9, no. 4 (2006): 287. 
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4 (September 2012): 283–89, doi:10.1016/j.jsr.2012.08.009. 
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officials from local, state, and federal agencies.151 For these reasons, it is critical for the 
homeland security professional, at an executive level, to be aware that an insider can 
devastate the operation of any organization, whether it is a private sector corporation or a 
government agency.152 Employees with an addictive personality behavior can greatly 
increase risk to the organization for which they work.153 To make this point, history has 
also revealed that at least four Americans convicted as spies and who conducted 
espionage against the U.S. government, did so to help alleviate debts incurred because of 
compulsive gambling.154 
I. SHOULD MOTIVES MATTER IN REGARD TO REPORTING CRIME? 
Accurate crime statistics are hard to place on gambling-related criminal offenses, 
especially in fraud and embezzlement cases. Many police departments and law 
enforcement agencies do not have specific reporting requirements as to motives or 
causation of the crime.155  
 
 
151 Southall, “17-Year Term for Official in Tax Scam”; Spagat, “Ex-San Diego Mayor’s Gambling 
Wagers Top $1B”; Michael Schwirtz and Ravi Somaiya, “Vice Admiral Is Suspended in Gambling 
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Thompson, “James Bagarozzo, Buffalo Parking Meter Mechanic, Jailed In $210K Scam,” Huffington Post, 
August 17, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/17/theft-of-840k-coins-sends_0_n_3772807. 
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Smith et al. express the view that: 
Scholars researching this topic” of accurate crime related statistics directly 
as a result of pathological gambling are, “facing an inherent paradox; the 
fact that official police statistics and court records do not show gambling-
related crime to be a serious problem, yet knowing that police and court 
databases are incomplete to the extent that gambling is seldom identified 
as a motive or precipitating factor for crime.156 
Arthur, Williams and Belanger, who investigated how increased legal gambling 
availability has affected crime in Alberta, emphasize in their study that overall 
jurisdictional crime rates were useful in analyzing trends in crime and specific crime rates 
by category.  
However, the main limitation of this type of data is that the causes of 
crime are not recorded within these statistics. One potential way to address 
this problem is to examine the original police report, where the responding 
officer has the option to record, in detail, any causes and mitigating factors 
of the incident to which she/he is responding.157 
This situation appears to be a consistent issue for many police jurisdictions with 
regard to causality in crime. Local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies in the 
United States are required to report annually to the FBI Uniformed Crime Report, 
statistics concerning acts of crime by gender, age, and jurisdiction; however, motive and 
causality are not required statistical data in most criminal cases, especially in fraud and 
embezzlement crimes, as it is a Schedule 2 offense (the only required reporting of those 
offenses is age and gender).158 
As was previously indicated in Henry Lesieur’s research on gambling addiction 
and the pathological gamblers’ need to fund their addiction once they have run out of an 
income source, the risk intensifies in individuals to commit criminal offenses to sustain 
their habit. If these individuals are trusted insiders operating within an organization, fraud 
156 Smith, Wynne, and Hartnagel, Examining Police Records to Assess Gambling Impacts: A Study of 
Gambling-related Crime in the City of Edmonton, 4. 
157 Arthur, Williams, and Belanger, “The Relationship Between Legal Gambling and Crime in 
Alberta1,” 49–84. 
158 “Offenses in Uniform Crime Reporting—Crime in the United States 2004,” accessed March 7, 
2014, https://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius_04/appendices/appendix_02.html. 
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and embezzlement is often the avenue of choice to fund their illegal behavior.159 The 
research indicates that a problematic situation arises for accurate reporting statistics, 
when motives and causality of a criminal offense are not recorded in official police 
reports or investigative notes on financial crimes caused by addiction to gambling. The 
issue of causality and motive for the offender committing a crime is a concern, as 
Blaszcynski and Silove have noted: 
Accurate rates of the prevalence and extent of gambling-related criminal 
behaviors are difficult to obtain. Arrest and conviction rates are inadequate 
because gambling is not necessarily identified on conviction records as 
underlying the offense, and not all gambling related offenses are detected 
or offenders apprehended. Therefore, the true prevalence rate is likely to 
be underestimated.160  
This state of affairs is an example of law enforcement personnel investigating an 
individual, who may also be a potential trusted insider within an organization, for fraud 
or embezzlement and not indicating in their reporting, the underlying motive or causation 
for the individual committing the criminal offense.  
The United States Secret Service (USSS) as a federal law enforcement agency 
has, as one of its core investigative missions, the investigation of financial crimes 
cases.161 It does not have a mechanism in place to record and report causation or motives 
of criminal financial crimes offenses in a format that can readily be used to provide a 
statistical analysis of causation or motives for the occurrence of a financial crime, 
whether for gambling or any other addiction-related motive.162 
The Kentucky State Police (KSP) is the agency charged with retaining criminal 
police records and traffic offense reports for city and county law enforcement agencies 
throughout the Commonwealth of Kentucky. The KSP Records Division advises that it is 
159 Lesieur, The Chase. 
160 Blaszczynski and Silove, “Pathological Gambling,” 360. 
161 “United States Secret Service,” accessed January 21, 2014, http://www.secretservice.gov/. 
162 As the Special Agent in Charge of the U.S. Secret Service, Louisville Field Office, with over 25 
years of experience in criminal investigations, the author can report that no requirement exists for Special 
Agents to include in their case reports, causality or motive, for a perpetrator of a criminal offense in a 
financial crimes investigation, as to their reason for committing a criminal offense.  
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not currently able to capture causation (motives) for most criminal offenses, with the 
exception of fatal traffic accidents.163 
J. INSIDERS HAVE THE ADVANTAGE: PREVENTION, DETECTION, 
AND MITIGATION IS VITAL 
The literature agrees that trusted insiders have substantial advantages over others 
who might want to damage an organization. Dawn Cappelli et al. summarized it well in 
their “3rd Edition of Common Sense Guide to Prevention and Detection of Insider 
Threats:”  
Insiders can bypass physical and technical security measures designed to 
prevent unauthorized access. Mechanisms such as firewalls, intrusion 
detection systems, and electronic building access systems are implemented 
primarily to defend against external threats. However, not only are insiders 
aware of the policies, procedures, and technology used in their 
organizations, but also they are often aware of their vulnerabilities, such as 
loosely enforced policies and procedures or exploitable technical flaws in 
networks or systems.164 
Andy Jones advocates that stopping and apprehending a malicious insider 
involves more than implementing strong technical measures; ultimately, the problem is a 
people issue. “Advocating strong physical, procedural and personnel measures in an 
organization will reduce the likelihood of a malicious attack occurring and increase the 
likelihood of an attack being detected.”165 Consensus exists in the literature that to detect 
insider threats as early as possible, or to prevent them altogether, management, IT, human 
resources, security officers, and others in the organization must understand the 
psychological, organizational, and technical aspects of the problem, as well as how they 
coordinate their actions over time.166  
163 Kentucky State Police, “Commonwealth of Kentucky 2012 Crime Report,” 2013, http://www. 
kentuckystatepolice.org/pdf/cik_2012.pdf. 
164 Cappelli et al., “Common Sense Guide to Prevention and Detection of Insider Threat, 3rd 
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165 Andy Jones, “Catching the Malicious Insider,” Information Security Technical Report 13, no. 4 
(November 2008): 220–24, doi:10.1016/j.istr.2008.10.008. 
166 Eric Savitz and Kevin Cunningham, “Insider Attacks Are Impacting Your Bottom Line,” 
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A common theme throughout the literature concludes that, regardless of the size 
of the organization, prevention, early detection, and mitigation, with buy-in from all 
levels of the corporate or organization management structures, are critical components. 
Building a layered and well-defined approach to insider fraud is clearly the goal. Having 
a plan in place to defend against, prevent, and deal with an insider attack, should one 
occur, is vital for any organization’s’ ability to recover quickly from an insider event of 
any magnitude.167  
Academic literature suggests that authorized employees are usually familiar with 
some or all the internal process of their organization. For example, insiders are almost 
always aware of the policies, procedures, security countermeasures, and the associated 
vulnerabilities, which relate to them, or they have the ability to gain that knowledge 
without suspicion.168 Illicit insider activity in the IT sector in particular serves as a prime 
example of the importance of educating and training all employees at every level of the 
organization in security awareness issues, acceptable use policies, and the key role each 
employee can play in prevention and early detection of insider activities. It is critical that 
employees from clerical staff to high-level managers in any organization who observe 
unusual activity or become aware of an insider’s plans must have a mechanism in place 
to report their knowledge or suspicions. Education that helps employees to recognize 
threats and encourages them to report unusual behaviors is a critical step in the early 
detection of insider activity. Creating a culture of security in which employees 
understand that they are an important line of defense against harmful and abusive attacks 
on systems and data is a key component of any strategy to mitigate the threat of illicit 
insider activity.169  
167 Silowash et al., “Common Sense Guide to Mitigating Insider Threats, 4th Edition”; Greitzer et al., 
“Combating the Insider Cyber Threat”; Wells, Corporate Fraud Handbook: Prevention and Detection. 
168 Cappelli, Moore, and Trzeciak, The CERT Guide to Insider Threats: How to Prevent, Detect, and 
Respond to Information Technology Crimes (Theft, Sabotage, Fraud), 2012; Randazzo et al., Insider Threat 
Study: Illicit Cyber Activity in the Banking and Finance Sector; Greitzer et al., “Combating the Insider 
Cyber Threat” 
169 Kowalski, Cappelli, and Moore, “Insider Threat Study: Illicit Cyber Activity in the Information 
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Threats: How to Prevent, Detect, and Respond to Information Technology Crimes (Theft, Sabotage, 
Fraud), 2012; Gelles, Brant, and Geffert, “Building A Secure Workforce: Guard Against Insider Threat.” 
 40 
                                                 
K. LEADING INDICATORS SUGGEST MORE NEEDS TO BE 
DISCOVERED ABOUT INSIDER THREAT’S CONNECTED TO 
ADDICTION AS A MOTIVE FOR COMMITTING FRAUD AND 
EMBEZZLEMENT 
Insider threats and insider fraud have been studied, researched, and documented. 
Clear definitions of insider threats, parameters around possible causes, predictive models, 
and best practices for prevention, early detection, and mitigation have been 
established.170 However, the research is lacking more in depth analysis and case studies 
on actual insider events in which a relationship to addiction exists as the motivating 
factor for the trusted insiders committing their crime.  
Each year, federal law enforcement agencies investigate hundreds of criminal 
cases involving insider crime.171 Researchers have studied a relatively small percentage 
of the actual insider fraud and embezzlement cases.172 Important lessons are to be learned 
regarding why insider threats and insider fraud and embezzlement are so pervasive. 
Research indicates that a gap exists on scientific case studies regarding addictive 
personality behavior and addiction to gambling and prescription drug abuse as a possible 
indicator of predictive insider threats. Recent criminal cases point to a trend toward 
insiders committing fraud and embezzlement due to pressure brought on by an addiction. 
Research also indicates that motives for why individuals commit fraud and embezzlement 
are not readily accessible from the Uniformed Crime Reports or from actual law 
enforcement documentation reporting these crimes. 
Press reports and open source records also indicate that public and government 
officials are not immune from committing fraud and embezzlement within their 
organizations, with addiction as a mitigating factor for their illegal behavior. Compelling 
evidence exists linking trusted insiders committing financial crimes offenses within 
170 Cappelli, Moore, and Trzeciak, The CERT Guide to Insider Threats: How to Prevent, Detect, and 
Respond to Information Technology Crimes (Theft, Sabotage, Fraud), 2012. 
171 Management and Organization Division, United States Secret Service Annual Statistical Report—
Fiscal Year 2013 (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2013). 
172 Cappelli, Moore, and Trzeciak, The CERT Guide to Insider Threats: How to Prevent, Detect, and 
Respond to Information Technology Crimes (Theft, Sabotage, Fraud), 2012. 
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organizations, to behavioral addictive patterns, such as an addiction to gambling, or pain 
prescription medication. Further research examining this connection is warranted. 
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III. U.S. SECRET SERVICE CASE STUDIES 
This chapter focuses on an examination of the USSS role in investigating fraud 
and embezzlement cases and also looks at the results from four of its field offices that 
reviewed 10 closed criminal cases in each office involving fraud and embezzlement to 
determine if addiction was a causal factor for the insiders’ illegal activity.  
The USSS, under 18 U.S. Code 1056, is authorized to investigate financial 
crimes. As one of the agency’s primary core investigative functions, it has historically 
been actively involved with investigations of fraud and embezzlement criminal cases 
conducted by trusted insiders within private sector, non-profit, and public sector 
organizations.173 
A. DEFINING THE SECRET SERVICE ROLE IN CRIMINAL 
INVESTIGATIONS 
In 2015, the USSS will celebrate its 150th year as one of the oldest federal law 
enforcement agencies in the nation. While best known for its mission of protecting the 
President and other senior officials, the USSS was created in 1865 under the Department 
of Treasury at the end of the Civil War for the investigation of counterfeit currency, a 
mission it is still mandated to conduct.  
Today, the agency’s primary investigative mission is to safeguard the payment 
and financial systems of the United States. This protection has been historically 
accomplished through the enforcement of counterfeiting statutes to preserve the integrity 
of U.S. currency, coin, and financial obligations.  
Since 1984, the USSS’ investigative responsibilities have expanded to include 
crimes that involve financial institution fraud, computer and telecommunications fraud, 
false identification documents, access device fraud, advance fee fraud, electronic funds 
transfers, and money laundering as it relates to the agency’s core violations. To combat 
173 “United States Secret Service.”  
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these crimes, the USSS has adopted a proactive approach that utilizes advanced 
technologies.174 
In March 2003, as part of the enactment of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, 
the USSS was transferred from the Department of the Treasury to the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) as a distinct entity.175 The USSS actively investigates the 
following types of crimes: 
Threats against the president and other protected persons (Protective Intelligence) 
Counterfeiting of currency (foreign and domestic) 
Counterfeiting of U.S. commercial securities 
False identification 
U.S. Treasury check forgery 
U.S. bond forgery 
Electronic financial transaction fraud (commercial and consumer) 
Access device fraud (credit and debit card fraud) 
Computer fraud (scams, intrusion and hacking) 
Embezzlement and misappropriation (public and private) 




B. RELEVANT CRIMINAL CASE FACTS FROM THE SECRET SERVICE 
The USSS’ Management and Organization Division (MNO) provides 
comprehensive analytical products and compiles a wide variety of statistics, including 
reported fraud and embezzlement cases worked by USSS Field Offices. The following 
numbers were produced by the MNO. 
174 “United States Secret Service.” 
175 Shawn Reese, The U.S. Secret Service: An Examination and Analysis of Its Evolving Missions, 
Report for Congress, CRS Report RL34603 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, January 8, 
2013), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL34603.pdf. 
176 “United States Secret Service.” 
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In fiscal year 2013, the USSS closed 6,283 criminal financial crimes 
investigations, including cybercrimes, and arrested 5,148 individuals. In FY2013, the 
USSS efforts in combating financial crimes prevented an estimated 5.3 billion dollars in 
losses, of which 1.1 billion involved cybercrimes. These numbers do not include arrest 
statistics for USSS protective intelligence related investigations. 
In FY2013, the USSS closed 498 cases of financial crimes investigations under 
the category of fraud, embezzlement and misappropriation investigations and arrested 
587 individuals for these crimes.177 These investigations are not restricted to only 
insiders, but are generally concentrated on insiders within organizations that have 
committed a financial crime. It should be noted that this category is not exclusive of all 
insider threat identified cases worked within the USSS, but is generally indicative of 
individuals committing financial crimes within organizations across public, private, and 
non-profit sectors.  
1. Louisville Field Office 
As the Special Agent in Charge of the USSS, Louisville Field Office, the author 
began to notice that an increased number of current fraud and embezzlement cases 
involving trusted insiders under investigation in Kentucky and Southern Indiana involved 
defendants addicted to gambling or pain prescription medication as primary motivators 
for committing their crimes.178 After further examination, he discovered in the summer 
of 2013, that six out of 11 then-open criminal cases involving fraud or embezzlement 
conducted by trusted insiders were motivated by either a gambling addiction or an 
addiction to pain prescription medication. This discovery led the author to ask the 
research question for this thesis: Insiders are committing fraud and embezzlement within 
organizations: Is there a connection to addiction? 
177 Management and Organization Division, United States Secret Service Annual Statistical Report—
Fiscal Year 2013. 
178 In reviewing an open criminal case in 2013, on a $1.7 million embezzlement investigation, the 
author discovered from the case agent that a trusted insider, responsible for the finances of a non-profit 
organization, had used the entire amount of funds he embezzled for the sole purpose of feeding a gambling 
addiction with which both he and his wife were involved. The investigation had revealed through wire 
transfers over the period of several months that $1.7 million had been transferred to several casinos and 
withdrawn by the insider and his spouse.  
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As a research objective for this project, he reviewed 10 closed and adjudicated 
criminal cases under the USSS financial crimes category of fraud, embezzlement and 
misappropriation investigations, in the Louisville Field Office. As stated above, and as a 
general rule, this category of financial crimes investigation involves individuals who have 
defrauded or embezzled funds within their control, as employees of public, private, or 
non-profit sector organizations. The objective of the research was to establish motivating 
factors for the criminal actions and reasons the defendant provided or could be 
determined during the course of the criminal investigation by the investigator or case 
agent for the illegal act.179 
The results of this review are as follows. 
 
Louisville Case 1 
 
Organization Type: Private Sector 
Insider Description Female, 61 y/o 
Fraud Loss Dollar Amount: $1,382,495 
Motives: Gambling addiction, but also used money for personal items 
Dates of Embezzlement/Fraud: Embezzlement started in 2007, was discovered 
in late 2010, prosecuted in 2011 
Incident description: Insider was the president of private company. Upon review 
of bank statements, the owner of the company was contacted by a bank 
representative about possible fraudulent actions of the now former president of 
the company. With closer inspection, it was revealed that the insider, over the 
course of roughly 3 years, made a number (18) of wire transfers and deposited 
checks (180) created by the insider for personal gain. The investigation began 
after suspicious activity occurred when it was known to the bank that the 
company was going out of business and neither the amount of money withdrawn 
nor number of checks written made sense. The insider covered her tracks by 
creating fraudulent reports to hide the illegal activity. The insider was convicted 
of wire fraud and embezzlement, pled guilty, and was sentenced to 41 months 







179 The examination of the closed criminal cases was done because of the Special Agent in Charge of 
the Louisville Field Office participation in the Naval Postgraduate School Cohort 1206 Master’s program. 
The examination only looked at the possible motive of the insiders’ crime. 
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Louisville Case 2 
 
Organization Type: Public Sector 
Insider Description: Male, 43 y/o, Female, 52 y/o 
Fraud Loss Dollar Amount: $233,120 
Motives: Insider had an addiction to pain prescription addiction, specifically 
Lortab pills in this case 
Dates of Embezzlement/Fraud: Insider began embezzlement in 2010, was 
discovered in 2011, and prosecuted federally in 2012. 
Incident description: Insider was a public sector agency’s Executive Director and 
over the duration of the insider’s employment, the insider embezzled funds by 
creating fraudulent invoices, issuing fraudulent checks and splitting the proceeds 
with a collusive vendor for services never rendered for the agency. The 
embezzlement was uncovered when a bank teller became suspicious when the 
insider was making a bank deposit and called the police. When confronted, the 
insider admitted he was addicted to pain pills and the fraudulent scheme funded his 
addiction. The insider was convicted in federal court for one count of 
embezzlement and sentenced to two years in prison, two years supervised release, 
and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $248,120. 
 
Louisville Case 3 
 
Organization Type: Public Sector 
Insider Description: Male, 53 y/o 
Fraud Loss Dollar Amount: $282,000 
Motives: Insider had depleted trust fund and embezzled to maintain lifestyle above 
his means 
Dates of Embezzlement/Fraud: Insider began embezzlement in 2002, was 
discovered in 2009, and prosecuted federally in 2010 
Incident Description: Insider was an agency’s fire chief and over the duration of 
the insider’s employment, the insider embezzled funds by using the company 
credit card for personal expenses, issuing himself additional fraudulent paychecks 
and paying for personal expenses from a chartable account he exclusively 
maintained. The embezzlement was uncovered when the insider was fired and the 
Board of Trustees discovered the chartable account. When confronted, the insider 
stated the embezzlement was a result of his inability to manage the business end of 
his position. The insider was convicted in federal court for counts of mail fraud, 
wire fraud and money laundering, sentenced to three years and five months in 








Louisville Case 4 
 
Organization Type: Private Sector 
Insider Descriptors: Male, 26 y/o 
Fraud Loss Dollar Amount: $17,313.11 
Motives: Unknown (Possible drug addiction) 
Dates of Embezzlement/Fraud: 11/23/09–02/25/11 
Incident Description: Insider was an employee at a privately owned storage 
facility who had a responsibility of accepting rental payments from storage tenants; 
both in cash and in check form. The employee would embezzle cash payments 
while entering the amount paid on a computer system to allow the employee to 
show daily reconciliation sheets to the owner, which displayed correct payments 
for that day keeping the tenants in good standing. After providing a correct 
reconciliation sheet to the owner, the employee would return to the computer 
system and remove cash he had taken from the reconciliation sheets to allow the 
employee to produce a second sheet, not showing the cash he embezzled, that he 
would provide to the business accountant with the checks and/or extra cash he did 
not take. In this manner, it would balance the amount taken in as rental payments 
with the reconciliation sheets, thus showing no discrepancy between monies taken 
in on that day and the amount shown on the reconciliation sheets. Insider pleaded 
guilty to theft over $10,000 and was given a two-year suspended sentence, and 
ordered to pay full restitution of $17,313.11 to the victim. 
 
Louisville Case 5 
 
Organization Type: Private Sector 
Insider Descriptors: Two Males, 27 and 33 y/o 
Fraud Loss Dollar Amount: $311, 000 
Motives: Insider’s suffered from a pain prescription addiction 
Dates of Embezzlement/Fraud: Criminal activity began in 2007, was discovered 
in 2011, and prosecuted in 2012 
Incident Description: Both insiders worked in IT department of private company, 
and had access to the company credit card to purchase IT supplies. Upon audit of 
the companies “order history,” the Senior Vice President of the company 
discovered possible fraudulent activity by two employees. With closer inspection, 
it was discovered that the insiders were buying high priced electronic equipment 
with the company credit card. The insiders would then sell or trade these items for 
prescription pain medication. Both insiders were convicted of wire/mail fraud and 
sentenced to 21 months incarceration in federal prison, three years supervised 







Louisville Case 6 
 
Organization Type: Private Sector 
Insider Descriptors: Female, 44 y/o 
Fraud Loss Dollar Amount: $648,525.47 
Motives: Insider had a gambling addiction 
Dates of Embezzlement/Fraud: Insider began embezzlement in 2004, was 
discovered in 2008, and was prosecuted in 2010. 
Incident Description: This case originated in 2008 with a call from 
representatives of a loan credit company. Corporate office personnel discovered 
multiple issues indicative of fraudulent activity, including loans with checks being 
issued to someone other than the borrower, after a review was conducted at one of 
the company branch locations. Further investigation revealed that the insider was 
the Branch Manager who in turn created approximately 190 fraudulent loans 
using the personal identifiers of former customers and other individuals in the 
community. The insider would then have friends and family members cash the 
issued checks and bring her the proceeds from the loans. The insider stated in a 
suspect interview that she committed the fraud to support a gambling habit. The 
insider pled guilty to a violation of 18 USC 1343, wire fraud, and was sentenced 
to three years and five months in federal prison, $648,525.47 in restitution, and 
three years of supervised release. 
 
Louisville Case 7 
 
Organization Type: Private Sector 
Insider Descriptors: Female, 45 y/o 
Fraud Loss Dollar Amount: $2,139,788.86 
Motives: Insider used embezzled funds to purchase home, vehicles, provide 
support for a home business, and for charitable purposes. 
Dates of Embezzlement/Fraud: Insider began embezzlement in 1997, was 
discovered in 2007, and was prosecuted federally in 2008.  
Incident Description: Insider was a company’s control accountant and was 
considered by management to be a “trusted employee, like a member of the 
family.” In 1997, insider began embezzling funds from the company’s petty cash 
account by writing checks to herself and to other employees that she considered 
loans. She used the money she received to put a down payment on a house, to 
purchase a recreational vehicle, automobile, boat and all-terrain vehicles, and to 
purchase equipment for her home-based business. Management discovered the 
embezzlement after an audit revealed discrepancies in account balances. Insider 
was convicted in 2008 in federal court and sentenced to serve 37 months 
incarceration, two years’ supervised release, ordered to pay $2,383,723.44 in 





Louisville Case 8 
 
Organization Type: Private Sector 
Insider Description: Male, 51 y/o 
Fraud Loss Dollar Amount: $1,100,000.00  
Motives: Insider had an addiction to gambling and pain prescription medication 
pills 
Dates of Embezzlement/Fraud: Insider conducted embezzlement over a 3-month 
period in 2008. Fraud was discovered in 2010, and prosecuted federally in 2013. 
Incident description: Insider was an owner of a small business. When his 
gambling and pain medication addiction became out of control, he created and 
passed counterfeit checks made on the company business and moved funds from 
account to account over a three-month period of time, drawing the money out to 
feed his gambling addiction. The owner/insider placed the businesses into 
bankruptcy and closed the doors. He was later prosecuted federally for wire and 
mail fraud.  
 
Louisville Case 9 
 
Organization Type: Private Sector 
Insider Description: Female, 54 y/o 
Fraud Loss Dollar Amount: $2,400,000.00 
Motives: Insider had a pain prescription medication addiction 
Dates of Embezzlement/Fraud: Insider began embezzlement in 2000, 
discovered in 2008, and prosecuted in 2010. 
Incident Description: Insider was the bookkeeper at a small law-firm where she 
had worked for over 18 years. Insider and her husband both became addicted to 
pain prescription medication and began embezzling funds in 2000 to support both 
of their addictions. Insider was prosecuted federally, pled guilty to wire fraud and 
was sentenced in 2010 to 51 months, three-year supervision, and ordered to pay 
restitution in the amount of $2,400,000.00. 
 
Louisville Case 10 
 
Organization Type: Private Sector 
Insider Description: Male, 28 y/o 
Fraud Loss Dollar Amount: $4800 
Motives: Insider was addicted to pain prescription medication 
Dates of Embezzlement/Fraud: Insider began illegal activity in 2008, 
discovered in 2009, and sentenced federally in 2010. 
Incident Description: Insider became addicted to pain prescription medication 
after having medical surgeries in 2007 and 2008. Insider was a company IT 
administrator and began using organizational client data to obtain pain 
prescription medication utilizing clients’ PII. Insider began ordering pain 
prescription medication in company client’s names. Insider had access to a large 
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database of client information numbering in the hundreds of thousands of possible 
victims. Insider pled guilty to wire fraud and was sentenced to one year and one 
day in federal prison.  
 
As research for this thesis, the author asked the USSS Cincinnati, Memphis, and 
Nashville Field Offices for their criminal case files from the 10 most recently closed 
criminal cases on insider fraud or embezzlement, under the USSS financial crimes 
category of fraud, embezzlement and misappropriation investigations to determine what 
the motivating factor(s) were for the insiders’ illegal activity. The goal of the research 
was to determine if addiction had a role to play in the motives for the insiders’ illegal 
activity. The following is a list of the questions asked to be completed by each office. 
 
USSS field office research questions on closed/adjudicated criminal cases 
involving trusted insiders within organizations prosecuted for fraud and or 
embezzlement (most recent 10 closed criminal cases) research question: is 
addiction associated with the motive of the illegal activity? 
• Secret Service Case Number (For internal tracking purposes only) 
• Victim Organization Type (Public Sector/Private Sector/Non-
Profit) 
• Insider Descriptors: Gender, Age 
• Fraud Loss Dollar Amount 
• Motives for embezzlement/fraud: **Please note if the Insider had 
any type of addiction as a motivating factor in the embezzlement 
or fraud** (Ex. Insider had a Gambling Addiction, Insider had a 
Pain Medication Addiction, Insider had an Enhanced Lifestyle 
Addiction 
• Provide very brief Incident Description (Example: Insider was a 
chief financial officer (CFO) of family business, became addicted 
to pain prescription medication, used access to organization data 
base, committed identity theft and opened/had issued unauthorized 
credit cards, employer discovered illegal insider activity while 
insider was away on vacation. Insider embezzled $100,000, 
convicted in federal court on three counts of aggravated identity 
theft, received 24 month sentence, fined $100, ordered to pay 




The following are the responses received from each field office. 
 
2. Cincinnati Field Office  
 
Cincinnati Case 1 
 
Organization Type: Public Sector 
Insider Descriptors: Male, 37 y/o. 
Fraud Loss Dollar Amount: $15,000 
Motives: Insider had an online gambling addiction. 
Dates of Embezzlement/Fraud: Insider began embezzlement in 2006, was 
discovered in 2012, and was prosecuted locally in 2013. 
Incident Description: Insider was an agency’s union treasurer and secretary. 
Embezzlement began in 2006; the time of the insider’s nomination, until a new 
union secretary and treasurer was nominated. Over the duration of the insider’s 
position, the insider embezzled funds directly from the union bank accounts. To 
hide the embezzlement, the insider would destroy bank statements, records, and 
check stubs. At the time of the yearly audit, the insider would claim to have 
personally performed the audit, and provide false reports showing no discrepancy. 
The embezzlement was discovered after the union decided to review the financial 
records following the completion of the insider’s position. When confronted, it 
was discovered that the insider used the funds to support his online gambling 
addiction. The insider was convicted in local court of one count of theft, and two 
counts of forgery. Insider was sentenced to 60 days in jail, five years of probation, 
a fine of $300, and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $15,000. 
 
Cincinnati Case 2 
 
Organization Type: Private Sector 
Insider Descriptors: Female, 40 y/o 
Fraud Loss Dollar Amount: $159,208.82 
Motives: Insider had a gambling addiction. 
Dates of Embezzlement/Fraud: Insider began embezzlement in 2008, was 
discovered in 2009, and was prosecuted in 2013. 
Incident Description: Insider was a Managing Director and responsible for the 
company’s bookkeeping. Over the course of a year, insider embezzled 
$159,208.82 with a potential loss of $474,730.17 through several methods, 
including direct embezzlement, payroll embezzlement, personal use of the 
company’s credit card, payroll making, and the use of a health saving’s account to 
mask embezzlement. The embezzlement was discovered during a company audit. 
A majority of the money was used to support the insider’s gambling addiction. 
The insider was convicted in federal court on one count of wire fraud and was 
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sentenced to 18 months incarceration with supervised release, and ordered to pay 
$258,000 in restitution to the victim.  
Cincinnati Case 3 
 
Organization Type: Private, Non-profit 
Insider Descriptors: Male, 53 y/o. 
Fraud Loss Dollar Amount: $10,100.00 
Motives: Insider has a severe gambling addiction. 
Dates of Embezzlement/Fraud: Insider embezzled $10,100.00 in January of 
2013.  
Incident Description: Insider worked as a CFO for a private, non-profit 
organization. After the insider took leave citing stress, the organization performed 
an audit on all deposits for the month of January 2013 and the accessible funds 
within the company vault. It was discovered that $10,100.00 was missing from 
the vault safe. When confronted, the insider claimed that he had a problem and 
was going to return the money. Later, it was discovered that the insider had a 
severe gambling addiction. The insider was convicted in local court on one count 
of forgery, and was granted admittance into a Diversion Program. 
 
Cincinnati Case 4 
 
Organization Type: Private sector 
Insider Descriptors: Male 32 y/o, female 31, y/o. 
Fraud Loss Dollar Amount:  
Motives: Insiders had a heroin addiction 
Dates of Embezzlement/Fraud: 2002–2012 
Incident Description: Offenders conspired with a group of various individuals 
that passed fraudulent and stolen checks at various chain stores with the help of 
insiders. Insiders would process the checks as traveler’s checks at the victim store 
to bypass the identification requirements. They would then take the items to 
another store to return them, where they would receive cash. Of the fraudulent 
checks used, some belonged to companies in which the people worked, or 
stolen/used from employee/friends. They would use the money received to 
purchase heroin. A store regional investigator discovered the fraud/embezzlement. 
The case was federally prosecuted, with the male insider receiving 16 years, and 
the female insider receiving four years for conspiracy and wire fraud. 
 
Cincinnati Case 5 
 
Organization Type: Private 
Insider Descriptors: 50 y/o female  
Fraud Loss Dollar Amount: $408,848.23 
Motives: Insider has a gambling addiction 
Dates of Embezzlement/Fraud: The embezzlement began in 2006, discovered in 
2012, and prosecuted in 2013. 
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Incident Description: Insider was a bookkeeper for a private company and ran 
the accounting department within the company. The insider would write company 
checks payable to her husband’s company without his knowledge, and 
immediately withdraw the funds from the account and gamble the money away at 
the slot machines. The company owner, due to his forged signature on the checks, 
discovered the embezzlement. Insider was very cooperative during the 
investigation, and served a federal target letter with a charge of bank fraud. The 
insider negotiated a plea agreement.  
 
Cincinnati Case 6 
 
Organization Type: Private Sector 
Insider Descriptors: 43 y/o female 
Fraud Loss Dollar Amount: $328,290.86 
Motives: Insider has a gambling addiction 
Dates of Embezzlement/Fraud: Insider began the embezzlement in 2010, and 
was discovered in 2013. 
Incident Description: Insider was the Vice President of Operations for one year 
prior to the start of the embezzlement in 2010. The insider directly transferred 
funds from the company account into a bank account controlled by the insider. 
The insider was suspended when the company grew suspicious, and an employee 
took over the insider’s duties. The employee discovered several customer refunds 
placed into an unidentified account under the insider’s name. The insider was 
terminated. The case met federal prosecution. 
 
Cincinnati Case 7 
 
Organization Type: Private  
Insider Descriptors: Insider is a 46 y/o female 
Fraud Loss Dollar Amount: $154,094.71 
Motives: Insider has a severe shopping addiction 
Dates of Embezzlement/Fraud: Embezzlement began in 2010, and was 
discovered and prosecuted in 2013. 
Incident Description: Insider worked for the company for 15 years, and hit 
financial trouble. Insider began using the company credit card to pay bills, but the 
spending quickly escalated. Over the course of three years, the insider embezzled 
$154,094.71. The majority of the money went towards the insider’s shopping 
sprees, with the use of the company credit card, or using the company credit card 
to pay off the insider’s personal credit card. The credit card company reported the 
fraud, as the transactions were indicative of wire fraud, money laundering, and 
credit card fraud, and embezzlement on behalf of an employee. The case has been 





Cincinnati Case 8 
 
Organization Type: Private  
Insider Descriptors: Insider is a 51 y/o female 
Fraud Loss Dollar Amount: $408,484.00 
Motives: Insider had a severe gambling problem  
Dates of Embezzlement/Fraud: Insider began the embezzlement in 2006, was 
discovered in 2012, and prosecuted in 2013 
Incident Description: Insider was a bookkeeper at a small business that was a 
distribution center. Trusted insider used business checks, forged the signature of 
the owner of the company, and deposited checks into fraudulent personal accounts 
to support her gambling addiction. Insider admitted that she was a compulsive 
gambler who had a previous conviction for embezzlement in 1998. Part of the 
insider’s previous sentence was a mandatory enrollment into GA.  
  
Cincinnati Case 9 
 
Organization Type: Private  
Insider Descriptors: Insider is a 45 y/o male 
Fraud Loss Dollar Amount: $96,579.00 
Motives: Insider had financial problems  
Dates of Embezzlement/Fraud: 2011–2012 
Incident Description: Insider used the company credit card and began making 
unauthorized purchases of gift cards. Insider began embezzlement to pay for 
financial problems. Unknown if insider had any known addictions.  
 
Cincinnati Case 10 
 
Organization Type: Private  
Insider Descriptors: Insider is a 54 y/o female 
Fraud Loss Dollar Amount: $1,340,636.00 
Motives: Insider appeared to desire an enhanced lifestyle  
Dates of Embezzlement/Fraud: 2007–2013 
Incident Description: Insider was a bookkeeper for a private company and 
embezzled company funds by falsifying company ledger accounts after she had 
written herself numerous checks and deposited them into accounts she controlled. 
Insider was found guilty on 10 counts of theft over $10,000, and two counts of 







3. Memphis Field Office 
 
Memphis Case 1 
 
State docket  
Private company 
Male, 47 yoa at arrest 
Loss: $1.2 million  
Motives: Unknown motives, refused to be interviewed. No known addictions 
Dates: Embezzlement began in 2000, discovered in 2011, prosecuted in 2012 
Incident: Insider was the CEO of company who wrote legitimate checks on 
company accounts to fictitious vendors, and through a scheme involving 
unwitting employees, he received the illicit funds. Insider was arrested at the 
airport en route to Hawaii. In State court, he pled guilty to one count of theft of 
property over $60,000, sentenced to 10 years in state prison, and restitution of 
$811,075.50. 
 
Memphis Case 2 
 
Federal Docket  
Private company 
Male, 48 yoa at arrest 
Loss: $431,983.79 
Motive: financial stress, possible enhanced lifestyle addition 
Dates: embezzlement began in 2003, discovered in 2011, prosecuted in 2012.  
Incident: Insider was the Vice President of Finance at a private sector 
corporation, forged company checks, and subsequently, deleted the checks from 
the companies system. The fraud was discovered during an audit. He pleaded 
guilty in federal court to one count of bank fraud. He was sentenced to 33 months 
incarceration, three years’ probation, restitution in the amount of $431,983.79, 
and a special assessment of $100.000. 
 
Memphis Case 3 
 
Federal docket  
Private company 
Female, 47 yoa at arrest 
Loss: $1.5 million 
Motives: financial pressures, possible enhanced lifestyle addiction (four houses 
and an antique business were funded through the fraud) 
Dates: embezzlement began in 2006, discovered in 2010, and prosecuted in 2011. 
Incident: Insider was a bookkeeper for a construction firm who made 
unauthorized electronic transfer of funds and wrote company checks (without 
signature authority) to pay for four houses, two cars, a motorcycle and an antique 
business. The fraud was discovered in an audit. The firm was forced into 
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bankruptcy. She pleaded guilty in federal court to one count of bank fraud, was 
sentenced to 51 months in custody, and restitution in the amount of 
$1,578,277.75.  
 




Female 37 yoa at arrest 
Loss: $19,690.79 
Motives: unknown, refused interview 
Dates: embezzlement began in 2008, ended in 2010, discovered in 2011, and 
prosecuted in 2012 
Incident: Insider was the accounting manager at a private corporation, developed 
a scheme in which she would locate stale uncashed checks in the system and 
reissue them to herself using an unauthorized signature stamp for validation. The 
loss was discovered during an audit. In state court, she pleaded guilty to 36 counts 
of forgery, and one count of theft under $60,000. She was placed on diversion for 
three years and paid $19,690.79 in restitution. 
 
Memphis Case 5 
 
Federal docket  
Private company 
Male 72 yoa at arrest 
Loss: $1.75 million 
Motives: enhanced life style, business pressures 
Dates: Embezzlement/check writing began in 1987, discovered in 2011, and 
prosecuted in 2012 
Incident: Insider was an attorney who used funds under his control from real 
estate escrow accounts, trust fund accounts, and probate estate accounts to fund 
other business and an enhanced lifestyle. He pleaded guilty in federal court and 
was sentenced to 48 months incarceration, two years supervised release, and 
restitution of $1.75 million. 
 




Female 39 yoa at arrest 
Loss: $234,000 
Motive: enhanced lifestyle, no known addictions 
Dates: embezzlement began in 2006, discovered in an audit 2012, and prosecuted 
in 2012 
 57 
Incident: Personal assistant of a business executive who used credit cards and 
bank accounts in unauthorized transactions to fund an enhanced lifestyle. She 
pleaded guilty in federal court to one count of mail fraud. She was sentenced to 27 
months in custody, three years supervised release, and $234000 in restitution. 
 




Female 56 yoa at arrest 
Loss: $134,964 
Motive: gambling addiction 
Dates: embezzlement began in 2008, discovered in 2010, and prosecuted in 2013 
Incident: Insider was a college bookstore manager, used elaborate system to void 
valid checks to the bookstore and redirect the funds to herself. She claimed to 
have gone through a divorce and needed funds to live, then became depressed, 
and used gambling as a coping mechanism. She pleaded guilty in state court and 
was sentenced to serve one year in state custody, and nine years probation with 
$50,000 restitution.  
 




Female 33 yoa at arrest 
Loss: $31,750 
Motive: Business pressures, stolen funds were used to bolster husband’s trucking 
business 
Dates: Began in 2009, discovered in 2010, and prosecuted in 2011 
Incident: Insider was a bank teller, stole cash from her drawer and manipulated 
electronic records to cover the loss. Discovered at audit. She pleaded guilty to one 
count of misapplication of bank funds and was sentenced to 90-day incarceration; 
three years supervised release, and restitution of $31,750. 
 




Female 53 yoa at arrest 
Loss: $274,390.33 
Motive: gambling addiction 
Dates: Began 2008, discovered in 2011, and prosecuted in 2012 
Incident: Insider was the bookkeeper who forged company check to herself to 
provide funds for gambling. Discovered at audit. She pleaded guilty in federal 
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court to two counts of fraud and was sentenced to 18 months incarceration, three 
years supervised release, and restitution of $274,390.33 
 
Memphis Case 10 
 
Federal docket  
Private company 
Female 36 yoa at arrest 
Loss: $260,727.35 
Motive: enhanced lifestyle 
Dates: began in 2009, discovered in 2010, prosecuted in 2011 
Incident: Insider was an accounts clerk at a private company who deferred 
incoming payments to a medical firm to her own accounts. She spent the money 
on clothes and travel. It was discovered after the bank questioned her deposits. 
She pleaded guilty in federal court to one count of forged checks. She was 
sentenced to 18 months incarceration, two years supervised release, and 
restitution of $260,727.35. 
 
4. Nashville Field Office 
 
Nashville Case 1 (No known addiction association) 
 
Closed 2002 
Federal Docket  
Victim Organization Type: Individual 
Insider Descriptors: Male, Age (at time of initial fraud): 23 
Actual Fraud Loss Dollar Amount: $50,900.00 
Potential Fraud Loss Dollar Amount: $62,730,900.00 
Motives for Fraud: None indicated 
Dates of Embezzlement: 11/12/98–12/05/98 
Incident Description: An informant provided information implicating the insider 
for fraud related activities in May 1998. While investigating another case, an 
agent discovered evidence of five money transfers from the victim to the insider 
between 11/12/98 and 12/05/98 as part of a Nigerian advance fee fraud scheme. 
Insider was arrested in 2001. Insider pled guilty to misuse of a social security 
number, wire fraud, and bank fraud in federal court on 2001. Insider was 
sentenced to 18 months in federal prison in 2001. 
 
Nashville Case 2 (No known addiction association) 
 
Closed 2002 
Federal Docket  
Victim Organization Type: Individual  
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Insider Descriptors: Insider One: Male, Age (at time of initial fraud): 28; 
Insider Two: Male, Age (at time of initial fraud): 27  
Fraud Loss Dollar Amount: $50,000.00 
Potential Fraud Loss Dollar Amount: $1,000,000.00 
Motives for Fraud: None indicated 
Dates of Embezzlement: 1998 
Incident Description: Two individuals scammed victim in 1998 for $18,000 as 
part of a Nigerian advance fee fraud scheme. The victim reported the fraud. 
Evidence of identity theft and credit card fraud was also discovered from 
surveillance cameras in several electronics stores in the ensuing investigation. 
Insider one was arrested in 1999; the insider gave the location of insider two 
during a post-arrest interview. Insider two was then arrested in 1999. Agents 
found numerous fraudulent identification documents in insider two’s apartment 
that implicated another individual (who was eventually charged, sentenced, and 
deported for the documents). Insider two pled guilty to the misuse of a social 
security number in 1999 in federal court; he was released after agreeing to testify 
in another case. Insider one pled guilty to credit card fraud in 1999 in federal 
court and was sentenced to 12 months one day in 2000.  
 
Nashville Case 3 (No known addiction association) 
 
Closed 2003 
Criminal Case Court Docket Number: N/A 
Victim Organization Type: Individual 
Insider Descriptors: Insider One: Male, Unknown Age; Insider Two: Male, 
Age (at time of initial fraud): 30; Insider Three: Male, Age (at time of initial 
fraud): 30 
Actual Fraud Loss Dollar Amount: $498,969.75 
Potential Fraud Loss Dollar Amount: $1,000,000.00 
Motives for Fraud: None indicated 
Dates of Embezzlement: 1998 
Incident Description: A bank fraud investigator contacted the USSS in 1998. A 
victim sent three cashier’s checks from Nashville to Canada totaling $41,462.50 
in a telemarketing advance fee fraud scheme. A total of 14 checks were written in 
1998 and sent to Canada by the victim. Investigators contacted the Canadian 
police and consolidated this case with a Canadian case due to common suspects 
(three total suspects). Two insiders were arrested in 1999 in Montreal; the third 
insider was never apprehended. Canadian prosecution of the suspects was 
declined on 2002. The USAO declined prosecution in 2002. 
 
Nashville Case 4 (No known addiction association) 
  
Closed 2008 
State Docket  
Victim Organization Type: Private Sector 
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Insider Descriptors: Female, Age (at time of initial fraud): 32 
Actual Fraud Loss Dollar Amount: $92,849.22 
Potential Fraud Loss Dollar Amount: $94,149.49 
Motives for Fraud: Insider used some of the money for house payments. 
Dates of Embezzlement: 2004–2005 
Incident Description: A local detective contacted the USSS in 2005 when the 
victim had initially reported the incident. A secretary of a trucking business made 
numerous unauthorized wire transactions from a business account to a personal 
bank account from 2004–2005. Insider was ordered to pay $287,480.32 in 
damages and fees on 03/14/07.  
 
Nashville Case 5 (No known addiction association) 
 
Closed 2010 
Federal Docket  
Victim Organization Type: Individual  
Insider Descriptors: Female, Age (at time of initial fraud): 30 
Actual Fraud Loss Dollar Amount: $61,940.81 
Potential Fraud Loss Dollar Amount: $76,806.61 
Motives for Fraud: Insider used the funds obtained from the student loans to 
attend two state universities from 1993–1996. 
Dates of Embezzlement: 1993–1996. 
Incident Description: Insider used her spouse’s former wife’s identity to obtain 
numerous student loans in the victim’s name and attend two universities from 
1993–1996. Insider also falsely filled out a naturalization application using the 
victim’s identity in 2007. The victim received notices as early as 1999 about the 
loans and filed several false claim reports but disregarded them. The victim 
reported the fraud in 2006, and the USSS began its investigation. An agent 
interviewed the insider in 2007. Insider was arrested in 2009. Insider pled guilty 
in federal court to false statements relating to naturalization, citizenship, or alien 
registration in 2010 and was sentenced to three years’ probation. Insider was also 
ordered to pay restitution totaling $50,365.31. 
 
Nashville Case 6 (No known addiction association) 
 
Closed 2011 
State Docket  
Victim Organization Type: Private Sector  
Insider Descriptors: Male, Age (at time of initial fraud): 49 
Actual Fraud Loss Dollar Amount: $2,000.00 
Potential Fraud Loss Dollar Amount: $2,000.00 
Motives for Fraud: None indicated 
Dates of Embezzlement: 2011 
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Incident Description: A Nashville detective contacted the USSS in 2011 
regarding an employee theft. The insider used a credit card to obtain a cash 
advance of $2,000 without authorization. Insider was arrested on 2011. 
 
 
Nashville Case 7 (No known addiction association) 
 
Closed 2012 
Criminal Case Court Docket Number: N/A 
Victim Organization Type: Private Sector 
Insider Descriptors: N/A 
Actual Fraud Loss Dollar Amount: $518,813.99 
Potential Fraud Loss Dollar Amount: $518,813.99 
Motives for Fraud: None indicated 
Dates of Embezzlement: October 2010  
Incident Description: The victim, a representative of Computer Marketing 
Corporation, reported fraud related to counterfeit purchase orders on 2010. The 
purchase orders were for computer equipment to be shipped to an address out of 
state. Two controlled deliveries were attempted unsuccessfully. The individual 
shipping the products could not be identified. It was determined that the fraud 
originated overseas. 
 
Nashville Case 8 (Possible addiction association) 
 
Closed 2012 
State Docket  
Victim Organization Type: Private Sector 
Insider Descriptors: Female, Age (at time of initial fraud): 27 
Actual Fraud Loss Dollar Amount: $63,540.10 
Potential Fraud Loss Dollar Amount: $63,540.10 
Motives for Fraud: The insider used the money for a variety of effects including 
groceries, sex toys, music, casino charges, cart payments, cart insurance, electric 
bills, and her husband’s child support payments. Insider may have a gambling and 
sex addiction. 
Dates of Embezzlement: 2008–2010 
Incident Description: The victim reported in 2011 that an employee used 
company credit cards and commercial checks without permission; the victim 
reported a loss of over $63,000. The insider from 2008 to 2010 used 74 fraudulent 
checks and four company credit cards. Insider was arrested on 2011 for theft of 
property and credit card fraud charges. Insider pled guilty to theft of property in 
state court in 2012. Insider was sentenced to eight years supervised probation, 





Nashville Case 9 (Possible addiction association) 
 
Closed 2012 
State Docket  
Victim Organization Type: Private Sector 
Insider Descriptors: Female, Age (at time of initial fraud): 28 
Actual Fraud Loss Dollar Amount: $118,395.69 
Potential Fraud Loss Dollar Amount: $118,395.69 
Motives for Fraud: Insider used the credit card for various personal expenditures 
including utility payments, a Disney World vacation, and a law school loan. 
Insider claimed that her spending “turned into a compulsion” and that she had a 
“binge spending disorder.” * (p. 7 of criminal indictment) 
Dates of Embezzlement: 2007–2009 
Incident Description: The victim reported in 2010 the unauthorized use of two 
credit cards by an employee. Insider was employed as an assistant from 2006 to 
2010. After determining that the insider was the only one with access to the cards, 
insider was arrested for credit card theft on 2011. Insider pled guilty in state court 
in 2012 for fraudulent use of a credit card and was given a nine-year sentence. 
The sentence was suspended on 2012 and insider was given 12 years of 
supervised probation and ordered to pay $90,000 of restitution in monthly 
payments of $800.  
 
Nashville Case 10 (No known addiction association) 
 
Closed 2013 
Federal Docket  
Victim Organization Type: Private Sector 
Insider Descriptors: Female, Age (at time of initial fraud): 38 
Actual Fraud Loss Dollar Amount: $34,945.00 
Potential Fraud Loss Dollar Amount: $34,945.00 
Motives for Fraud: Insider used all embezzled funds to pay for a new car and 
rent.  
*A possible enhanced lifestyle addiction is possible adue to many large returned 
checks, but it is not noted in the case file. 
Dates of Embezzlement: 2009–2010. 
Incident Description: The victim reported in 2010 that the insider, in the 
company’s name, had used numerous forged checks. The insider worked at the 
company from 2009–2010. Insider was arrested in 2011. Insider pled guilty in 
federal court to bank fraud and was sentenced to weekend imprisonment for eight 
months; insider also was ordered to make restitution in the amount of $34,945.00. 
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C. CASE ASSESSMENTS 
It should be noted that the author did not have direct access to the closed criminal 
case files from the Cincinnati, Memphis or Nashville Field Offices. He relied solely on 
the written responses regarding all of the insider threat cases reported by each office as 
the basis for this assessment. The cases requested to be reviewed by each field office 
were under the USSS category of fraud, embezzlement and misappropriation 
investigations. 
1. Louisville Field Office  
As the Special Agent in Charge, the author had complete access to the closed case 
files in the Louisville Field Office and the ability to interview the case agents who had 
completed the investigations. Thus, he was able to conduct an accurate assessment of the 
cases. The cases ranged from small victim organizations of less than six employees, to 
large organizations of over 10,000 employees. Many of the cases devastated the 
organization and caused irreparable financial or reputational harm. In some cases, the 
insider fraud harmed the entire community due to the widespread publication of the 
event.  
At first review of the closed cases, the author discovered from the investigative 
information contained within the case reports that four out of the 10 closed cases 
indicated that an addiction to pain prescription medication was the motivating factor for 
the insider’s reason to commit the crime. He then specifically asked each case agent to 
respond to a question on each of the closed cases to determine if that agent recalled if the 
insider/defendant(s) had any known addiction-related behaviors that were uncovered 
during the course of the criminal investigation and might not have been recorded in the 
case file.  
In Case 1, it was discovered that although not listed in the case reports, the 
investigating case agents recalled that the defendant was addicted to gambling, and had 
admitted during the course of the investigation that, “they were feeding a gambling 
addiction.” When asked why the gambling addiction information was not included in the 
case report, the case agent did not think it was relevant to the facts of the case. In Case 4, 
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the case agent highly suspected the insider was using pain prescription medication 
because a witnesses interviewed for the case stated that the insider was “addicted to pain 
pills.” However, the case agent did not indicate this addition in his case report since the 
insider did not admit to using pain prescription medication and it was not 
corroborated.180  
Out of the 10 Louisville closed cases reviewed for this thesis, the defendants in 
five of the cases were insiders addicted to prescription drug medication; three insiders 
admitted to being addicted to gambling, and in one case, the insider admitted an addiction 
to both gambling and pain prescription medication as his motivating factor for the 
embezzlement. The other two cases indicated the insiders’ desire for an enhanced 
lifestyle. In one of these, Case 3, the investigating case agents reported that the case 
involved a trusted insider who had a collection of 12 high-priced collector vehicles, and 
the insider reportedly, “spent the majority of his embezzlement funds on maintaining his 
prized car collection.” The investigating agents opined that the insider was “obsessed 
with his cars.” 
One of the goals of USSS investigations into financial crimes is to identify assets 
or proceeds that a defendant has stolen or purchased with their ill-gotten gains. Once 
bank accounts or items of value can be identified as proceeds of a crime, the government 
has a process in place to be able to seize and forfeit illegally obtained assets to make 
restitution to the victim organizations.181 Of note, in the eight cases involving gambling 
or pain prescription medication as a motivating factor for the illegal behavior, 
investigating agents discovered that no assets were available to seize or recover. All the 
illegal proceeds from the crimes committed had gone to support the insiders’ addiction to 
gambling or pain prescription medication. The loss in one case was over $2.4 million, 
two cases were over $1 million, and in four cases, losses were several hundred thousand 
dollars. 
180 It should be noted that an addiction to gambling or pain prescription medication is not required to 
be noted in case reports for Secret Service reporting requirements.  
181 The USSS, as a federal agency, is empowered by federal statutes to seize assets believed to have 
been obtained through illegal means, and based on the outcome of civil or criminal action, return those 
seized assets to the victims of the crime.  
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2. Cincinnati Field Office 
Closed criminal case reviews for this thesis conducted by the Cincinnati Field 
Office had the largest reported insider motivations for fraud and embezzlement listed as 
gambling addictions. In six out of 10 instances, the motives for the illegal activity were 
reported to be gambling addictions. In four of the gambling addiction cases, the insiders 
were female, and in two instances, the insiders were male. In Case 8, the insider admitted 
to being previously convicted of insider theft with a former employer due to her gambling 
addiction prior to the embezzlement conducted at the insider’s current place of 
employment. It should also be noted that the insider admitted that as a part of her 
judgment, she was ordered to enroll in Gamblers Anonymous (GA) as a condition of her 
sentencing in the previous offense. 
In Case 4, two insiders conducted fraud, one female and one male. The motivation 
given for their illegal behavior was an addiction to heroin. In Case 7, the female 
embezzler conducted her illegal insider activities due to a severe shopping addiction. In 
Case 9, the insider’s motives for conducting his illegal activity were due to financial 
pressures. 
3. Memphis Field Office 
The Memphis Field Office closed criminal cases had the largest number of trusted 
insiders convicted of illegal fraud and embezzlement activities listed as female 
perpetrators, eight out of 10 cases. Males accounted for two of the cases. In Cases 7 and 
9, both insiders were convicted of fraud and claimed to have been addicted to gambling 
as the motivation for their criminal behavior in each case. In Case 7, the female insider 
reported, “she was going through a divorce, was depressed, and used gambling as a 
coping mechanism.” 
In two cases, no known motivations for the illegal insider activity were 
discovered. In five cases, the motives reported for conducting the illegal insider fraud or 
embezzlement were to maintain an enhanced lifestyle. In Case 8, the insider admitted to 
embezzling funds due to financial pressures to provide support for her husband’s trucking 
business.  
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4. Nashville Field Office 
The Nashville closed criminal cases reported that in two out of the 10 cases, 
addiction appeared to be a motivating factor in the insider’s illegal activity. In Case 8, the 
female insider appeared to have an addiction to gambling, as well as a sex addiction. In 
Case 9, the female insider claimed to have admitted that her spending “turned into a 
compulsion” and that she had a “binge spending disorder.” 
In five cases, motives for the illegal activity could not determined from the case 
files. In Cases 4 and 5, both with female perpetrators, the cause appeared to be outside 
financial pressures. In Case 10, the insider appeared to desire an enhanced lifestyle as the 
motivating factor for her embezzlement. See Table 1. 
 
Motive Male Female 
Gambling Addiction 3 8 
Pain Prescription Med Addiction 4 2 
Gambling and Pain Med Addiction 1 0 
Heroin Addiction 1 1 
Possible Pain Med Addiction 1 0 
Gambling and Sex Addiction 0 1 
Binge Shopping Disorder 0 1 
Enhanced Lifestyle 3 6 
Financial Pressures 1 3 
Unknown Motive 8 1 
Total 22 23 
Table 1.   Results of Motives 
5. Case Assessment General Findings  
The USSS case reviews conducted by the Louisville, Cincinnati, Memphis and 
Nashville Field Offices under the USSS category of fraud, embezzlement and 
misappropriation investigations revealed the following general statistics. 
Forty closed criminal cases were reviewed with a total of 45 insiders involved in 
fraud or embezzlement; the perpetrators were 24 females and 21 males. Out of 40 entities 
victimized, four were from the public sector, one was non-profit, and 35 private sector 
bodies that suffered loss due to an insider threat being conducted against it. Eleven cases 
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had a gambling addiction as a motivating factor, three of which had male perpetrators and 
eight were female. Six events had pain prescription medication addiction as a motivating 
factor, and in one case, an addiction to both gambling and pain prescription medication 
was listed as the motive. In one case, both a male and female insider claimed a heroin 
addiction as the motivating factor. Another incident had both a gambling addiction and a 
sex addiction as the motivating factor, and yet another case had a binge spending or 
shopping disorder as the insiders’ motivation for her illegal activity. Nine cases listed an 
enhanced lifestyle as a motivating factor, four incidents listed outside financial pressures 
as the motivating factor, and in nine instances, a motive for the insider criminal action 
could not be determined and was listed as unknown. 
Figure 2 shows the 40 case motives for committing fraud and embezzlement 
separated by gender. It is interesting to note that the majority of female perpetrators had 
motives related to gambling addiction, and aside from unknown motives, the male 
perpetrators’ majority motive was pain prescription medication addiction. 
 
Figure 2.  Insider Fraud Motives by Gender 
 68 
In these 40 cases reviewed for a determination of motive(s) by the 45 insiders 
committing fraud or embezzlement activities, Figure 3 provides an indication of the 
breakdown of motives. Twenty-three individuals were identified with an addictive 
behavior, 13 motives were tied to financial pressures or a desire for an enhanced lifestyle 
as motivating factors, and in nine cases, the motives were unknown.182 
 
Figure 3.  Insiders by Motive Type 
D. CERT INSIDER THREAT CASE STUDIES 
The CERT Insider Threat Center conducts empirical research and analysis to 
develop and transition socio-technical solutions to combat insider cyber threats. It has 
been researching this problem since 2001 in partnership with the DOD, the DHS, the 
USSS, other federal agencies, the intelligence community, private industry, academia, 
182 The USSS does not require case agents to document a specific motive or motives for a suspect or 
defendant in a criminal case, as to their reason for conducting their illegal activities. Case agents are 
focused on determining the criminal elements of a case and being able to determine probable cause of 
illegal criminal activity to provide documentation of the elements of a crime to present the facts of criminal 
wrongdoing to a prosecuting attorney for judicial action to occur.  
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and the vendor community. CERT is located at Carnegie Mellon University’s Software 
Engineering Institute, a federally funded research and development center (FFRDC).183 
Currently, the CERT program has over 700 documented cases of malicious 
insiders convicted in a U.S. court of law for criminal violations regarding illegal insider 
activity involving some form of critical IT services; see Figure 3. The current cases in the 
insider threat database involve insider incidents from 1996 to the present.184 
 
Figure 4.  CERT Insider Threat Cases by Category185 
CERT breaks down its research of insider threats into five types of crimes. 
IT sabotage: An insider’s use of IT to direct specific harm at an organization or 
an individual. 
Fraud: An insider’s use of IT for the unauthorized modification, addition, or 
deletion of an organization’s data (not programs or systems) for personal gain, or 
183 Michael Hanley et al., An Analysis of Technical Observations in Insider Theft of Intellectual 
Property Cases (Pittsburgh, PA: Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellon University, February 
2011). 
184 Cappelli, Moore, and Trzeciak, The CERT Guide to Insider Threats: How to Prevent, Detect, and 
Respond to Information Technology Crimes (Theft, Sabotage, Fraud).  
185 All graphs in this section were provided by CERT for this thesis research. 
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theft of information that leads to an identity crime (e.g., identity theft, credit card 
fraud).  
Theft of intellectual property (IP): An insider’s use of IT to steal intellectual 
property from the organization. This category includes industrial and national 
security espionage involving insiders. 
Miscellaneous: Cases in which the insider’s activity was not for IT sabotage, 
fraud, or IP theft. 
Espionage: An insider’s use of IT for the act of obtaining, delivering, 
transmitting, communicating, or receiving information about the national defense 
with an intent, or reason to believe, that the information may be used for the 
injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation. (It should be 
noted that no espionage cases were used for this study.)186  
CERT defines an insider threat as: 
A malicious insider threat to an organization is a current or former 
employee, contractor, or other business partner who has or had authorized 
access to an organization’s network, system, or data and intentionally 
exceeded or misused that access in a manner that negatively affected the 
confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the organization’s information 
or information systems.187 
The following are the sources of information CERT used to code insider threat 
cases. 
Public sources of information 
• Media reports 
• Court documents 
• Publications 
Non-public sources of information 
• Law enforcement investigations 
• Organization investigations 
• Interviews with victim organizations 
• Interviews with convicted insiders188 
186 Cappelli, Moore, and Trzeciak, The CERT Guide to Insider Threats: How to Prevent, Detect, and 
Respond to Information Technology Crimes (Theft, Sabotage, Fraud), xviii–xxi. 
187 Cappelli et al., “Common Sense Guide to Prevention and Detection of Insider Threat, 3rd 
Edition—Version 3.1.”  
188 Randall Trzeciak, “The CERT Insider Threat Database|Insider Threat,” CERT Insider Threat 
Center, August 15, 2011, http://www.cert.org/blogs/insider-threat/post.cfm?EntryID=76. 
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 Listed as follows are types of information about each incident collected including, 
but not limited to the following 
Details of the insider’s behavior and interactions with coworkers 
Vulnerabilities in organization systems that the inside was able to exploit in the 
attack 
Unmet expectations related to job conditions 
Technical and nontechnical methods used by the insider 
Evidence of planning and deception 
How the incident was detected or reported 
Types of information or assets that were stolen or targeted 
 
Information about coconspirators and recruitment189 
1. Thesis Research Conducted by CERT 
The research examined by the CERT program for this thesis reviewed 680 
documented insider threat cases currently evaluated and in their database. The purpose of 
this study was to determine if any of the documented motivating factors for the insider’s 
illegal activity had any references to addiction as a motive.190  
Out of the 680 insider threat cases reviewed by CERT for the research on this 
thesis, the principal data set revealed that 29 out of the 680 cases involved some kind of 
addiction related motive as a contributing factor for the illegal insider activity. It should 
be noted that addiction was listed in the CERT database only if it was documented during 
the investigation or through any of the above listed public and non-public sources of 
information. The data revealed that the addiction noted in the findings involved 




189 Hanley et al., An Analysis of Technical Observations in Insider Theft of Intellectual Property 
Cases. 
190 Information provided by CERT for research on this thesis. 
191 Ibid. 
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Action Count 
Alcohol and Drug Use 3 
Drug Use (non-alcohol) 15 
Alcohol Use 5 
Gambling 6 
Table 2.   CERT Insider Threat Cases by Breakdown of Addictive 
Indicators192 
In the 29 identified cases with known addiction behaviors, 21 indicated fraud as 
the illegal activity committed by the insider, as noted in Figure 5, with almost half of 
those cases coming from the banking and finance sector. Figure 6 shows the 29 cases 
identified with addiction-related behaviors, broken down by type of case.  
 
Figure 5.  CERT Insider Threat Cases with Addiction As a Motivating Factor193  
192 All graphs in this section were provided by CERT for this thesis research. 
193 All graphs in this section were provided by CERT for this thesis research. 
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Figure 6.  CERT Insider Threat Cases with Addiction As a Motivating Factor 
Broken Down by Sectors194 
In 24 out of the 29 insider threat cases, gambling and drug use was indicated as 
the addictive behavior trait. As was previously stated, fraud connected criminal activity, 
accounted for 21 out of the 29 insider threat cases of addiction related illegal insider 
behavior in the CERT database, which is reflective of the thesis literature review in 
Chapter II. In most incidents in which fraud is committed because of the insider attack, 
the need to finance the addiction is often indicated as the motivating factor driving the 
insider to conduct their illegal activity.195  
 
194 Ibid. 
195 Lesieur, The Chase: Career of the Compulsive Gambler, vol. xxi; Cressey, Other People’s Money; 
A Study in the Social Psychology of Embezzlement; Green, “White-Collar Crime and the Study of 
Embezzlement,” 95–106. 
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2. Detailed Breakdown 
CERT detailed breakdown of the cases with addiction as a motivator follows.196 
Total Number of Addiction/Alcohol/Gambling Drugs Cases  
• 29 Cases Industry Sector and 27 Cases Banking and Finance: 
44.44%  
• Information Technology: 14.81% 
• Government/Federal: 11.11%  
• Government/State/Local: 7.41% 
• Agriculture and Food: 3.7%  
• Water: 3.7%  
• Communications: 3.7% 
• Education: 3.7%  
• Commercial Facilities: 3.7%  
• Healthcare and Public Health: 3.7% 
Gender of Insider: 29 Cases 
• Male: 65.52%  
• Female: 34.48% 
Insider’s Employment Type: 29 Cases 
• Full Time: 82.61% 
• Contractor: 17.39% 
Insider’s Employment Status: 29 Cases 
• Current: 71.43% 
• Former: 28.57% 
Trusted Business Partner: 29 Cases 
• No: 82.14% 
• Yes : 17.86% 
Type of Trusted Business Partner Relationship: 5 Cases 
• Organizational: 40.0% 
• Contract Employee: 40.0%  
196 CERT detailed breakdown of cases with addiction provided in raw data format. 
 75 
                                                 
• Individual Consultant: 20.0% 
Prior Planning by Insider: 8 Cases 
• 0–24 Hours: 25.0% 
• None: 25.0% 
• > 1 Year: 25.0% 
• Planned, Time Unknown: 12.5% 
• 8–31 Days: 12.5% 
Prior Deception by Insider: 7 Cases 
• > 1 Year: 42.86% 
• None: 28.57% 
• 90–365 Days: 28.57% 
Time of Insider Attack: 19 Cases 
• During Work Hours: 63.16% 
• During and Outside of Work Hours: 21.05%  
• Outside of Work Hours: 15.79% 
Location of Insider Attack: 23 Cases 
• On-Site: 69.57% 
• Remotely: 21.74% 
• On-Site and Remotely: 8.7% 
 
Attack On-Site: 29 Cases 
• TRUE: 55.17%  
• FALSE: 44.83% 
Insider had Remote Access: 29 Cases 
• FALSE: 79.31%  
• TRUE: 20.69% 
Location of Attack Unknown: 29 Cases 
• FALSE: 82.76%  
• TRUE: 17.24% 
Attack During Working Hours: 29 Cases 
• TRUE: 51.72%  
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• FALSE: 48.28% 
Attack Outside of Working Hours: 29 Cases 
• FALSE: 79.31%  
• TRUE: 20.69% 
Time of Attack Unknown: 29 Cases 
• FALSE: 72.41%  
• TRUE: 27.59% 
Case Type: 29 Cases 
• Fraud: 75.0% 
• Sabotage: 21.43% 
• Miscellaneous: 3.57% 
Sabotage: 29 Cases 
• FALSE: 75.86%  
• TRUE: 24.14% 
Theft: 29 Cases 
• FALSE: 75.86%  
• TRUE: 24.14% 
 
Affiliated with  
• Organized Crime: 7.14%  
• Criminal Enterprise: 7.14% 
Subject’s Account Used in Attack: 29 Cases 
• TRUE: 58.62%  
• FALSE: 41.38% 
Shared Account used in Attack: 29 Cases 
• FALSE: 96.55%  
• TRUE: 3.45% 
Organization’s Account Used in Attack: 29 Cases 
• FALSE: 93.1%  




Backdoor Account Used in Attack: 29 Cases 
• FALSE: 93.1%  
• TRUE: 6.9% 
Coworker’s Account Used in Attack: 29 Cases 
• FALSE: 89.66%  
• TRUE: 10.34% 
Unknown IT Account Used in Attack: 29 Cases 
• FALSE: 93.1%  
• TRUE: 6.9% 
Other IT Account Used in Attack: 29 Cases 
• FALSE: 89.66%  
• TRUE: 10.34% 
Financial Impact of Attack: 29 Cases 
• $100,000–$999,999: 46.15% 
• $10,000–$99,999: 34.62% 
• $1,000,000+: 15.38% 
• $1–$9,999: 3.85% 
Attack Detected by Information Systems: 29 Cases 
• FALSE: 96.55%  
• TRUE: 3.45% 
Attack Detected by System Failure: 29 Cases 
• FALSE: 93.1%  
• TRUE: 6.9% 
Attack Detected by Audit: 29 Cases 
• FALSE: 68.97%  
• TRUE: 31.03% 
Attack Detected by Non-technical Means: 29 Cases 
• FALSE: 68.97%  




Unknown How Attack Was Detected: 29 Cases 
• FALSE: 72.41%  
• TRUE: 27.59% 
Attack was Self Reported: 29 Cases 
• FALSE: 93.1%  
• TRUE: 6.9% 
Attack Detected by IT Staff: 29 Cases 
• FALSE: 86.21%  
• TRUE: 13.79% 
Other Internal (reported attack): 29 Cases 
• FALSE: 65.52%  
• TRUE: 34.48% 
Attack Detected by a Customer: 29 Cases 
• FALSE: 89.66%  
• TRUE: 10.34% 
 
Attack Detected by Law Enforcement: 29 Cases 
• FALSE: 96.55%  
• TRUE: 3.45% 
Attack Detected by Unknown Party: 29 Cases 
• FALSE: 65.52%  
• TRUE: 34.48% 
Response to Attack-Incident Response Team: 29 Cases 
• FALSE: 96.55%  
• TRUE: 3.45% 
Response to Attack-Other Technical Response: 29 Cases  
• FALSE: 96.55%  
• TRUE: 3.45% 
Response to Attack—Management: 29 Cases 
• FALSE: 86.21%  
• TRUE: 13.79% 
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IV. ANALYSIS 
In this analysis chapter, using the case study method, the author answers the 
research question: Insiders are committing fraud and embezzlement within organizations, 
does a connection exist to addiction as a motivating factor? The basis for this research 
and the nexus to his research question was formed by his current role as the Special 
Agent in Charge of the USSS, Louisville Field Office. In this role, he began to notice 
what he believed was an unusual amount of fraud and embezzlement cases in which the 
defendants were trusted insiders, who had addictive behaviors as the motivating cause for 
their illegal behavior.197 He conducted an informal examination of 11 current and open 
criminal cases of fraud and embezzlement in Kentucky for the years 2010 to 2013 to 
determine if addiction played a role in the cases. At the time of this review, he observed 
that six out of the current 11 open and active criminal cases involving insiders within 
organizations were addicted to either gambling or pain prescription medication, which 
served as the motivating factor for their illegal behavior against the victims’ 
organizations.  
The goal of this research was to answer the research question and identify gaps in 
the literature on insider threats to organizations, primarily as it relates to trusted insiders 
committing fraud and embezzlement within private, public, and non-profit organizations, 
with a connection to addiction as the motivating factor for the insider’s illegal behavior. 
The literature showed that an insider who has an addiction, especially to gambling or pain 
prescription medication, is susceptible to committing fraud and embezzlement to finance 
and support this addiction.198 The research presented a strong correlation between insider 
197 In reviewing an open criminal case in 2013, on a $1.7 million embezzlement investigation, the 
author discovered from the case agent that a trusted insider, responsible for the finances of a non-profit 
organization, had used the entire amount of funds he embezzled for the sole purpose of feeding a gambling 
addiction with which both he and his wife were involved. The investigation had revealed through numerous 
wire transfers over the period of several months that $1.7 million had been illegally transferred to several 
casinos and withdrawn by the insider and his spouse.  
198 “About NCPG,” accessed February 2, 2014, http://www.npgaw.org/problemgamblinginformation/ 
factsfigures.asp; National Research Council. Pathological Gambling: A Critical Review. Committee on the 
Social and Economic Impact of Pathological Gambling, Committee on Law and Justice, Commission on 
Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education. 
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fraud and embezzlement cases with addiction as the motive for the insider’s illegal 
behavior. Also discovered through research was an indication that causation, as well as 
motivation, is not often specified on police reports of fraud and embezzlement 
investigations, even when an addiction may be implied as the motivating factor for the 
criminal offense. 
The case study method was used in this paper in which 40 recently closed USSS 
criminal cases were studied involving trusted insiders convicted of fraud or 
embezzlement. Four Secret Service Field Offices including the Louisville, Cincinnati, 
Nashville and Memphis Field Offices examined 10 closed cases each from the years 
2002–2013. The research focused on attempting to determine the motivating factors for 
the defendants’ reasons for committing their crimes in each case.  
Contributing research conducted by CERT at Carnegie Mellon University’s 
Software Engineering Institute was also used for this thesis. CERT queried its Insider 
Threat Database that consisted of 680 criminal cases involving IT crimes. This query and 
subsequent research was used to determine if any of the insider threat cases in the CERT 
database had addiction identified as a motivating factor for the insider’s illegal behavior 
against the victim organization.199  
A. SECRET SERVICE CASE STUDIES 
In the 40 USSS case reviews, motives for the 45 trusted insiders’ conducting 
fraud or embezzlement against the victim entities varied when the causality of the crime 
could be determined.200 The recorded motivations for all 40 cases were: gambling 
addiction, pain prescription medication addiction, heroin addiction, sex addiction, binge 
shopping disorder, an enhanced lifestyle, financial pressures, and other unknown motives.  
199 CERT claims to have the largest collection of detailed insider threat cases in the world. CERT used 
the search term “addiction” in its database to determine if addiction related motives could be measured as 
contributing factors for the insiders’ motives for conducting their illegal behavior. CERT only used 
addictive behaviors if it was clearly documented in their research database. The author relied solely on 
CERT to provide this information; Cappelli, Moore, and Trzeciak, The CERT Guide to Insider Threats: 
How to Prevent, Detect, and Respond to Information Technology Crimes (Theft, Sabotage, Fraud), xix. 
200 In several cases, more than one insider was involved in the criminal activity; for this reason,  45 
convicted insiders were convicted in 40 cases.  
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In all four USSS Field Offices, addiction, primarily to gambling and pain 
prescription medication combined, was the primary motivating factor for the insiders’ 
illegal behavior when an addiction or addictive behavior was indicated. In fact, as the 
chart in Figure 7 indicates, 23 out of the 45, or 51% of the convicted insiders, had an 
addiction related behavior as the insiders’ primary motivation for committing the crime.  
 
Figure 7.  Secret Service Case Studies Showing Addiction Related Behavior in 
23/45 Insiders Convicted of Fraud or Embezzlement 
In 13 out of the 23 USSS case studies, in which addiction was reported, an 
addiction to gambling was the predominant motivating factor for the trusted insiders’ 
illegal behavior for conducting fraud or embezzlement within the victim organization. 
Meyer and Stadler assert with addiction related behaviors in which an individual is 
addicted to gambling, “The majority of clinical studies on pathological gamblers in 
outpatient treatment centers and self-help groups indicate that a high percentage of 
subjects committed offenses in order to finance their gambling.”201 Respected gambling 
authors and researchers, Richard Rosenthal and Henry Lesieur, argue, “Academic 
research and numerous criminal cases have shown the existence of a causal relationship 
201 Meyer and Stadler, “Criminal Behavior Associated with Pathological Gambling,” 29–43. 
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between criminal behavior and pathological gambling.”202 Paul and Townsend contend 
that:  
An estimated 80% of American adults gamble, and as many as 10% may 
become pathological gamblers. Research on compulsive gamblers 
indicates that 85% will commit felony crimes of a financial nature during 
their addiction, 86% are gainfully employed, more than 90% will destroy 
their family life, 90% will steal from their employers and 95% will have a 
negative impact on workplace morale and perform poorly on the job.203 
Virgil Peterson states, “Regardless of whether gambling is the direct or indirect 
cause of employee dishonesty, it is one of the most important factors contributing to 
embezzlement.”204 Several fraud and embezzlement academic research texts and articles 
on the connection between gambling and criminal behavior also support this 
relationship.205  
In 1998, Dr. Henry Lesieur, the aforementioned criminology professor at Illinois 
State University and one of the leading experts on gambling research, told the U.S. 
National Gambling Impact Study Commission, “that while some problem gamblers 
commit street crime, the overwhelming majority of them are committing embezzlement, 
forgery and fraud.” Also noted in the Commission Report was the fact that nearly two-
thirds of compulsive gamblers surveyed have engaged in illegal activities to pay 
gambling debts or to continue gambling.206  
Supportive of the literature on addiction and the commission of financial crimes, 
it should be noted that in Louisville case 8, the insider had an addiction to both gambling 
and pain prescription medication as the cause and motivating factor for his illegal 
202 Rosenthal and Lesieur, “Pathological Gambling and Criminal Behavior,” in Explorations in 
Criminal Psychopathology: Clinical Syndromes with Forensic Implications, 149–169. 
203 Robert J. Paul and James B. Townsend, “Managing Workplace Gambling—Some Cautions and 
Recommendations,” Employee Responsibilities and Rights Journal 11, no. 3 (September 1998): 171. 
204 Peterson, “Why Honest People Steal,” 96. 
205 Donald R. Cressey, “The Criminal Violation of Financial Trust,” American Sociological Review 
15, no. 6 (December 1, 1950): 738–743, doi:10.2307/2086606; Zietz, Women Who Embezzle or Defraud: A 
Study of Convicted Felons; Ragatz, Fremouw, and Baker, “The Psychological Profile of White-collar 
Offenders Demographics, Criminal Thinking, Psychopathic Traits, and Psychopathology,” 978–997; Wells, 
Corporate Fraud Handbook: Prevention and Detection. 
206 National Gambling Impact Study Commission, Final Report, 7–13. 
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behavior. The trusted insider embezzled over $1.1 million, and as the criminal case report 
indicated, “His addiction to gambling and pain prescription medication had become out 
of control.”207 Rosenthal and Lesieur indicate, “there is a significant overlap between 
pathological gambling and chemical dependency.”208 In Nashville case 8, the insider had 
an addiction to gambling and a sex addiction indicated as a dual cause or motive for the 
illegal activity.209 Again, this finding was also consistent with the literature in which 
more than one addiction is not uncommon.210  
Gambling addiction was followed by an addiction to pain prescription medication 
as the second primary motive in the USSS case studies. In seven of the 23 cases of 
addiction related behavior, pain prescription medication addiction was indicated as the 
primary motivation for the insider threat. All seven cases were investigated in Kentucky. 
As research demonstrates, according to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC), prescription drug abuse is the nation’s fastest growing drug problem 
and has been classified as an epidemic.211 Kentucky has the third highest drug overdose 
mortality rate in the United States, with 23.6 per 100,000 people suffering drug overdose 
fatalities, according to a new report, “Prescription Drug Abuse: Strategies to Stop the 
Epidemic.”212 “The number of drug overdose deaths—a majority of which are from 
prescription drugs—in Kentucky quadrupled since 1999 when the rate was 4.9 per 
100,000.”213 See Figure 8. 
207 See Louisville Case #8 in Chapter III Case studies. 
208 Rosenthal and Lesieur, “Pathological Gambling and Criminal Behavior,” in Explorations in 
Criminal Psychopathology: Clinical Syndromes with Forensic Implications, 32.  
209 See Nashville Case #8 in Chapter III Case studies. 
210 Frances, Miller, and Mack, Clinical Textbook of Addictive. 
211 The White House, “Office of National Drug Control Policy.”  
212 Trust for America’s Health, “Prescription Drug Abuse: Issue Report 2013—Strategies to Stop the 
Epidemic,” October 2013, 
http://healthyamericans.org/assets/files/TFAH2013RxDrugAbuseRptFINAL.pdf. 
213 Trust for America’s Health, “Drug Abuse 2013 Data for Kentucky,” October 7, 2013, 
http://healthyamericans.org/reports/drugabuse2013/release.php?stateid=KY. 
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Figure 8.  Kentucky Drug Overdoes Fatalities 
Also, according to the CDC, “the sharp increase in opioid prescribing has led to 
parallel increases in opioid addiction and overdose deaths.” Since 1999, it was reported 
that, “overdose deaths have risen steeply in the United States, especially among middle-
aged individuals who have been prescribed opioids for chronic pain. Opioid analgesic 
overdose deaths have increased by 415% in women and 265% in men.”214 To provide a 
perspective on the significance of drug overdose statistics in the United States, the CDC 
reports: 
Drug overdose was the leading cause of injury death in 2010. Among 
people 25 to 64 years old, drug overdose caused more deaths than motor 
vehicle traffic crashes. In 2010, of the 38,329 drug overdose deaths in the 
United States, 22,134 (60%) were related to pharmaceuticals. Of the 
22,134 deaths relating to prescription drug overdose in 2010, 16,651 
(75%) involved opioid analgesics (also called opioid pain relievers or 
prescription painkillers), and 6,497 (30%) involved benzodiazepines.215 
These statistics reflect directly on the costs to law enforcement, the medical 
community, and the employers and families of those individuals affected by prescription 
opioid drug abuse in this country. The CDC further reports, “more than 60 people die 
every day in the United States from overdosing on prescription drugs. Prescription opioid 
abuse resulted in more than 400,000 emergency department visits in 2011, and cost 
health insurers an estimated $72 billion annually in medical costs.”216 As a comparison, 
214 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “QuickStats: Number of Deaths From Poisoning,* 
Drug Poisoning,† and Drug Poisoning Involving Opioid Analgesics§—United States, 1999–2010,” March 
29, 2013, http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6212a7.htm. 
215 Paulozzi, “Prescription Drug Overdoses: A Review,” 283–289. 
216 “CDC—Prescription Drug Overdose Prevention. FY 2015 President’s Budget Request|$15.6 
Million,” accessed March 17, 2014, http://www.cdc.gov/injury/pdfs/budget/NCIPC_PDO_FY2015-a.pdf. 
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the CDC reports that homicide rates of people killed by firearms in the United States 
averages 30 per day, compared with 60 people per day dying from overdosing on 
prescription drugs.217 An increase in addiction to pain prescription medication in the 
general population suggests an accordant increase in insider threats because of that 
upward trend. 
In a recent publication of the “Societal Costs of Prescription Opioid Abuse, 
Dependence, and Misuse in the United States,” the authors opined, “The costs of 
prescription opioid abuse represent a substantial and growing economic burden for the 
society. The increasing prevalence of abuse suggests an even greater societal burden in 
the future.”218 According to the study, the costs are significant: 
Total U.S. societal costs of prescription opioid abuse were estimated at 
$55.7 billion in 2007 (USD in 2009). Workplace costs accounted for $25.6 
billion (46%), health care costs accounted for $25.0 billion (45%), and 
criminal justice costs accounted for $5.1 billion (9%). Workplace costs 
were driven by lost earnings from premature death ($11.2 billion) and 
reduced compensation/lost employment ($7.9 billion). Health care costs 
consisted primarily of excess medical and prescription costs ($23.7 
billion). Criminal justice costs were largely comprised of correctional 
facility ($2.3 billion) and police costs ($1.5 billion).219 
A 2006 study placed the costs of the misuse and abuse of prescription painkillers 
for the country at an estimated $53.4 billion a year in lost productivity, medical costs, and 
criminal justice costs.220 National statistics suggest that addiction to this type of drug is 
quite concerning as reported in a recent letter to the Commissioner of the U.S. Food and 
Drug Administration by the Coalition to End the Opioid Epidemic, in which they 
contend, “Over the past 15 years, prescriptions for opioids have skyrocketed” in the 
United States. According to the hydrocodone and oxycodone consumption statistics as 
reported by the International Narcotics Control Board in 2012, “The United States, with 
217 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “FASTSTATS—Homicide,” 2010, http://www.cdc. 
gov/nchs/fastats/homicide.htm. 
218 Howard G. Birnbaum et al., “Societal Costs of Prescription Opioid Abuse, Dependence, and 
Misuse in the United States,” Pain Medicine 12, no. 4 (2011): 657 doi:10.1111/j.1526-4637.2011.01075.x. 
219 Ibid., Abstract. 
220 “Drug Abuse 2013 Data for Kentucky.” 
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about 5% of the world’s population, is now consuming more than 84% of the world’s 
entire oxycodone supply and more than 99% of the hydrocodone supply.”221  
USSS Louisville Case 2 was a public sector, insider threat case, which was widely 
reported in the news, and involved the former executive director of a city-county 
convention center convicted of embezzlement along with a co-conspirator. “They devised 
a scheme to steal money that was intended for the greater good of the community,” stated 
the U.S. Attorney for the Western District of Kentucky. “In doing so, they violated the 
public’s trust and harmed an important community asset.” The trusted insider embezzled 
$250,000 of taxpayer’s money to support his addiction to pain medication.222 It is 
important to note that this incident offers insight into the overriding nature of an 
addiction to pain prescription medication. In a review of the criminal case notes and file, 
as well as interaction with the case agent during the course of the investigation, the 
insider in this incident, “possessed an all consuming desire to do anything, in order to 
finance his addiction.” The insider admitted to taking 40 to 60 Lortab pain pills per day. 
Had an alert bank employee in this case not followed up on suspicions of an unusual 
check deposit by the convicted insider, this criminal conduct may have continued costing 
the taxpayers in Western Kentucky an unknown sum of money through his ongoing 
embezzlement.223 As a homeland security concern, anytime a trusted insider working 
within a government agency has an addiction, that government agency is vulnerable to 
compromising behavior by the insider who can significantly affect the reputation, 
integrity, and ultimately, threaten the public’s trust of a community organization.  
 
221 FED Up Coalition Steering Committee, “Zohydro Letter with Signatures Final,” February 26, 
2014, http://www.citizen.org/documents/2185.pdf. 
222 USDOJ, “Convention Center’s Former Executive Director Sentenced to 24 Months in Prison for 
Embezzlement.” 
223 As the case agent’s supervisor during the course of the criminal investigation in Louisville Case 2, 
the author was able to have first hand knowledge of the convicted insider’s motivation for his criminal 
behavior and was able to gain insight from the criminal case file on the insider’s conduct concerning his 
addiction. 
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B. CERT CASE STUDIES 
The contributing research conducted for this thesis by CERT at Carnegie Mellon 
University from its Insider Threat Database consisted of a data search on 680 criminal 
cases involving IT crimes. The research revealed that 29 insiders indicated that addiction 
was a primary motivator for conducting their criminal behavior. In 24 out the 29 insider 
threat cases, drug use and gambling was indicated as the addiction behavior trait. Drug 
use was indicated as the addiction motivation in 15 cases, followed by gambling in six 
cases.224 Alcohol and drug use was indicated in three of the cases, and in five cases, 
alcohol use was the indicator for the causation of the insiders’ illegal behavior.225 See 
Figure 9. As previously noted in Chapter III from the CERT research was the fact that the 
primary area for addiction related behavior came from the fraud category, with 21 out of 
the 29 instances coming from that classification.226 This fact is important as it is aligned 
with the literature on addiction, as trusted insiders who have addictions are often 
compelled with the need to continue financing their addiction.227  
224 CERT was unable to break down the exact types of drug use in its database so it is unknown what 
the specific drug type was that was indicated by the insider. 
225 CERT conducted a data search of its insider threat database as a request by the author for research 
conducted on this thesis. Data and figures were provided by CERT as a result of its data search. See 
Chapter III CERT Insider Threats Case Studies. 
226 As noted in Figure 4 from the CERT section in Chapter III, 300 fraud cases were found in the 
CERT database; thus, the 21 cases would be out of a total of 300 total fraud cases. 
227 Green, “White-Collar Crime and the Study of Embezzlement,” 95–106; Lesieur, The Chase: 
Career of the Compulsive Gambler, vol. xxi; Griffin, “Major Embezzlement Cases on the Rise.” 
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Figure 9.  CERT Insider Threat Cases with Addiction As a Motivating Factor 
Broken Down by Sectors.228 
C. CONCLUDING SUMMARY OF CASE STUDIES: SHOULD THIS 
NATION BE CONCERNED ABOUT ADDICTION?  
As seen from the 29 aforementioned CERT cases, as well as the USSS cases 
involving fraud or embezzlement by trusted insiders, 23 out of the 45 convicted insiders 
had an addiction related motive behind their illegal behavior. Although addiction is not 
the only cause for a trusted insider to commit fraud or embezzlement against an 
organization, research shows it is clearly an important cause. Also discerned from the 
research is that fraud and embezzlement can occur for many other reasons: financial 
pressures, greed, an enhanced lifestyle, or in some cases, unknown reasons. However, it 
is seen that in cases in which addiction was established prior to the fraud or 
embezzlement occurring, the insiders committed their illegal behavior out of the need to 
feed that addiction financially. 
1. Recent Criminal Cases That Should Concern Homeland Security 
Officials about Addiction and Trusted Insiders 
As was the case with the former tax clerk and trusted insider from Chapter I who 
embezzled $50 million over an 18 year time period from the taxpayers of the District of 
228 This graph was provided by CERT for this thesis research. 
 90 
                                                 
Columbia, it is important to recognize some considerations.229 A trusted insider with 
authority and access to operate freely within any organization who is intent on 
committing criminal acts to finance an addictive behavior should concern not only law 
enforcement professionals, but leadership from all across private, non-profit, and public 
sector organizations.230  
The research has indicated that individuals who are addicted to gambling or pain 
prescription medication will commit fraud and embezzlement to continue financing their 
addiction if they have no other means to do so.231 Chapter II demonstrated cases of 
trusted insiders who have committed treason against the United States financially to 
support their addiction to gambling.232 Research has shown former FBI agents who had 
access to national security secrets and who worked on some of the nation’s most sensitive 
foreign counter intelligence investigations having been convicted of embezzling funds 
from the government to finance their addiction to gambling.233 These individuals include 
a former senior FBI supervisor who oversaw a major metropolitan drug task force and 
embezzled funds from the government over a long period of time to finance his gambling 
addiction. This trusted insider also lied to a federal judge for the promise of money to pay 
off gambling debts by an organized crime figure.234  
Former major city mayors have been convicted of embezzling money due to their 
gambling addiction.235 Consider the former mayor of San Diego who embezzled over $2 
million due to her gambling addiction.236 Mayors are trusted insiders with access to 
229 Southall, “17-Year Term for Official in Tax Scam.” 
230 “2012 Report to the Nations—Key Findings and Highlights.”  
231 Rosenthal and Lesieur, “Pathological Gambling and Criminal Behavior,” in Explorations in 
Criminal Psychopathology: Clinical Syndromes with Forensic Implications; “Prescription Drugs Elevate 
Crime Rate,” accessed March 6, 2014, http://narconongeorgia.hubpages.com/hub/Prescription-Drugs-
Elevate-Crime-Rate; Green, “White-Collar Crime and the Study of Embezzlement.” 
232 Herbig and Wiskoff, “Espionage Against the United States by American Citizens 1947–2001, 
PERSEREC Technical Report 02–5.” 
233 Clay, “Ex-FBI Agent in Oklahoma Gets Six Months in Prison for Embezzling.” 
234 Lebowitz, “Ex-FBI Agent Sentenced to Five Years in Prison.” 
235 Annie Karni, “Real Mayors of New Jersey,” New York Post, June 24, 2012, 
http://nypost.com/2012/06/24/real-mayors-of-new-jersey/. 
236 Spagat, “Ex-San Diego Mayor’s Gambling Wagers Top $1B.” 
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highly sensitive information regarding critical infrastructure, vulnerable city financial 
documents and contracts, and authorization to make and influence decisions that affect 
the entire community, because of their trusted position in the government.237 The U.S. 
military is not immune from gambling issues as well; in a recent incident, the second 
highest-ranking officer of the nation’s nuclear forces was arrested for passing counterfeit 
poker chips at a local casino. The former Vice Admiral was “suspended from oversight of 
nuclear weapons or any responsibilities involving classified material.”238 
The question that must be asked is how to recognize and understand that trusted 
insiders with addictions are potentially capable of compromising national security within 
public sector organizations or causing catastrophic financial harm, even to the point of 
bankrupting some firms to feed their addiction? What are the warning signs of a trusted 
insider with an addiction? Gambling and using prescribed pain prescription medication 
by Americans in a responsible way is both legal and common all across the homeland; 
however, committing fraud and embezzlement against organizations to finance an 
addiction to gambling or pain prescription medication is not. Simply being aware that a 
trusted insider is gambling or using pain prescription medication is a start. 
2. Causes and Motives for Committing Fraud and Embezzlement Matter 
The research and literature illuminated a gap in the reporting of causes and 
motives in fraud and embezzlement cases reporting by law-enforcement agencies. 
Currently, 18,000 participating local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies in the 
United States are annually required to provide to the FBI Uniformed Crime Report 
(UCR) statistics concerning acts of crime, by age, gender, race, and location under the 
traditional Summary Reporting System (SRS). However, motive and causality are not 
statistical data required by the UCR in criminal cases. This fact is especially true in fraud 
and embezzlement crimes, as it is a Schedule 2 offense, and the only required reporting 
237 “Homeland Security Blog,” accessed March 18, 2014, http://www.dhs.gov/blog. 
238 Steve Liewer, “StratCom Deputy Chief Fired as Nation’s No. 2 Nuclear Commander,” 
Omaha.com, October 10, 2013, http://www.omaha.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20131009/ 
NEWS/131008617. 
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of those offenses is age, sex and race.239 This type of reporting is a significant concern 
for anyone conducting research on causes of crimes, since the information is not always 
recorded and preserved with the case.  
Another weighty issue with the UCR reporting is that it is also very difficult to 
provide accurate white-collar criminal offense statistics, which typically include fraud 
and embezzlement cases as noted by the FBI: 
Under the traditional Summary Reporting System (SRS), there is a limited 
amount of information available on white-collar crime. The white-collar 
offenses that are measured are fraud, forgery/counterfeiting, 
embezzlement, and all other offenses. Because white-collar crimes are not 
Index crimes, the only information available on these offenses is arrest 
information, which includes age, sex, and race of the arrestee. 
Additionally, the all other offenses arrest category is very limited in its 
ability to measure the white-collar offenses included in its counts. This is 
due to the inability to differentiate the white-collar offenses from the 
others that also fall in this category. Based upon the most recently 
published data from the FBI, the arrest rates for the offenses of 
embezzlement, fraud, and forgery/counterfeiting are much lower than the 
arrest rates for property crime or for total crimes in general.240 
Fortunately, the FBI and Department of Justice have created the FBI UCR 
Program’s National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS) with the intent to 
improve the quantity and quality of crime data collected by law enforcement. The NIBRS 
captures more detailed information for each single crime occurrence than the traditional 
SRS.  
The NIBRS identifies when and where crime takes place, what form it 
takes, and the characteristics of its victims and perpetrators. As more law 
enforcement agencies (LEAs) submit their crime data via the NIBRS, 
they—along with legislators, municipal planners and administrators, 
239 “Offenses in Uniform Crime Reporting—Crime in the United States 2004.”  
240 Cynthia Barnett, “The Measurement of White-Collar Crime Using Uniform Crime Reporting 
(UCR) Data,” U.S. Department of Justice Federal Bureau of Investigation Criminal Justice Information 
Services (CJIS) Division, accessed March 14, 2014, http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/about-
us/cjis/ucr/nibrs/nibrs_wcc.pdf. 
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academicians, researchers, and the general public—will be better able to 
assess the scope of the nation’s crime problem.241 
In its second year, the recently published NIBRS 2012 report shows crime details 
captured through incident-based reporting.  
This second compilation of annual NIBRS data represents crime reported 
for calendar year 2012 by 6,115 Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) 
around the nation, approximately 33 percent of all agencies that submit 
data to the FBI UCR Program. The data include information on incidents, 
offenses, victims, and known offenders for 46 specific crimes in 22 major 
offense categories. The report details the age, sex, and race of victims, 
offenders, and arrestees; crime locations and times of day; and the type of 
weapons and force involved. Comprised of 97 tables, NIBRS 2012 features 
32 offense tables about crimes against persons, crimes against property, 
and crimes against society; 24 tables on sex offenses; 36 tables that list 
offenses by state by individual law enforcement agency; and 5 tables 
focusing on the demographics of the arrestees connected to NIBRS 
incidents.242 
Only 15 states participate in the NIBRS, but it is a remarkable improvement for 
crime statistics and collection of incident-based reporting. Although currently a category 
for law enforcement agencies does not exist to report motive and cause of a crime for an 
offender committing a fraud or embezzlement case, “the agencies that submit data via the 
NIBRS can report an offender’s suspected involvement with drugs/narcotics, alcohol, or 
gangs in committing an offense.”243  
This issue is important for researchers to note, as Smith et al. have expressed in 
their study on gambling and crime, “The fact that official police statistics and court 
records do not show gambling-related crime to be a serious problem, yet knowing that 
police and court databases are incomplete to the extent that gambling is seldom identified 
241 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Criminal Justice Information Services Division, “2012 National 
Incident-Based Reporting System,” accessed March 17, 2014, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/nibrs/ 
2012/nibrs-2012-home. 
242 Ibid. 
243 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Criminal Justice Information Services Division, “2012 National 
Incident-Based Reporting System,” accessed March 17, 2014, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/nibrs/ 
2012/nibrs-2012-home. 
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as a motive or precipitating factor for crime.”244 The implications of this finding are 
significant for law enforcement agencies to recognize that causation and motives are 
critical to document and account for in police reports. The significance for homeland 
security and the role that law enforcement plays in recognizing that motives, especially 
documenting addiction as a motive for committing criminal offenses, are essential for 
building accurate databases. It is critical for law enforcement professionals and 
researchers to understand what the prevalence of addiction is in contributing to causing 
fraud and embezzlement within organizations. Needless to say, it is also important to 
understand what role addiction plays in causing all types of crime.  
The USSS investigates thousands of financial crimes cases each year across the 
United States and abroad. More specifically, it closes approximately 500 criminal 
investigations under the categories of fraud, embezzlement, and misappropriation on an 
annual basis.245 As has been previously discussed in this paper, this category is most 
closely indicative of a trusted insider committing a financial crimes offense within or 
against an organization in which the insider is employed or within which has authorized 
access and authority to operate.246 
The USSS does not require its investigators to report cause of a financial crime in 
a format that can be captured electronically for statistical recording purposes. Also, no 
requirement exits for a USSS Special Agent investigating a financial crimes case to 
report an individual’s motive for committing the crime. The USSS investigates numerous 
financial crimes cases committed against organizations by trusted insiders conducting 
fraud or embezzlement each year, yet no mechanism is currently in place to require an 
investigating Special Agent to capture or report when the defendant may have had an 
244 Smith, Wynne, and Hartnagel, Examining Police Records to Assess Gambling Impacts: A Study of 
Gambling-related Crime in the City of Edmonton. 
245 Management and Organization Division, United States Secret Service Annual Statistical Report—
Fiscal Year 2013. 
246 This category of financial crimes investigation most closely aligns with investigations of insiders 
conducting fraud and embezzlement offenses within organizations and does not encompass all Secret 
Service financial crimes investigations against individuals or organizations.  
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addiction to gambling, pain prescription medication, or any other addiction related 
behavior as the reason for conducting the illegal activity.247  
This lack of reporting is important to consider as it relates directly to anyone 
conducting research on gambling and gambling related criminal offenses. Blaszcynski 
and Silove note that:  
Accurate rates of the prevalence and extent of gambling-related criminal 
behaviors are difficult to obtain. Arrest and conviction rates are inadequate 
because gambling is not necessarily identified on conviction records as 
underlying the offense, and not all gambling related offenses are detected 
or offenders apprehended. Therefore, the true prevalence rate is likely to 
be underestimated.248 
As Blaszcynski and Silove contend in their argument of recording accurate rates of the 
prevalence and extent of gambling-related criminal behaviors, a similar contention should 
be made with regard to obtaining documentation on any addictive behavior as a motive in 
law enforcement records.249 One way to advance awareness is to require such reporting 
by law enforcement and make this information widely available.  
The KSP is responsible for retaining criminal police records and traffic offense 
reports for over 400 city and county law enforcement agencies throughout the 
Commonwealth of Kentucky. The KSP is also charged with compiling the annual 
statistics on crimes within the Commonwealth of Kentucky and reporting those to the 
UCR at the FBI. The KSP currently does not participate in the FBI UCR Program’s 
NIBRS.250  
247 As the Special Agent in Charge of the U.S. Secret Service, Louisville Field Office, with over 25 
years of experience in criminal investigations, the author can report that no requirement exists for Special 
Agents to include in their case reports, causality or motive, for a perpetrator of a criminal offense in a 
financial crimes investigation, as to their reason for committing a criminal offense.  
248 Blaszczynski and Silove, “Pathological Gambling: Forensic Issues.” 
249 The author’s experience as a law enforcement professional and senior executive suggests that law 
enforcement agencies are generally more concerned with accurately reporting statistics on how much crime 
is occurring in their districts, where it is occurring, and by what method is it occurring. It is also his 
contention in financial crimes investigations, law enforcement officials tend to care more about discovering 
who is conducting criminal behavior, proving a criminal case against them, providing the necessary 
documentation and evidence for prosecuting them, and moving on to the next case, than they are in trying 
to determine why the perpetrators committed the criminal act and what motivated them to do so. 
250 Kentucky Legislature, “Kentucky Revised Statutes,” 2013, http://www.lrc.ky.gov/statutes/index. 
aspx. 
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The KSP Records Division reports that modus operandi (MO) is captured in the 
report only if the reporting officers include it in their narrative. MO is generally defined 
in relationship to how a criminal act occurred. An example of MO would be the method 
used to embezzle funds from a business, such as writing fraudulent checks on a business 
account. This data is not recoverable via an electronic report search and would only be 
recoverable by an individual record search of the case file. Furthermore, this information 
could only be retrieved if the reporting officer recorded it in the police report. The record 
does not report the causation or motive of why a crime occurred.251  
The KSP Records Division advises that it is not currently able to capture causes 
(motives) of criminal offenses as it relates to Chapter 514 of the Kentucky Penal Code, 
Theft and Related Offenses. Chapter 514 encompasses theft, fraud and embezzlement 
offenses under the Kentucky Revised Statutes. The KSP also confirms that it is unable to 
capture cause or motive of criminal offenses for most criminal offenses, with the 
exception of fatal traffic accidents.252 Addiction related causes or motives for a criminal 
offense, such as an addiction to gambling, pain prescription medication or alcohol, is not 
currently captured under reporting statistics in the Commonwealth of Kentucky.253  
As one state official reported, “We are very good at telling you what caused a 
traffic accident. We can provide you with what the road conditions were at the time of the 
accident, if the driver was impaired or not, if the vehicle had faulty equipment, or if there 
was excessive speed as a mitigating factor in an accident, but we have no way of 
providing statistical analysis of causes or motives for an individual committing a criminal 
offense in the Commonwealth of Kentucky.”254  
251 Ibid.; Kentucky State Police, “Commonwealth of Kentucky 2012 Crime Report.”  
252 Ibid. 
253 Kentucky State Police, “Commonwealth of Kentucky 2012 Crime Report”; Kentucky Legislature, 
“Kentucky Revised Statutes.” 
254 This information was derived from anonymous subject matter experts within the Kentucky State 
Police during the research phase of this thesis on determining if the agency was able to provide motive or 
causation of criminal offenses, specifically fraud and embezzlement investigations, to determine if 
addiction was a possible contributor in the motive for individuals conducting their illegal behavior. 
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A revealing fact discovered throughout the research of this thesis is the USSS as a 
federal agency, as well as most local and county law enforcement agencies throughout 
the Commonwealth of Kentucky including the Kentucky State Police, are not recording 
cause or motive for perpetrators committing their crimes, which is especially true for 
fraud and embezzlement cases conducted by trusted insiders within organizations. 
However, it should be noted that in spite of the inability to determine cause and motive of 
these crimes in the Commonwealth of Kentucky it is important to notice that addiction 
does play a role.  
In a recent report from the Kentucky Department of Corrections, drug offenses 
account for a significant role in the current prison population, as well as in its current 
parolee population as Table 3 and Figure 10 show.255 It would be helpful for law 
enforcement practitioners and researchers to know how many of these individuals are 
incarcerated due to an addiction to drugs or how many prisoners or parolees committed 
crimes to feed their addiction to drugs. 
 
 
TYPE TOTAL DRUG OFFENSE 
COUNT PERCENTAGE 
Active Parolee 14237 7895 55.45% 
Active Inmate 20664 6808 32.95% 
TOTAL 34901 14703 42.13% 
Table 3.   Kentucky Department of Corrections 2014 
255 Figures provided by the Kentucky Department of Corrections for current March 2014 inmate and 
parole populations who have a drug related conviction. 
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Figure 10.  Kentucky Department of Corrections 2014 
The reality is that in most cases, motive for an offender conducting illegal 
behavior or activity is not required on law enforcement reports. In the event that this 
information is recorded in law enforcement reports, it is not easily recoverable, and does 
not provide the ability to research individual case files for statistical reporting or research 
purposes. The gap in this type of reporting is one worth investigating, as cause and 
motive matter, when it comes to reporting fraud and embezzlement cases.256  
It was reported that $193 billion is the estimated cost of drug use to the U.S. 
society in lost productivity, health care, and criminal justice costs in 2007.257 Therefore, 
it is important to determine how much criminal activity individuals conduct due to an 
addiction, as the primary motive for committing fraud and embezzlement, or for that 
matter any criminal behavior. 
256 Blaszczynski and Silove, “Pathological Gambling”; P. Crofts, Gambling & Criminal Behavior: An 
Analysis of Local & District Court File, 2002. 
257 U.S. Department of Justice, National Drug Intelligence Center, “National Drug Threat Assessment 
2011,” August 2011, http://www.justice.gov/archive/ndic/pubs44/44849/44849p.pdf. 
 99 
                                                 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 100 
V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS  
This concluding chapter highlights the research finding that trusted insiders are 
committing fraud and embezzlement against organizations and indicate a connection 
exists to addiction as a primary cause or motive for many convicted insiders who have 
conducted illegal behavior within their organizations. This research indicates that insiders 
with addictions will embezzle or commit fraud to provide a funding mechanism to 
continue financing their addiction. What is clear is that insider threats are a reality that 
will continue to be a concern to any organizations that contain valuable assets. This paper 
has noted that valuable assets are not only located in company bank accounts and 
financial data resources, but are also deemed to be anything of worth that could be 
compromised or stolen, including intellectual property, sensitive proprietary data or any 
information or resources controlled by an organization. These assets can also involve 
access to classified data networks and to government secrets.  
History has shown that the effects of a successful fraud or embezzlement scheme 
perpetrated against any institution can cause enormous financial harm, damaging its 
reputation, and even bankrupting some organizations. This finding is significant for 
homeland security officials to be cognizant of, as this research indicates that trusted 
insiders within government agencies are also committing criminal offenses to sustain 
addiction.  
The author discusses a strategy for providing recommendations aimed at 
addressing the problem of insider threats to organizations in which addiction is 
determined to be a cause or motivating factor for conducting fraud and embezzlement. He 
suggests that the research is indicative of a lack of reporting by law enforcement agencies 
in investigative reports in which addictive behavior as a motive or cause of a crime is not 
being reflected, captured, or recorded. This lack of detailed reporting on motives for 
criminal activity is unfortunately a part of standard operating practice for most law 
enforcement agencies, and in fact, is not required for national reporting standards for the 
UCR or the NIBRS. This factor was especially evident in the fraud and embezzlement 
cases examined as a part of this research. The author suggests that law enforcement 
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agencies, such as the USSS and the Kentucky State Police, begin a program of assessing 
and collecting motives, as well as causes of criminal acts, and specifically, measure 
whether addiction plays a role in motive and causes of criminal behavior, especially in 
the area of fraud and embezzlement committed against organizations by trusted insiders. 
This pilot program could illuminate in a fact-based manner the utility of broadening the 
required capture of relevant information in police reporting if a correlation exists between 
addiction and insider threat and or the masking of other criminal activity. Moreover, if 
the results are compelling, an opportunity may present itself for the implementation at a 
national level and the revamping of existing standards related to the UCR and the 
NIBRS. 
A. IS ADDICTION, AS A MOTIVE FOR CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR, 
ACCURATELY REPORTED? 
Research indicates that addiction is one of the most serious and expensive public 
health problems in the United States. “Addiction is a disease in and of itself, 
characterized by compulsion, loss of control, and continued use in spite of adverse 
consequences.”258 Addiction is a problem that organizations need to understand and 
factor throughout the hiring, evaluation, and retention of personnel.  
This research indicates that addiction to gambling and pain prescription 
medication is an increasingly common issue, and a principally unrecognized problem that 
is a catalyst for a previously trusted individual to commit illegal acts to maintain the 
semblance of a successful work ethic while sustaining the addiction. Interestingly, the 
illegal acts were not committed for self-enrichment or personal gain, but as a mechanism 
to fund the insiders’ addiction.259 The research along with numerous criminal case 
examples cited in this paper clearly indicates that addiction to gambling and pain 
prescription medication is a problem at all levels of society to include small, medium, and 
258 Brian W. Jackson, “Financial Cost of Addictive Disorders,” Journal of Addictive Disorders, 2010, 
http://breining.edu/JAD10BWJ.pdf. 
259 USDOJ, “Convention Center’s Former Executive Director Sentenced to 24 Months in Prison for 
Embezzlement”; Patrick, “Former Brentwood Official Admits Embezzling Money, Gambling It Away.”  
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large corporations,260 as well as non-profit organizations,261 and at all levels of the 
government.262 The author suggests that one of the defining issues in this paper is the fact 
that addiction is a cause or motive for a trusted insider conducting illegal behavior within 
organizations, and further submits that the literature suggests motives are also not being 
accurately recorded in police reports and documentation from victim organizations. His 
research from the USSS Case Studies Section in Chapter III noted that in two separate 
instances, the case agents did not document that addiction was tied into the motive for the 
insiders’ illegal behavior because they did not think that the information was relative or 
necessary to report.  
An insider threat to an organization in which fraud and embezzlement is occurring 
is a continuing area of concern for most entities. The statistics are staggering when a 
tabulation of the estimated dollar loss to businesses and organizations each year due to 
insider fraud and embezzlement is calculated. As the research has reflected, the estimated 
costs of white-collar crime in the United States may reach as much as $1 trillion 
annually.263 Studies lack the exact correlation directly tied to how much of the estimated 
$1 trillion in annual losses caused by insiders each year to specific addiction related 
motives; however, from the following listed costs to society of drug and gambling 
addiction, the percentage is significant. 
Addiction costs society as a whole an enormous amount of financial resources on 
an annual basis. Illicit drug use alone accounts for $181 billion in health care, 
productivity loss, crime and incarceration, and drug enforcement.264 Overdosing is now 
260 Bruce Lambert and Valerie Cotsalas, “Bookkeeper Admits Embezzling $2.3 Million for Lottery 
Habit,” New York Times, August 24, 2006, sec. New York Region, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/ 
08/24/nyregion/24theft.html. 
261 Gary Snyder, “Nonprofit Imperative: Nonprofit Fraud: The Effects of Addictions on Charities,” 
Nonprofit Imperative, April 8, 2013, http://nonprofitimperative.blogspot.com/2013/04/nonprofit-fraud-
effects-of-addictions.html. 
262 Lebowitz, “Ex-FBI Agent Sentenced to Five Years in Prison.”  
263 Ragatz, Fremouw, and Baker, “The Psychological Profile of White-collar Offenders 
Demographics, Criminal Thinking, Psychopathic Traits, and Psychopathology,” 978–97. 
264 National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA), “Drug Abuse Costs the United States Economy 
Hundreds of Billions of Dollars in Increased Health Care Costs, Crime, and Lost Productivity,” accessed 
March 20, 2014, http://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/addiction-science-molecules-to-managed-
care/introduction/drug-abuse-costs-united-states-economy-hundreds-billions-dollars-in-increased-health. 
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the leading cause of accidental death in the United States, which accounts for more 
deaths than traffic fatalities or gun homicides and suicides. Fatal overdoses from opiate 
medications, such as oxycodone, hydrocodone, and methadone, have quadrupled since 
1999 and accounted for an estimated 16,651 deaths in 2010.265 The CDC calls pain 
prescription addiction an epidemic. Pain prescription drug addiction alone shows costs to 
society between $55-$70 million a year.266 Numerous studies have documented the 
strong relationship between substance use and crime, and although causality between the 
two has not been conclusively established, U.S. statistics show that more than 50% of 
state and federal inmates used drugs in the month prior to committing the offense for 
which they were incarcerated, and that more than a quarter of all offenders were using 
drugs at the time of their offense.267 
Gambling addiction also has a tremendous negative societal impact in this 
country. According to some experts, the cost of pathological and problem gambling has 
soared to nearly half the annual cost of drug abuse in the United States. Earl L. Grinols, 
an Illinois economist, has written in Gambling in America: Costs and Benefits, “The 
social costs of gambling, such as increased crime, lost work time, bankruptcies and 
financial hardships faced by the families of gambling addicts, have reached epidemic 
proportions, costing the economy as much as $54 billion annually.”268 Put differently, 
Grinols said, “The costs of problem and pathological gambling are comparable to the 
value of the lost output of an additional recession in the economy every four years.”269 
265 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “QuickStats: Number of Deaths From Poisoning,* 
Drug Poisoning,† and Drug Poisoning Involving Opioid Analgesics§—United States, 1999–2010.” 
266 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “CDC Grand Rounds: Prescription Drug Overdoses—
A U.S. Epidemic,” January 13, 2012, http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6101a3.htm. 
267 Kathryn E. McCollister, Michael T. French, and Hai Fang, “The Cost of Crime to Society: New 
Crime-Specific Estimates for Policy and Program Evaluation,” Drug and Alcohol Dependence 108, no. 1–2 
(April 1, 2010): 98–109, doi:10.1016/j.drugalcdep.2009.12.002. 
268 Earl L. Grinols, Gambling in America: Costs and Benefits (New York, NY: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004), 108–109. 
269 Mark Reutter, “Social Costs of Gambling Nearly Half That of Drug Abuse, New Book 
Concludes|Archives|News Bureau|University of Illinois,” March 8, 2004, http://news.illinois.edu/news/ 
04/0308grinols.html. 
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According to a recent report by Baylor University, “The social costs of 
gambling—crime costs, business and employment costs, bankruptcy, suicide, illness 
related to pathological gambling, social service costs, direct regulatory costs, family 
costs, and abused dollars—are “hidden” only to the extent that they are often 
misunderstood or overlooked.”270 Some of those “hidden” contributors to the costs of 
this type of addiction need to acknowledge a problem exists and experts in the field state, 
“80 to 90 percent of people in Gamblers Anonymous will tell you they did something 
illegal in order to get money to gamble. A lot of them do white collar crimes, fraud, credit 
card and employee theft.”271  
This information should command everyone’s attention, including members of the 
homeland security community. Data clearly indicates that addiction related behaviors 
cause a great deal of harm for society in many tangible and intangible ways. The research 
and data in this thesis suggests that in spite of this certainty, clear indications are apparent 
that addiction as a motive for criminal behavior is not accurately being recorded as the 
primary indication for an individual’s reason for committing the illegal activity, 
especially in the area of fraud and embezzlement crimes. 
B. SHOULD MOTIVES MATTER FOR UNDERSTANDING FRAUD AND 
EMBEZZLEMENT CRIMES? 
Most every organization is faced with the potential need to defend against a 
trusted individual on the inside as a possible threat. Fortunately, not every employee is a 
threat. However, as noted criminologist, Donald Cressey has implied, those individuals 
who have a problem or need that is “un-shareable” are potentially vulnerable to 
committing fraud or embezzlement within an organization. Cressey’s fraud triangle 
theory holds that for fraud to occur, three dimensions must all be present: pressure, 
opportunity, and rationalization.272 The author suggests that removing opportunity is the 
270 Robert B. Kruschwitz, “The Hidden Social Costs of Gambling,” Center for Christian Ethics, 
Baylor University, 4, 2011, http://www.baylor.edu/content/services/document.php/145417.pdf. 
271 Edward Looney, Testimony Before The National Gambling Impact Study Commission (Atlantic 
City, NJ, 1998). 
272 Cressey, Other People’s Money; A Study in the Social Psychology of Embezzlement. 
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best way to deconstruct the fraud triangle. Security layering and awareness of addictive 
signs help minimize opportunity.  
One proposed strategy for law enforcement agencies is to recognize that motives 
and causation for committing financial crimes cases, especially in the fraud and 
embezzlement arena, is important to include in training to enhance understanding and 
awareness. Developing a more comprehensive, and in this case, accurate reporting 
protocol, is of equal importance. 
As has been learned, most trusted insiders who commit fraud and embezzlement 
do not have any previous criminal record. They are in most cases perceived as stalwarts 
of society and law abiding citizens who many people would be proud to call neighbors 
and friends.273 They are after all, “trusted” for a reason. What happens when an insider 
goes rouge within an organization? Many Americans are familiar with the names, 
Edward Snowden,274 Robert Hannsen,275 and Aldrich Ames276 in the world of “trusted 
government insiders” who committed treasonous crimes for ideological reasons, and in 
the case of Hannsen and Ames, financial gain as a motivating factor. However, what 
about the Washington, DC tax office manager whole stole over $48 million documented 
in Chapter I, and the other trusted insiders discussed in this paper who committed serious 
financial crimes to fund an addiction?277 
This paper has cited numerous examples of trusted insiders committing fraud and 
embezzlement within organizations to provide a funding mechanism for sustaining their 
addiction. Unfortunately, some of these trusted insiders are operating at all levels of 
government organizations as well. Should officials in the homeland security enterprise 
concern themselves with causes and motives when trusted insiders within government 
273 Cressey, Other People’s Money; A Study in the Social Psychology of Embezzlement. 
274 Glenn Greenwald, Ewen MacAskill, and Laura Poitras, “Edward Snowden: The Whistleblower 
Behind the NSA Surveillance Revelations,” The Guardian, June 9, 2013, sec. World news, http://www.the 
guardian.com/world/2013/jun/09/edward-snowden-nsa-whistleblower-surveillance. 
275 Gary McGraw and J. Viega, “The Ultimate Insider Threat,” Software Development 11, no. 7 (July 
2003): 49. 
276 David Johnston, “How the F.B.I. Finally, Caught Aldrich Ames,” New York Times, January 27, 
1995, sec. U.S., http://www.nytimes.com/1995/01/27/us/how-the-fbi-finally-caught-aldrich-ames.html. 
277 Southall, “17-Year Term for Official in Tax Scam.”  
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agencies commit fraud and embezzlement when addiction is the motivating factor for 
committing criminal behavior? These trusted insiders have come from all levels of local, 
state, and federal government organizations including: city administrators,278 county 
convention center managers,279 county commissioners,280 community health system 
administrators,281 large city mayors,282 police officers,283 fire fighters,284 school district 
employees,285 athletic directors,286 public university administrators,287 state senators,288 
TSA employees,289 FBI agents,290 federal judges,291 National Guard Commanders,292 
and active duty high ranking military officers,293 all trusted within their local 
communities, none with previous criminal records, and all with addictions that caused 
them to commit crimes to finance their dependencies, which ultimately, became 
enslavements.  
278 Patrick, “Former Brentwood Official Admits Embezzling Money, Gambling It Away.”  
279 USDOJ, “Convention Center’s Former Executive Director Sentenced to 24 Months in Prison for 
Embezzlement.” 
280 Collins, “Calif. Politician Pleads Guilty to Misusing Funds.” 
281 Heather Abraham, “Man Accused Of Stealing $700K from WPAHS Appears in Court « CBS 
Pittsburgh,” March 5, 2013, http://pittsburgh.cbslocal.com/2013/03/05/man-accused-of-stealing-700k-
from-wpahs-appears-in-court/. 
282 Spagat, “Ex-San Diego Mayor’s Gambling Wagers Top $1B.” 
283 Lisa Redmond, “Lowell Police Officer Found Guilty of Illegal Gambling, Extortion—Lowell Sun 
Online,” June 20, 2009, http://www.lowellsun.com/ci_12654723. 
284 Amy Taxin, “Ex-fire Captain Pleads Guilty in Gambling Case,” The Washington Times, January 
27, 2014, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/jan/27/ex-firefighter-pleads-guilty-to-illegal-
gambling/. 
285 CBS News, “Pa. School ‘Lunch Ladies’ Allegedly Stole $94K to Gamble.”  
286 Associated Press, “Tulsa Fires Athletic Director over Gambling Probe.”  
287 Fagen, “Twisted Sister in Nun Jail.”  
288 Funk, “Neb. AG: Senator Misused Campaign Cash at Casinos.” 
289 Barry Leibowitz, “Report: TSA Workers Fired for Gambling at Pittsburgh Airport,” CBS News, 
September 23, 2013, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504083_162-57603982-504083/tsa-workers-fired-or-
suspended-for-gambling-ring-at-pittsburgh-airport-report-says/. 
290 Lebowitz, “Ex-FBI Agent Sentenced to Five Years in Prison.” 
291 Christina Jewett, “Judge Who Faces Impeachment Took Cash, Gifts from Lawyers with Pending 
Cases,” ProPublica, September 16, 2009, http://www.propublica.org/article/judge-who-faces-
impeachment-took-cash-gifts-from-lawyers-with-pending-916. 
292 Associated Press, “Retired Colonel Sentenced for Embezzling Millions.”  
293 Schwirtz and Somaiya, “Vice Admiral Is Suspended in Gambling Investigation.”  
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The research has identified specific examples of trusted government insiders with 
access to very sensitive city, county, state, and federal information, and in several 
instances, individuals with access to some of this nation’s most sensitive and classified 
material with addiction as a motivating factor for conducting their illegal activities. The 
nation, and most certainly the homeland security enterprise, depends on trusted 
government officials who have taken an oath to defend the Constitution and uphold the 
laws of the land. When trusted insiders operating freely within a government agency 
compromises their integrity to commit fraud or embezzlement due to an addiction, an 
undue and worrisome level of risk is placed upon the overall safety and security of this 
nation’s cities, counties, and states, as well as potentially damaging the overall security of 
the United States.  
The author suggests that motives should and do matter, especially in the case of 
trusted government officials committing fraud and embezzlement crimes due to the need 
to finance an addiction. This type of behavior is concerning for any organization that 
must contend with an insider threat. However, in reality, this conduct is potentially very 
damaging if government employees with access to sensitive or classified information 
were to become compromised and were selling government secrets, or allow access to 
classified programs or installations, to nefarious actors to maintain an addiction. 
Trusted insiders are the linchpins of homeland security efforts at the local, state, 
and federal levels. The secure and delicate nature of the entire homeland security project 
requires a dedication to patriotism and collective protection antithetical to the self-
focused nature of the addict, either to gambling or pain medication. Homeland security 
positions are unique in their reliance on the trusted insider. Military, law-enforcement, 
fire, health and safety positions are easily defined by their focus on protecting and giving 
to others and require trusted insiders; thus, the homeland security project in general is at 
risk if addiction is spreading into this arena.  
Culturally, and in large measure, members of the military, law-enforcement and 
the first responder community selflessly symbolize by the nature of their service that they 
are trusted and above reproach, which in fact, may contribute to the likelihood that less 
scrutiny on such individuals is less rigorous.  
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As previously cited, Donald Cressey talked about the fraud triangle and the need 
for three things to be present, opportunity, pressure, and rationalization.294 Causality and 
motives matter in understanding why people do what they do when it comes to criminal 
behavior. Law enforcement agencies, as well as state and federal legislators, need to 
become involved to mandate the need to change the way criminal behavior is recorded in 
police reports and investigations. Accurate statistics are critical when it comes to 
reporting crime rates and a myriad of decisions are made regarding community planning, 
hiring, grant award, and research based upon the UCR. However, the law enforcement 
community, academic researcher, or criminologist needs to know and understand what is 
motivating a criminal to act and conduct their illegal activity. Without accurate statistics 
on the causality of crime, organizations may not have a correct assessment on actual 
crime being committed by those insiders who have an addiction when it comes to fraud 
and embezzlement being committed against victim establishments. This inaccuracy is a 
significant gap in the literature and the available reported criminal statistics of law 
enforcement agencies and private sector organizations reporting fraud and embezzlement. 
Calculating the addiction rates for Americans is not an exact science; however, 
research indicates it is a significant cost to society. These statistics are collected in many 
ways by researchers; however, actual police statistics on reported crimes in which 
causality is a discernable item is clearly an area lacking a comprehensive method for 
accurate accounting. The lack of accurate statistics on causality of crimes perpetrated 
because of an addiction is clearly an important measurement that researchers, 
criminologists, and homeland security officials should be able to capture. More 
compelling is the need for these same officials to be able to draw clear conclusions on 
accurate statistics surrounding causes and motives for not only fraud and embezzlement 
cases regarding trusted insiders, but additionally, all criminal acts reported to law 
enforcement. This lack of accurate reporting on causes and motives for criminal behavior 
indicates serious gaps in the overall crime reporting in this country, and a gap analysis 
including the comprehensive examination of motivating causes of crime, to include 
addiction is warranted.  
294 CBS News, “Pa. School ‘Lunch Ladies’ Allegedly Stole $94K to Gamble.”  
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C. FUTURE RESEARCH 
1. U.S. Secret Service 
Initially, future research should begin with the author’s own agency, the USSS. 
As indicated in this thesis, the USSS investigates thousands of financial crimes cases 
each year, and more specifically, investigates hundreds of cases under the category of 
fraud, embezzlement and miss-appropriation, which is most closely aligned to trusted 
insiders committing fraud and embezzlement within organizations.295  
The USSS would be an excellent federal agency to conduct an in-depth case 
review of all its closed fraud, embezzlement, and misappropriation cases investigated in 
the last five years, to determine and document the trusted insiders’ motive or causality of 
the criminal behavior. The USSS could take the lead in research as a federal agency 
under the DHS that has a primary mandate to investigate complex financial crimes cases. 
The USSS could provide a comprehensive analysis of causation and motives for trusted 
insiders committing fraud and embezzlement against organizations. This documentation 
could provide valuable data to researchers on causation of financial crimes cases. This 
information would also provide an opportunity to determine what if any effect addiction 
plays in determining insider’s motive for conducting their illegal activity.  
As the research indicated in the Case Studies section in Chapter III, the fact that in 
a relatively small sampling of four USSS field offices in which 40 closed criminal cases 
were reviewed indicated that in 23 out of 45 instances or 51% of the time, the trusted 
insiders committing the fraud and embezzlement within the victim organization had an 
addiction as their motivating reason for committing the crime. This review may indicate 
an important statistical discovery not currently being documented or analyzed in a proper 
format on a national scope.  
The USSS has demonstrated its capabilities in the past in its unique protective 
mission on how it conducts in-depth research on individuals who have threatened the 
president of the United States and other world leaders. The USSS has an extensive 
295 Management and Organization Division, United States Secret Service Annual Statistical Report—
Fiscal Year 2013. 
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research capability within its National Threat Assessment Center (NTAC).296 The USSS 
should utilize this research capability to identify and track motives and causes for trusted 
insiders committing criminal acts within organizations and provide this data to 
researchers studying this phenomenon.  
2. Kentucky State Police—Expansion of Causes and Motives of Crime 
Reporting 
The KSP is the primary police records retention and reporting agency for the 
Commonwealth of Kentucky. KSP would be an excellent state agency to take on the role 
of requiring its 400 city and county law enforcement agencies to document and record the 
causality and motives of crimes committed in Kentucky. Kentucky is a state known for 
its high levels of addiction to pain prescription medication and methadone drugs.297 
Furthermore, Kentucky would be a useful state to document and study how much 
“addiction” plays a role in the motives or causes of individuals committing crimes.298  
Local police departments and law enforcement agencies in Kentucky should 
require their officers to notate motives and causality of crime on every case when known. 
This information should also be in a retrievable format for statistical data collection for 
accurate reporting purposes. It should also be an important requirement to notate if 
perpetrators of any criminal offense have an addiction as a motivating factor for their 
criminal behavior. 
3. Expansion of the FBI Uniform Crime Report and the National 
Incident-Based Reporting System) 
The FBI and the UCR should require police agencies to report causality. This 
issue may need to be raised with the Department of Justice to seek requirements for 
causation reporting in the NIBRS under the UCR for communities to have a larger 
296 The National Threat Assessment Center is a primary research arm for protective intelligence 
assessments and functions within the Protective Intelligence Division at the USSS. www.SecretService. 
gov. 
297 Stephanie Smith and Nadia Kounang, “Prescription Drugs ‘Orphan’ Children in Eastern 
Kentucky,” CNN, December 3, 2013, http://www.cnn.com/2012/12/14/health/kentucky-overdoses/ 
index.html. 
298 “Drug Abuse 2013 Data for Kentucky.”  
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understanding on reported motives for criminal behavior. This reporting is especially 
important for municipal leaders and planners, the homeland security community, and 
researchers to understand to assess the issue of addiction as it relates to crime accurately.  
Researchers in many cases are left with general statistics for the reporting of 
crime and crime statistics from the UCR; they know what crimes are being reported and 
the amount of crime reported, but for all practical purposes, do not know the cause or 
motive of the criminal committing the crime. Again, motives should and do matter when 
it comes to understanding why the actor committing the crime being reported is doing it, 
especially in cases of fraud and embezzlement in which trusted insiders of organizations 
are committing criminal offenses. 
4. Training and Awareness for Private, Non-Profit, and Government 
Sector Agencies on Recognizing Insider Threats to Organizations 
Concerning Fraud and Embezzlement 
Excellent programs are available to organizations for training and education on 
the insider threat. A number of programs exist concerning “best practices” that 
organizations of all sizes should adhere to and incorporate as a part of their internal 
security policies and procedures regarding potential insider compromises. CERT at 
Carnegie Mellon University, PERSEREC, the DOD, the Defense Security Service, the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the U.S. Secret Service Electronic Crimes Task Forces, 
Deloitte, Lockheed Martin, and many other government, non-profit, and private sector 
organizations have resources available for any size sector entity to draw from in 
formulating a security plan surrounding the insider threat.  
People are an organization’s greatest asset and most critical vulnerability. The key 
is recognizing that all organizations must consider the very real challenge of defending 
against the insider threat. Prevention, detection, and mitigation strategies are paramount 
for any organization to have in place before the insider attack occurs. Establishments 
must also take a proactive approach in understanding that addiction and addiction related 
behavior might be a contributing factor to insider threats posed against an organization. 
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D. CONCLUSION 
The DOD defines risk as follows: 
Risk is the probability of loss or damage. Risk management is a function 
of three variables: criticality, vulnerability and threat. The first element is 
criticality; how important is this asset to the mission or organization? The 
second element is vulnerability; in what ways can the asset be 
compromised, exploited, damaged or destroyed? The third element is 
threat; who intends to exploit vulnerability, against what, and what 
capabilities do they possess to do so? Risk occurs at the intersection of 
criticality, vulnerability and threat.299 
Insider threats to organizations will continue to occur within organizations for the 
foreseeable future and need to be calculated in assessing risk. All organizations are 
vulnerable to the trusted insider who has authority and access to operate safely within its 
boundaries. Law enforcement agencies will continue to investigate and prosecute these 
crimes, and it is important for line officers and investigators to identify, document, and 
report possible causes and motives for the insider’s illegal activity, especially if addiction 
is a primary cause or motive. 
A problematic issue with those individuals who have an addiction, and are 
conducting fraud and embezzlement within organizations, is they are committing their 
crimes to finance the addiction, and generally not to enrich themselves. This viewpoint is 
challenging in the sense that an addict will sacrifice anything to continue the addiction, 
which potentially places the trusted insiders in a situation in which they may compromise 
the entire organization. In some instances, this breach of trust could lead to 
compromising national security secrets if a nefarious outside government or organization 
was able to leverage the insiders to provide information for payments to continue their 
addiction.  
In this thesis, the author has endeavored to capitalize on his extensive experience 
in investigating and managing complex financial crimes cases, especially in the area of 
fraud and embezzlement committed by “trusted insiders” against private, non-profit, and 
299 Final Report of the Insider Threat Integrated Process Team, Office of the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence), 7–8. 
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public sector organizations for well over a quarter century. He has identified a threat to 
homeland security by identifying the larger threat to all organizations from trusted 
insiders committing these crimes due to addiction as a primary cause and motivating 
factor for their illegal behavior. He has highlighted the need for law-enforcement 
agencies to report causes and motives in their criminal reporting, and for a more complete 
analysis of trusted insiders conducting financial crimes against organizations. 
Additionally, he has noted the fact that the UCR and the NIBRS do not require capturing 
causation and motive in their reporting of Schedule 2 crimes, which encompass fraud and 
embezzlement cases most closely connected with trusted insiders committing financial 
crimes against organizations while making the case that this information should be 
captured. He has further strived to make a compelling argument for the need for law 
enforcement agencies to be required to report motives and causes of all criminal offenses 
in the UCR and NIBRS. The increased reporting of causation or motives will allow for a 
more accurate picture of addictive related behaviors and allow for an increased 
knowledge base of the threat that insiders may pose to an organization’s vulnerabilities 
due to an addiction.  
The ultimate goal of this thesis was to answer the author’s research question and 
he is able to definitively conclude, “trusted insiders” are committing fraud and 
embezzlement within all organizational sectors, and a connection to addiction does exist, 
as a motivating factor for their illegal behavior.  
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